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ABSTRACT
In the 1970s, interacting political and military decisions by
China, the Soviet Union, and the United States probably will dominate
world politics much as have interacting Soviet and American decisions
since World War II. What are the dynamics of superpower interaction?
How much is it dependent on nuclear weapons systems? What does a "tri-
angle" of nuclear superpowers portend for world peace and security?
To obtain tentative answers to these questions, this inquiry
is based on two premises: first, that as any nation's technology and
weapons systems change, so do its attitudes, foreign policies, and tac-
tics. Second, that trends in Soviet-American interaction over the past
twenty-five nuclear years can be discerned.
The trends in Soviet-American interaction are used as a basis
of comparison for Chinese interaction with the United States and the
Soviet Union. Although China's debut as a nuclear power is recent, the
analysis attempts to locate preliminary evidence that could support a
view that Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-U.S. behavior as China's nuclear
arsenal increases might begin to parallel the trends previously discerned.
Soviet-American interaction is treated briefly on the assumption
that it is well understood. Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interactions
since 1964 are subjected to detailed analysis in two lengthy case studies.
An analog has been developed for the case study analysis and is employed
to structure the interactions and view them from several perspectives.
Evidence from the case studies indicates that the superpowers
may be able to avoid an apocalyptic nuclear exchange, given a persistent
measure of prudence, reflection, and restraint. But the contending nature
of their goals and the varying tactics used to achieve them indicates that
continuing dispute and occasional conflict, probably by proxy forces, is
likely.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: Lincoln P. Bloomfield
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An Analysis of Superpower Political-Military Interaction
Introduction
By 1971 it was being asked with increasing frequency whether a
world theretofore dominated by two giant nations would have to face the
less certain and thus more fearful prospect of three competitive super-
powers. In popular phraseology, the question was whether an "interna-
tional political triangle" had come into existence.
The "triangularists," in asserting their view, had to overcome
a somewhat entrenched acceptance of the bipolar model of the internation-
al system. Moreover, a strong case could be made that China, the prospec-
tive third superpower, was not only far from achieving a stature equiva-
lent to that of the two superpowers but that the gap between them was
widening, not narrowing. Neither of these obstacles seemed to deter the
"triangularists" from their view.
A bipolar system was in any event more a theoretical expression
than a true description of the world political scene. The innovator who
had theorized the bipolar systemic model initially had differentiated
loose and tight bipolar systems, and prior to China's first nuclear det-
onation in 1964, it had been predicted that in the next ten years
...the system of polarization of
power will cease to be recognizable; that
other states will count for so much in
I'lorton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics
,
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957, pp. 36-43. The "loose bipolar sys-

world politics that the two present great
powers will find it difficult, even when
cooperating, to dominate them.
2
Following the Chinese nuclear detonation, one international relations
3
theorist spoke of a bi-multipolar system. Not long thereafter it be-
came possible to find direct scholarly reference to a U. S . -Soviet-Chi-
4
nese triangle. As China continued to test more powerful nuclear wea-
pons and as the Sino-Soviet dispute became less esoteric and more mili-
tarily dangerous, discussion of the political triangle became common-
place. The outbreak of major violence along the Sino-Soviet border in
1969 triggered a flood of commentary in the popular press concerning the
triangle as well as additional scholarly effort on the subject.
tern" model accomodates other than national actors, such as multinational
blocs or supranational bodies.
2
Hedley Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems: A Preliminary Essay,"
(prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations meeting of November 20,
1963, p. 21), quoted in Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity
,
and the Future," The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 10, No. 3






The best and most comprehensive early scholarly triangular an-
alyses known to the author are in Morton H. Halperin, (ed.), Sino-Soviet
Relations and Arms Control , Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, which also
contains, as an appe.nd.i-x.., a. three-person game theoretic analysis by Bern-
hardt Lieberman, "The S'ino—Servlejt. Pair: Coalition Behavior from 1921 to
1965."
See, for example, The New York Times
,
October 12, 1969 and
January 5, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor , April 15, September 15,




October 12 and November 6, 1969; and The Ob server
(London), January 11, 1970.
See, for example, Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia
and China
,
New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969; John Paton Davies, "The

Needless to say, additional discussion accomplished little in
the way of agreement or consensus that a triangular configuration indeed
had become dominant in world politics. For some, the world would con-
tinue indefinitely to be bipolar, or, in the lexicon of communist theo-
rists, divided into two camps. For others, the world power configura-
U.S. Invented the Imbalance of Power," The New York Times Magazine
,
De-
cember 7, 1969, pp. 50 f f
.
; Sir Robert Scott, "China, Russia, and the U-
nited States—A British View," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 48, No. 2 (January,
1970), pp. 334-43; A. Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Poli-
cy," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 48, No. 3 (April, 1970), pp. 427-42; and two
articles by Harry G. Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on Strategic
Deterrence," Orbis , Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1969), pp. 407-34, and "Stra-
tegic Arms Limitations and the Sino-Soviet Relationship," Asian Survey
,
Vol. 10, No. 4 (June, 1970), pp. 265-89. Additionally, the volume by A.
Doak Barnett and Edwin 0. Reischauer, The United States and China—The
Next Decade
,
New York: Praeger, 1970, the report of a March 1969 confer-
ence sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations,
includes specific references to the triangular situation or multipolarity
by conference participants Lincoln P. Bloomfield (p. 55), Allen S. whiting
(pp. 85-86), and Kenneth T. Young (p. 166), Klaus Mehnert (p. 173), and
John K. Fairbank (p. 199). Theodore C. Sorenson, Harrison E. Salisbury,
and a few others address the matter of concurrent U.S. policy toward the
U.S.S.R. and China without referring to triangularity or multipolarity.
A more recent valuable analysis is Michel Tatu, The Great Power Triangle
,
Atlantic Paper No. 3, London: The Atlantic Institute, 1971. This was re-
printed in four parts in The Times (London), January 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1971.
For at least one communist theoretician, the conception of an
international political triangle discussed in the Western press was an
imperialist plot to intensify distrust between the two great socialist
powers, the Soviet Union, and China* I. Vasilev, "The Global Strategy of
U.S. and Sino-Soviet Relations," Rude Pravo (Prague), September 23, 1970.
Vasilev is a prominent orientalist.

tion was more than triangular. To the rectangular or pentagonal school,
8 9
Tokyo and perhaps New Delhi were equally as important as Peking in
world politics now or in the future.
A pragmatic view, however, emphasized that China did possess
certain characteristics of a world superpower: a growing nuclear capa-
bility; the world's largest and, in many ways, one of the most talented
populations; a great land area of strategic value due to size and loca-
tion as well as resources; and perhaps most importantly, a memory of
past power, a drive to reassert international leadership, and a preten-
sion to greatness. China certainly trailed Japan economically and
technologically, but the situation was reversed in most other measures.
The reversal was probably most important in two vital and overlapping
characteristics: nuclear capability and pretension to greatness.
Thus while a Japanese economic giant might prove to be an in-
ternational problem in the future, the pragmatic view found nuclear-
armed China to be a current international problem. This perception was
greatly intensified by the fact that Japan's most important recent in-
ternational interactions were cooperative while China's most important
o
He rman Kahn , The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and
Response
,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970; Kazuo Murakamy,
On the American-Soviet-Chinese Triangular Power Relations and Japan's
Role in Asia in the 1970s
,
Cambridge: Harvard University Center for In-
ternational Affairs, mimeographed, March, 1970.
9
Raymond Aron , Peace and War, A Theory of International Rela-
tions
,
New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 319.

recent international interactions have been conflictive.
In fact, until China developed a nuclear weapons capability,
a broadened study of conflictive relationships between nuclear-armed
states has not been possible. Both Britain and France have accommodated
their nuclear capabilities to those of the United States. British-U.S.
and French-U.S. interaction has been argumentative on numerous occasions,
but never militarily conflictive. Meanwhile both Britain and France have
assumed supporting rather than initiatory roles in Western conflicts with
the Soviet Union. Thus U.S. -Soviet conflict or confrontation can be an-
alysed directly but British-Soviet or French-Soviet interaction has been
impossible to isolate from the U.S. -Soviet patterns.
China, then, whether or not classed positively as a superpower
and whether or not considered a member of a "superpower triangle," can be
fairly thought of as a nuclear-armed "star" on the current international
stage whose future role, for better or worse, will have profound effects
on mankind.
China always has been a riddle wrapped in an enigma, particu-
larly to the occidental observer. The unification of China and the ex-
pulsion of foreign interests from the mainland by the Chinese Communist
Party has done little to alleviate the mystery, and may have had an oppo-
site effect. The inherent difficulty in fathoming the societal complex-
ities of China, however, in no way detracts from the necessity to enhance
our understanding of Chinese actions in the international arena. Espe-
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cially important is an understanding of the evolution of Chinese con-
duct in those conflict situations involving the coordinated use of poli-
tical and military measures that are edged with a threat of nuclear war-
fare.
Although much has been written about modern Chinese strategy,
a large part of the work has been extrapolated from the philosophical
writings of Mao Tse-tung or based on Chinese military activity in the
pre-nuclear stage of Chinese development. Certainly these works are
valuable in their own right; they definitely are of value to this inqui-
ry, which will draw heavily on them. But the passage of time since
Peking acquired nuclear weapons, although covering a mere six-year span,
provides a new opportunity for an analysis of a nuclear China interacting
with other nuclear powers in world affairs. This thesis has been de-
signed to exploit the opportunity.
Among the better literature: A. Doak Barnett, Communist Chi-
na and Asia
,
New York: Harper, 1960; (ed.) Communist
Strategies in Asia
,
New York: Praeger, 1963; Alastair Buchan, (ed.), Chi-
na and the Peace of Asia , New York: Praeger, 1965; Vantin Chu, Ta Ta ,
Tan Tan, "Fight, Fight, Talk, Talk," New York: W.W. Norton, 1963; Morton
H. Halperin, China and the Bomb , New York: Praeger, 1965; and, with D.H.
Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control
,
Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1965: Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nu-
clear Era
,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962; Samuel B. Grif-
fith, II, "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," For-
eign Affairs
,
Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 1964), pp. 669-74; D.E. Kennedy,
The Security of Southern Asia , New York: Praeger, 1965; Stuart R. Schram,
"The Military Deviation of Mao Tse-tung," Problems of Communism, Vol. 13,
No. 1 (January-February, 1964), pp. 49-56; and Charles W. Thayer, Guer-
rilla
,




China is perhaps best described as an embryonic nuclear super-
power. The initial modifier is especially fitting because it indicates
growth in progress as well as the prospect of future growth. In fact,
due to the growth phenomenon, there is a distinct possibility that faint
patterns, or the beginning of new and special trends, of conduct can be
discerned in Chinese foreign relations since 1964, when Peking acquired
a nuclear capability.
A major problem, however, is to define a method through which
it will be possible, first, to isolate or define, and, then, to measure
and compare patterns of Chinese behavior vis a vis those of the Soviet
Union and the United States.
Fortunately, there seems to be at least one solution to this
problem. It is based on two premises. The first, which is almost a
truism, is that as a nation's technology and weapons systems change, so
do its attitudes and its foreign policies, as well as the tactics which
it employs to try to achieve its goals. Following from this is the sec-
ond premise, that a set of trends or patterns in Soviet-American inter-
action over the twenty-five years of the nuclear era can be discerned.
These trends or patterns can provide at least the beginnings of a basis
of measurement and comparison for subsequent Chinese interaction with one
or both senior superpowers. Case studies of Chinese interaction with the
United States and the Soviet Union will be necessary to isolate or define
the specific patterns of Chinese behavior. Simultaneously, they will
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highlight whether Soviet or U.S. behavior toward China has shown dif-
ferent characteristics than their behavior toward each other.
Specifically, the plan of this thesis is as follows: an over-
view of United States-Soviet politico-military interaction during the
nuclear era will be presented in Chapter 1. Patterns or trends in the
interaction will be highlighted with a view toward generalizing them
to an interaction between any pair of nuclear-armed nation states.
In Chapter 2 I will derive four hypotheses on superpower po-
litico-military interaction from the trends and patterns observed in
Chapter 1. In view of the complexity of the subject with which they deal,
it will be necessary to impose several caveats on the hypotheses. Fur-
ther, the right to amend or add to them will be reserved.
Before examining Chinese international behavior it will be
necessary to review the development of the Chinese nuclear capability
during the past decade, and to estimate China's current nuclear posture.
This will be briefly accomplished in Chapter 3.
Case studies of Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interaction
will be developed in the succeeding two chapters. As noted above, Chi-
na's interaction with the superpowers since Peking began to manage nu-
clear weaponry has beerr essentially conflictive. Peking has repeatedly
alleged that the Soviet Union and the United States, while contending
with each other for supremacy in the world, are nevertheless colluding
with each other by any and all means, including the use of force, to pre-
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vent China from achieving due prominence. The Chinese leadership in
fact has regularly predicted attacks by either or both of the two super-
powers since 1964 and has prepared to counter them. Chinese forces have
engaged in combat with U.S. and Soviet forces. Chapter 4 will examine in
detail the Chinese-U.S. politico-military interaction in the period 1964-
1968, when Peking may have diagnosed Washington to be the major threat to
China. Chapter 5 will examine in detail the Sino-Soviet politico-mili-
tary interaction in the period 1968-1970, when Peking probably diagnosed
Moscow as the major threat to China.
The topical presentation of these lengthy chapters is based on
a view that interstate political-military interaction is analogous to
the message traffic in a large, three-stranded telegraph cable connecting
two participants. (In the international sense there also would be poli-
tical-economic and cultural cables.) The "insulation" of the politico-
military interaction cable may be removed and the message traffic in each
strand examined separately. One strand is the pathway for the record of
superpower military engagement . Another strand is the route in which the
political dialogue between the two powers is transmitted. The third
strand, which may be thought of as a "tap" on superpower interaction ca-
One of hundreds of Chinese statements to this effect car-
ried an especially picturesque title: "Anti- Imperialist Warrior [the
Soviet Union-W.P.] Reduced to Size: Puny Clown Toadying to Imperialism,"
Peking Review
,
No. 27, July 4, 1969, p. 33.
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bles to another superpower or to a lesser third power, Is the channel
containing what may be described as the tacit exchange between the two
powers.
Each of the three strands consists of several "filaments."
The military engagement strand has two filaments, conventional and nu-
clear; the political dialogue strand has three filaments, irregular,
political, and diplomatic; and the tacit exchange strand has a complete
set of filaments corresponding to the main cable.
But the interstate political-military interaction cable is
most unusual. The strands and filaments of this interaction cable car-
ry signals (read messages or events) of varying frequency and intensity.
The cable is not shielded. Signals can be lost or drowned out. More-
over, there often is considerable inductance or "cross-talk" from one
strand to another. Hence there can be no assurance that the recipient
of a signal in fact has perceived exactly what was transmitted. The
probability is always finite that a response to a given stimulus, or re-
ply to a given query, in the cable will be unintended or anti-intended.
Use of the analog adds complexity to the case studies in the
sense that the events in each strand and filament of interaction are
chronologically treated. The disadvantages of this complexity seem to
be substantially outweighed by the gains accruing from ordering an other-
wise amorphous mass of information. As Chapters A and 5 proceed, sub-




In Chapter 6 the evidence from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will be
weighed to determine whether it tends to support the hypotheses on su-
perpower interaction advanced in Chapter 2. There may be a better than
even chance that one or more of the hypotheses will not be supported.
Should this occur, possible explanations will be offered. Insofar as
this analytical procedure is self-correcting, revisions to the initial
hypotheses, and new hypotheses, will be advanced. Since the case stud-
ies may generate information applicable to other than hypothesized is-
sues, Chapter 6 will conclude with comment on the further issues raised
by the inquiry.
A Note on Source Material
A research design which emphasizes international events since
1964 is heavily dependent on newspaper reports, magazine articles, and,
in some cases, radio broadcasts, All of these sources have been readily
available. Not only Western publications in English, French, and German
but Soviet and Chinese publications in English as well as English trans-
lations of Russian and Chinese language publications have been used to
develop Chapters 4 and 5.
However, Chapter 1, concerning the record of the Soviet Union
and the United States in the first quarter-century of the nuclear era,
necessarily must be treated on a gross scale in the interests of brevity
and conservation of research time. It will be assumed that much of the
record is fairly well known, and the argument therein will be based
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largely on secondary sources. This holds true, to a certain extent, for
the exposition on Chinese nuclear development in Chapter 3. An effort
has been made to select authoritative and unbiased secondary sources for
these chapters.
The Level of Analysis
This plan of approach for an analysis of superpower interac-
tion implicitly indicates that the discussion will be concentrated on
the nation-state level of activity. To be explicit about the level of
analysis, however, it must be stipulated that the concentration on na-
tion-states as actors will not be taken so seriously as to proscribe
discussion of internal characteristics or processes when this is deemed
relevant to the understanding of a particular episode. Certainly there
will be instances when the importance of a domestic decision process in
China or the U.S.S.R. will be critical to the narrative, but where in-
formation on the subject has not yet been made available. In these
cases, expert opinion will be relied on insofar as possible. Emphasis,
then, is on the nation-state level of analysis. Important incidental
reference will be made to internal events. And, as the opening commen-
tary has indicated, the phenomenon of an emergent third superpower has
important ramifications for the international systemic level of analysis.
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Remarks on the Title
Although this research design examines developments in Chi-
nese politico-military interaction with each of the two superpowers in
turn, the inquiry nevertheless is founded on the record of interaction
of those first two superpowers. Thus, the total analysis should im-
prove our understanding of superpower interaction on a universalistic
as well as an individualistic (e.g., Chinese policy-making) basis, and
it is entitled accordingly.
However, the broad scope of the title in fact has been limited
in part. That is, by specifying political-military interaction, more
than incidental interest in cultural and economic interactions has been
automatically ruled out. For an economic determinist, of course, this
approach is entirely unacceptable. For the researcher in politics whose
problem is exceedingly large at the outset, such initial delimitation is
essential.
By including the political-military interaction of superpowers,
be they mature or embryonic, and excluding, for all practical purposes,
cultural and economic interactions in order to emphasize the political
aspects, the title reflects this author's intent to keep alive the issue
of triangularity. Hopefully, the analysis which follows will help the
interested reader to draw an opinion of his own as to whether or not
world politics in the 1970s may fairly be described by the systemic con-




Superpower Interaction—The U.S. -Soviet Example
Introduction
Persons closely involved in an important sequence of events
easily can fail to note meaningful trends. Caught up in battling the
action of wind and wave in a series of local storms, they may not dis-
cern the imperceptible but strong relentless movement of a main current
carrying them toward the rocks and shoals of a forbidding coastline.
For instance, the military aviator of either the Soviet Union
or the United States who has served since the late 1940s has exper-
ienced a succession of dangerous crises as a function of the Cold War.
He is not positive how this conflict originated. Few are. But he does
know that each new crisis found him strapping an increasingly heavier,
more sophisticated, powerful and deadly airframe around his flight suit
which, shortly thereafter, would hurtle him into the air to engage an
equally improved man-machine team sent by the opponent. Concerned with
the immediate, he cared little about the significance of the trend: each
time he was sent into a crisis situation, he wielded much greater de-
structive potential.
There have been several meaningful interpretations of the ori-
gins of the Cold War, as follows: the Cold War resulted from the world
view and objectives of International Communism (Charles Burton Marshall,
The Cold War: A Concise History
,
New York: Franklin Watts, 1965); the
idiosyncracies of Stalin personally (Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold
War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); the errors and intransi-
gence of U.S. policy (D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, Lon-
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Once removed from the action by time, distance, or degree of
involvement, however, the same participant often is able to see the ef-
fects of imperceptible but relentless currents, the significance of al-
ways increasing sophistication and destructive potential.
This image suggests that the U.S. -Soviet Cold War interaction
can be typified in at least three important trends. The aviator's ex-
perience alludes to a most obvious main trend, commonly termed the "arms
race." But there is also a noticeable contradictory trend that is sig-
nified by the phrases "arms control" or "arms limitation." The arms
control trend primarily is expressed in the record of specialized di-
plomacy between the two superpowers , diplomacy undertaken for the pur-
pose of improving security through limiting the growth of destructive
power. As the arms race has proceeded through the Cold War years, it
has been accompanied by an arms control dialogue.
There is a third, less noticeable trend in superpower interac-
tion that can best be described by the phrases "crisis control" or "cri-
sis limitation." This type of interaction is denoted by a continuing
series of superpower diplomatic or military moves designed to defuse
imminent crises. The purpose is to avoid not only the possibility of
nuclear confrontation but incidents involving the engagement of conven-
tional forces which might escalate to a nuclear exchange.
don: Allen and Unwin, 1961, Gar Alperowitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima
and Potsdam
,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); or the unpurposeful,
undesigned but tragic interplay of tremendous forces led by mortals all
too prone to great folly (Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, New
York: Harper and Row, 1967).
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These three trends will be outlined briefly in this chapter
as a basis for further analysis.
2
The Arms Race Trend
Willingness to expend large amounts of energy and treasure in
pursuit of national security is a major characteristic of both the Uni-
ted States and the Soviet Union. Over the quarter century of the nuclear
era they regularly have expended about ten percent of their gross nation-
al product per annum on their respective national military establish-
3
ments. This search for security has received high societal priority to
the extent, now realized more clearly, that other pressing social prob-
lems have been neglected. Nonetheless, much higher proportions of re-
sources could have been devoted to defense purposes. In this sense what
has become known as an "arms race" in fact may have been an "arms creep."
2
I have found the following books of great value in preparing
this and the following sections of this chapter: Jeremy Stone, Contain-
ing the Arms Race
,
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966; Herbert York, Race to
Oblivion
,
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970; Chalmers M. Roberts, The
Nuclear Years
,
The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-19 70 , New York:
Praeger, 1970; George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-
Five Years
,
New York: Dunellen, 1970.
3
In 1969 the estimated "out-turn" of the United States defense
expenditure was $79,774 billion, or 8.6% of the GNP. Soviet expenditures
were estimated at $39,333 billion, or 8.5% of the Soviet GNP. Only Israel
(25.1%) and the prominent opposing Arab states (10-14.7%), Laos (11%), and
North (21.3) and South Vietnam (13.6%) expended proportionally higher a-




The phrase "arms creep" is William W. Kaufmann's. Others have
referred to an "arms walk."
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Total possible expenditures, particularly in the United States, could
have far exceeded total actual expenditures.
The "arms race" or "arms creep" proceeds on two levels, the
nuclear or strategic force level, and the non-nuclear, conventional, or
general purpose force level. In this discussion accent will be placed
on the strategic arms race, but it must be recognized that the super-
powers also have engaged in a conventional arms race that may be equally
dangerous. Superpower-produced conventional weapons systems are de-
ployed over wide geographic areas by the superpowers themselves, as well
as dispersed to nations throughout the world in grants or sales. It
follows that these procedures significantly raise the chances for mili-
tary engagements that could escalate to the nuclear level.
There is a general consensus on the driving power behind an
arms race. The race can be characterized in a number of ways, including
mathematical analogs, but it is perhaps most easily described as a dy-
There is also an in-between level of the so-called "tactical"
nuclear weapon which can be delivered by general purpose force weapons
systems.
The U.S. is the world's largest arms supplier; the U.S.S.R. Is
second. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, S. I.P . R. I.
Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70 , New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1970. The S.I. P. R.I. statement was summarized in The New
York Times
,
November 2, 1970. The most detailed study of the transfer
process for conventional weapons systems has been done by the M.I.T. Cen-
ter for International Studies Arms Control Project directed by Prof. Lin-
coln P. Bloomfield. See Amelia C. Leiss, with Geoffrey Kemp et. al.
,
Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries
, Cambridge: Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology/Center for International Studies, C/70-1, February,
1970, and associated annexes.




namic action-reaction sequence propelled by fear and accelerated by mis-
perception, misestimation, and acceptance of "worst-case analysis." In-
ternational distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States, ex-
emplified by obsessions with secrecy and deliberate programs of decep-
tion, has continued to be so great that if a newly designed weapons sys-
tem exhibited any potential for performing, the designing nation would
9produce and deploy it before the opponent nation was able to do so.
The fact that many weapons systems have been deployed by the two super-
powers during the last twenty-five years before their operational feasi-
bility was firmly established is the strength of the technological de-
. .
10termmism argument.
When the Soviet Union initially deployed an ABM system in
1965, its performance unquestionally was not up to the claims made for
it by Chairman Khrushchev and Soviet Air Defense Command (Protivovozdush-
of Deadly Quarrels
,
London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960. Also see more
recent work by Paul Smoker, including "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathema-
tical Study," Journal of Peace Research , Vol. 1 (1964) pp. 55-63. Samuel
P. Huntington distinguished qualitative from quantitative and abortive
from sustained arms races in the classic essay "Arms Races: Prerequisites
and Results," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, (eds.), Public
Policy
,
Cambridge: Harvard University Graduate School of Public Adminis-
tration, 1958, pp. 41-86.
o





, pp. 31, 40, 84, 237-39; also see Ralph E.
Lapp, The Weapons Culture
, New York: W.W. Norton, 1968, p. 12.
Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisi-
tions Process; An Economic Analysis . Boston: Harvard U. Graduate School
of Business, Division of Research, 1962, Chapters 2 and 11; Quester,
op. cit . , pp. 76-83.
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naya Oberona—PVO) generals. Yet that deployment triggered a U.S. de-
cision to proceed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
(MIRV) development and deployment. U.S. MIRVs caused a Soviet response
in kind, which then provided additional impetus for a U.S. decision to
12deploy ABMs.
Moscow and Washington have perpetually doubted each other's in-
tentions. They have conducted a long Alphonse and Gaston scenario, each
unwilling to take the first step away from hostility for fear of decep-
tion by the other. Only recently the Kremlin concluded that Washington,
while talking of limiting strategic arms, was in fact expanding the U.S.
nuclear arsenal:
...the criterion of "sufficiency"
officially incorporated in the basis of
the arms race policy scarcely differs
1
„
from the former criterion of "supremacy."
The penultimate tragedy in the dynamic action-reaction sequence is that
even when one participant in the arms race realizes that the intelligence
estimates on the opponent's deployment decisions were in error, or that
his distrust was mistaken, it is often too late, for a variety of reasons,
to completely halt or reverse his response. There have been occasional
Soviet ABM claims have been analysed by John Erickson in an
article "'The Fly in Outer Space': The Soviet Union and the Anti-Ballis-
tic Missile," The World Today
, March, 1967, pp. 106-14. Also see Cle-
mens, op. cit
., pp. 176-90, 290-91.
12
York, op. cit.
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instances, in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., when governments have
acted to limit production and deployment of aircraft or missiles when
it was determined that the opponent was acting contrary to expectations.
A complete halt or reversal of a program has been practically unknown,
however, except when the program was obviously redundant.
Therefore, the arms race dynamic has caused each superpower to
produce, deploy, or stockpile nuclear destructive potential almost be-
yond the grasp of human imagination. From two U.S. atomic bombs in 1945,
the combined nuclear arsenals of the superpowers have grown by leaps and
bounds. By 1960 the world nuclear stockpile was estimated at some 30,000
megatons. There were some 10,000 warheads, including thousands of hydro-
gen bombs, in the U.S. stockpile alone at that time. The U.S. and the
Soviet Union each had achieved a multiple "overkill" capacity. In the
decade of the 1950s the expected yield of nuclear weapons changed a
thousand-fold while the means of delivery, sub-sonic aircraft, changed
little. Nevertheless, the number of people "at risk" in areas targeted
14
by the U.S. alone changed from a few million to a few hundred million.
the press March 11, 19 70, pp. 3-8. (The journal is published by the in-
fluential Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. [the "Arbatov"
Institute]). Not to discount Washington's sincerity in seeking to limit
strategic arms, it is nevertheless evident that the Kremlin assessment








Nonetheless, superpowers continued to develop their strategic
forces. Weapons became more sophisticated and smaller, suitable for
ICBM delivery, while yield changed little. But the numbers of missile
systems grew rapidly to giant proportions. During the decade 1969-
1970, the speed of the delivery systems increased thirty-fold, but as the
weapon yields changed little, the number of persons "at risk" stayed a-
bout the same.
At the outset of the 1970s, it seemed as though an ABM-MIRV
round in the arms race would increase numbers of warheads to astronomic
heights. Persons directly "at risk" would increase tremendously even
though the extra warheads ostensibly were necessary to insure penetra-
tion of enemy defenses of counterforce targets. In a world which al-
ready had nuclear stockpiles sufficiently large to allocate fifteen tons
of TNT to every human being, superpowers continued to increase their




p. 133, presents a graph of the U.S. mis-
sile growth picture from FY 1963 through FY 1967, during which the U.S.
ICBM/SLBH delivery capability grew from about 320 to about 1640 vehicles.
Also see S.I. P. R.I. Yearbook , op . cit .
,
p. 41, and Quester, op. c it
. , pp.
293-96, for graphs comparing the growth of U.S. and Soviet strategic mis-
sile forces from 1959 to date. Quester's presentation also portrays
the record of comparative defense expenditures, effective ground forces,
and atomic-capable bomber aircraft.
I c.
York, op. cit
. , pp. 47-48.







Number of Separately Targetable
Strategic Warheads^S
BEFORE MIRV AFTER MIRV
By the U.S. 3854 (14.5)* 10,264 (40)
By the U.S.S.R. 2155 (7.5) 6,295 (26)
"'Brackets inclose a numerical expression of units of overkill.
Available evidence seemed to indicate that this expected growth probably
would occur. Washington was seriously concerned over continued Soviet
19deployment of an especially high-payload ICBM, which might be MIRVed.
On the other hand, Moscow certainly analysed U.S. MIRV plans as highly
threatening, for MIRVs completely restructure the mathematics of a nu-
clear exchange. A U.S. decision to produce a prototype of a new-genera-
tion bomber, the B-l, and serious consideration of an advanced SLBM
system, the ULMS, aggravated Moscow's concern.
Both superpowers were aware of the implications in the contin-
uing improvement in ICBM guidance. Accuracy seemed to be increasing by
a factor of two every four years in U.S. missilry; Soviet improvements
were slower but perhaps not far behind. Even the most sophisticated
"hardening" of a land-based ICBM silo would not protect the missile if an
incoming warhead detonated within an eighth of a mile. Both superpowers
18
Table derived from a graph presented in G.W. Rathjens and
G.B. Kiskiatowsky , "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," Scientific Ameri-
can
,
Vol. 222, No. 1 (January, 1970), p. 22.
19Both the President and the Secretary of Defense spoke on
this matter, the latter repeatedly. See The New York Times, April 28,
1970, for presidential remarks, and June 10, July 10, and October 10,
1970 for typical SecDef statements.
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feared the prospect of unexpected technological advances in anti-bal-
20 21
listic missile systems or anti-submarine warfare systems '" by the other
that would wreck their deterrent posture. Looming in the not distant fu-
ture was a dread possibility that either or both superpowers would sus-
pect that the other had achieved a capability for a first strike that
could eliminate opponent land-based ICBMs and bombers. In the first
strike case, the only way to save the targeted ICBMs would be to launch
them automatically upon receipt of warning of an inbound attack. "Launch
22
on Warning" holds an inherent danger of acting in error, " with cata-
clysmic results unless some sort of disarming or destruct mechanism, with
failsafe communications, was incorporated in the "Launch on Warning" mis-
siles.
By 1971 it was difficult to avoid a conclusion that resources
allocated to security had not purchased a commensurate sense of safety
and well-being. It might be said that after a quarter century of arms
purchases, often to the detriment of other valid national priorities, the
superpowers had become less secure than before.
Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated weapons systems demanded
20
The Soviet Union was reported to have invented an "asphalt
cloud" ABM system. Time
,
October 12, 1970, p. 33.
21
The New York Times, June 16, 1969, an account of a letter
from Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover to Senator Henry M. Jackson.
22
"Launch on Warning" is the bete noire of, among others, Her-
bert York, and is the reason for the title of his book Race to Oblivion ,






such substantial investments that there was real concern over their
23
rationality and validity.
Under these circumstances, the superpowers began to place in-
creasing emphasis on the negotiation of agreements designed at least to
limit the arms race and, at best, reverse it.
The Arms Control Trend
Since the superpower arms race has proceeded on nuclear and
conventional levels, it might be expected that arms control trends would
be found on two similar levels. To a degree this is true. However, pro-
ductive arms control measures have been comparatively more numerous and
more significant on the nuclear level than the conventional level. Prior-
ity on controlling the employment of a weapon has seemed to vary directly
24
with its sophistication, cost, and destructive power. Great emphasis
has been placed on limiting nuclear systems, while the main effort on
limiting non-nuclear systems has been concentrated in the chemical and
23Governmental concern over the sky-rocketing costs of weapons
systems has been frequently expressed in both Moscow and Washington dur-
ing recent years. For the Soviet viewpoint, see Col. Yu. Vlasyevich,
"On The Laws Governing the Dynamics of Military-Economic Costs," Kom-
munist Vooruzhennykh sil
,
No. 16, August, 1970, pp. 16-22, reprinted in
The Current Digest of the Soviet Pres s (CDSP) , Vol. 22, No. 44, pp. 6-7.
The article uses U.S. data.
24
Probably because numbers of unsophisticated conventional wea-
pons systems produced are so great and their production sources and dis-
tribution channels are so diffuse as to render control, in the sense of
formal international agreements and machinery, out of the question.
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biological warfare area. The following discussion is addressed to the
nuclear-level arms control effort of the superpowers.
It also should be noted that tacit, or informal, as well as
25
overt, formal arms limitation arrangements are theoretically possible.
It is probable that tacit understandings on armaments occasionally have
occurred between the superpowers. But tracing tacit developments is dif-
ficult and, since tacit understandings may in the end be followed by for-
mal agreement, would unnecessarily burden the discussion.
The record of superpower arms control attempts is extensive
but its total effect has been disappointingly small. Over 1500 arms con-
trol meetings involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the course of
the nuclear era have netted meagre results. The arms limitation sequence
reflects the same elements of suspicion and distrust noted in the arms
race. Each superpower often has seen initiatives of the other as the
height of insincerity, as flagrant polemics, or as obvious publicity
26
stunts, attempts to garner support from other nations. More detrimen-
tal, since arms control is the other side of the arms race coin, each
superpower seems to have been persuaded that security and political in-
fluence were more readily gained unilaterally through further armament
than bilaterally or multilaterally through arms negotiations.
25
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict , Cambridge:





p. 187; also see John W. Spanier and
Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament; A Study in Soviet-American
Gamesmanship, New York: Praeger, 1962.
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Yet the arms control experience does feature a number of posi-
tive achievements and there recently has developed a potential for sub-
stantially greater progress in strategic arms limitation.
The superpower arms control record has been categorized in
several ways, but for purposes of this discussion, a two-fold categoriza-
tion should be sufficient:
I. The Moribund Years, 1945-1962.
II. The Years of Promise, 1963-1970. 27
For seventeen years after Bernard Baruch told the United Na-
tions Atomic Energy Commission that "We are come to make a choice be-
28
tween the quick and the dead," the superpower arms control record was
dismal. Not only was the Baruch Plan stillborn, but Soviet proposals
for staged disarmament and a formal H-Bomb test moratorium, the Eisen-
hower "Open Skies" initiative, aerial inspection of Europe, the Rapacki
Plan for a European nuclear free zone, and the ideas of a test ban treaty
or a weapons production ban made little headway. As their bickering dia-
logue continued, the superpowers sometimes found themselves proposing
29
what each had spurned when the other had initiated it. The continuing
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U.S. insisted was vital in promoting trust and confidence necessary for
a lasting agreement. When inspection could be arranged without infrin-
ging on perceived security interests, as in the cases of the Antartica
Treaty and the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency, pro-
gress was made.
By 1963, however, the superpowers had managed to terrify them-
selves into a frame of mind more conducive to progress on arms limita-
tion. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 commonly is regarded as
30
the terrifying turning point which finally caused the superpowers to
recognize the interdependence of their ultimate interests. In 1963 "Le
31Grande Freres" mutually agreed to try to work around the inspection/
verification problem, thus making possible a watershed arms control a-
greement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
While the Antarctic Treaty had been a hopeful harbinger of
progress as well as a pattern for future arms limitation agreements
30
There is room for conjecture on this point. William W.
Kaufmann has mentioned to the author that he believed the 1961 Berlin
Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than the Cuban Missile
Crisis. This partially verified the author's personal impression of
Cuban Missile Crisis action from a Pentagon vantage point that the pro-
spects for direct Soviet-U.S. conflict were slim and, for nuclear con-
flict, even more so, due to Soviet calculations of the overwhelming








covering desolate areas, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was an actual pre-
cursor of progress and a pattern for future agreement in matters of
direct strategic relevance. During the next seven years the super-
powers followed up, in the Antarctic Treaty pattern, with the Outer Space
Treaty and, in 1971, a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear wea-
32
pons on the seabed. Of more immediate strategic relevance, in the Test
Ban Treaty pattern, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was approved
and ratified which, in Article VI, obligated the signatories to search
33for ways to limit numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Con-
tinuing in this vein, the superpowers commenced talks on Strategic Arms
Limitation in Helsinki in November 1969. The SALT series, inconclusive
at this writing, is continuing. This is the first time that the super-
powers have come to grips with the problem of limiting, or even reducing,
their weapons system inventories.
This resume should not be taken to imply that the Years of
Promise have proceeded without difficulty, for problems have been plen-
tiful. Just as arms control attempts during the Moribund Years were ham-
32
The Treaty Banning the Stationing of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Types of Mass-Destruction Weapons on the Seabed and in the Ocean
Floor was approved by the UNGA Political Committee on November 17, 1970.
It was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on February 11,
19 71, and will become operative after twenty-two national ratifications
are deposited with the United Nations.
33
The NPT, having been duly ratified by 40 nations plus the nu-
clear powers, went into effect on March 5, 1970. It was signed initially,




pered by external crises, Berlin in 1948, the Korean War, Suez, Hungary
and Poland, the Formosa Strait, and the U-2 incident, so were the post-
Cuban Crisis attempts. Had it not been for the Vietnam War and the
Czechoslovakian invasion, for example, the NPT, whose antecedents can
be traced to 1960, might have come into effect much earlier, thus ac-
34
celerating SALT. SALT, too, faced the problem of continued exis-
tence amid the trials and tribulations of superpower interaction in other
areas. Washington had once agreed with Moscow that SALT should be dis-
connected from the problems of East-West relations, only to contradict
35
that proposition later on. SALT's survival of the U.S. May 1970 Cam-
bodian incursion and a period of heightened mutual U.S. -Soviet suspicion
in the Fall of 1970, however, indicated that its chances for continuance
were good.
The Years of Promise seemed to be enhanced still further by
technological advances in the 1960s which might make it possible to
overcome the inspection/verification stumbling block. Seismic detection
of underground nuclear tests had improved greatly since the Limited Test
Ban Treaty signature, as had photographic and other sensor monitoring of
events on the earth's surface by reconnaissance satellites. The cur-
34
The initial proposal for discussions on limiting offensive
and defensive strategic weapons systems was made to Moscow by Washing-
ton in 1964.
35 Secretary of State Rogers was the spokesman for both posi-
tions, a dichotomy pointed out by Izvestia , November 16, 1969. (M. Sa-
gatelyan, "On the Eve of the Helsinki Meetings," also carried in CDSP ,
Vol. 21, No. 46, December 10, 1969, p. 14.)
Satellite photography had benefitted from years of exper-
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rent problem of inspecting the interior of ICBM MIRV-cassettes seemed
insuperable to the layman and to many experts. But to a former director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
...our verification capabilities
using "national means" alone are con-
siderably greater than it has been pos-
sible, so far, to reveal. 37
In sum, the arms control trend was one of increasing activity
and more favorable prospects during the nuclear era. The success that
thoughtful men had hoped for arms limitation efforts thus far had eluded
their grasp. Problems were plentiful. But the Years of Promise looked
better than the Moribund Years and a degree of optimism seemed justi-
fied. The word count between the two superpowers on arms control mat-
ters had remained relatively constant over the 1500-plus arms control
meetings conducted during the nuclear era, but the prospects for impor-
tant results from the dialogue seemed more promising at the outset of
the 1970s.
Closely allied with the arms control dialogue was another su-
perpower dialogue on crisis control, the subject of the third trend of
interaction.
ience with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. RB-36, U-2 , and, more
recently, SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft have overflown the Soviet Union
and China seeking nuclear weapon and missile production information since
the early 1950s. In the 1960s aircraft reconnaissance was supplemented,
but not superceded, by shallow orbit satellites, the U.S. Samos and the
Soviet Cosmos series. Cf
. ,
Quester, op. cit .
, pp. 192, 206.
37
William C. Foster, "Prospects for Arms Control," Foreign Af-
fairs
, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April, 1969), pp. 413-21. Before the opening of
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The Crisis Control Trend
The crises of the Cold War had seen the superpowers in fear-
some confrontation, yet the Cold War never had involved prolonged com-
bat between the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.
This is not to say that shooting and casualties have not occurred. Uni-
ted States reconnaissance aircraft have been shot down by Soviet for-
38
ces. Unarmed U.S. transport aircraft, flying off course, have been in-
tercepted and destroyed by Soviet fighters. Superpower naval units oper-
ating in close proximity sometimes have experienced minor collisions or
hair-raising near misses which engender diplomatic flurries similar to
those arising from shooting scrapes. But the fact of the matter is that
both the U.S. and the Soviet governments generally have been rather cir-
cumspect in the employment of major units of their armed forces, and have
exercised close supervision over their activities, throughout the nuclear
39
era.
the Helsinki session of SALT in November, 1969, the U.S. rushed to com-
pletion "the most thorough review of espionage capabilities ever con-
ducted" because Washington did not want to see the talks bog down over
the inspection/verification issue. The New York Times, October 2, 1969.
The U-2 of Gary Powers and the RB-47 incidents of 1960 are
most well known. Numerous other incidents have occurred that are less
well known because the U.S. unit involved was able to return to U.S. ter-
ritory safely. Thus, a badly shot-up Navy patrol bomber once crash-lan-
ded on the U.S. Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait after having
been engaged by Soviet interceptors.
39
Thus Stalin was willing to use proxies but not Soviet troops
in combat against U.S. forces in Korea.
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Ac arms control efforts have paralleled the arms race through-
out the nuclear era, crisis control efforts have been a third continuing
feature of superpower interaction.
Moreover, when the major turning point in arms control pro-
gress occurred in 1963, the crisis control trend experienced a concur-
rent dramatic change. A two-fold categorization of superpower crisis
control practices similar to that derived for their arms control exper-
ience is therefore possible: the years prior to 1963 may be character-
ized as uncooperative and unsophisticated; those after 1963 may be char-
acterized as cooperative and sophisticated.
However, it is difficult to evaluate one of these eras as more
nerve-wracking than the other. On the surface, the years since 1963
would seem, to be emotionally less demanding on ,the two national leader-
ships because of the more cooperative and sophisticated procedures and
facilities in operation. However, these also were the years in which the
arms race was rapidly ascending to new heights of dangerous destructive
power, making any and every crisis control advance entirely necessary but
perhaps insufficient. There was room for legitimate doubt in 1971 whether
crisis control in fact had kept pace with the arms race. The nagging sus-
picion that escalation was always a distinct possibility, since crisis
control might not work, continued to dominate superpower diplomacy.
In the unsophisticated years the successful experience of the
superpowers in preventing escalation might well be characterized as the
result of both astute politico-military decisions and a good bit of luck.
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The United States proved adept at blockade-running in 1948—when the
Berlin Airlift circumvented the Berlin Blockade—and at establishing and
enforcing an American blockade in 1962—when the Cuban Quarantine stopped
the ingress and prompted the removal of Soviet missiles from the Western
Hemisphere. In both cases the U.S. move deliberately conveyed Washing-
ton's intention to avoid escalation and leave the next decision up to
the Soviet Union. Moscow's astuteness appeared in Stalin's and Khrush-
chev's responses, which accepted the proffered opportunities to avoid
conflict. Nonetheless, each superpower often exhibited tendencies to ag-
gravate a crisis to an extreme pitch during the unsophisticated era.
Dulles' "brinkmanship" and Khrushchev's "rocket-rattling" diplomacy, even
if sometimes practiced post-crisis, made the 1950 's a very tender decade.
Crisis control continued to be successful, in an ultimate sense,
in the early 1960 's. By this time, however, as nuclear missiles rapidly
entered the superpower inventories, each crisis assumed a look of cata-
clysm. The 1961 Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 were
so serious that the need for innovative measures to improve superpower
crisis control was self-evident.
During the 1961 Berlin Crisis, American and Soviet armored
units faced each other near the Brandenburg Gate, crews on alert, tank
cannon muzzle to muzzle. In Washington the Administration's Berlin Task
40




Force developed scenarios of escalation involving "probes" of the auto-
bahn, using conventional or tactical nuclear modes, and President Ken-
nedy spoke in thoughtful but apocalyptic tones "...If we push the but-
ton— if I push the button..."
One year later confrontation was between Soviet missile troops
in Cuba and the U.S. Tactical Air Command, between Soviet submarines and
the U.S. Navy, and ultimately, between SAC and the Soviet Missile Force.
SAC was dispersed, TAC was ready to strike at Cuban IRBM/MRBM launching
sites, and the Navy detected, tracked, and ordered Soviet submarines to
the surface. A quick or misunderstood move in this tense situation might
have been irretrievable.
In June, 1963, keeping in mind the decisionmaker's agonies of
Berlin and Cuba, President Kennedy declared
. . .nuclear powers must avert
those confrontations which bring an
adversary to a choice of either a ,_
humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.
The American University speech, subsequently hailed as the basis of a
/ i
"Soviet-American Survival Pact," was followed by progress in arms con-
trol, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and a significant development in cri-
41
To C.L. Sulzberger in early October 1961. C.L. Sulzberger,
The Last of the Giants , New York: MacMillan, 1970, p. 811. Even a non-nu-
clear "probe" down the autobahn to Berlin, if attacked by Soviet and East
German forces, could have triggered other engagements along the East-West






President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, "Toward a Strategy of
Peace," address at American University, June 10, 1963, quoted in the State
Department Bulletin , Vol. 49, No. 1253, July 1, 196 3, p. 4.
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Harry Schwartz, "The Soviet American Survival Pact After Five
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sis control: the Moscow-Washington "Hot Line" was opened in September
1963, marking the beginning of the cooperative and sophisticated years
in crisis control.
It has been pointed out that emergency bargaining between the
superpowers during crisis situations had been accommodated fairly suc-
cessfully through normal diplomatic channels. If communication diffi-
culties existed, they stemmed from inadequate technical communication
44links. (Thus President Kennedy and the Excom would rely on Radio Mos-
cow and communications received through irregular intelligence channels
[e.g. John Scali of CBS] during the missile crisis.) The "Hot Line," a
technological-political innovation designed in part to correct technical
communications deficiencies, was primarily an instrument for crisis con-
trol.
Since 1963, incidents in the Vietnam War, events in Europe in
1968, and in the Middle East in 1967 and 1970 probably have resulted in
use of the "Hot Line." However, the evidence substantiating two possi-
ble instances of superpower "Hot Line" usage concerning incidents in Viet-
nam is slim. Governmental statements on the subject have not emanated
from either superpower. But remarks concerning the strafing of a Soviet
freighter in Cam Pha, North Vietnam by USAF F-105s tend to support the i-
45
dea. Further support can be derived from an incident involving night




Fred C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row,
1964, pp. 44-45.
^ 5 Col. Jacksel M. Broughton, USAF (Ret.), Thud Ridge , Philadel-
phia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969, p. 246, concerning "The Turkestan Inci-
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photoflash photography of a Soviet frieghter off the coast of South Viet-
nam in which the Soviet master's erroneous report of an attack had gone
from the freighter to Moscow, as a protest to Washington, and as an in-
quiry to the South China Sea almost before the photographic aircraft had
returned to base.
"Hot Line" usage in the Mid-Eastern Six-Day War is much more
fully documented. President Johnson personally indicated that he had
called Moscow on the special line to assure Premier Kosygin that aircraft
launched from Sixth Fleet carriers were not going to participate on the
t -a 46Israelx sxde.
Conversely, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
Soviet Union reportedly made every effort to keep Washington informed of
Warsaw Pact force movements and to assure the Administration that those
movements were aimed solely at Czechoslovakia and not at NATO. Many of
Moscow's messages were carried by Ambassador Dobrynin, and we do not know
whether the "Hot Line" was used during the East European action. We may
47
speculate, however, that it was exercised.
dent." The strafing and subsequent USAF court martial action resulted in
Col. Broughton's earlier-than-expected retirement. Although he was not
flying either of the strafing aircraft, Col. Broughton was the immediate
superior in command. Further light on the "Turkestan Incident" is provi-
ded in Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny— Informing the People on National
Security
,
New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 139-52. At p. 140 Goulding
refers to a Soviet formal diplomatic protest over the Turkestan , but he
does not mention the "Hot Line" specifically.
46
During the Liberty incident.
47
The Soviet effort to keep Washington informed about the Czech-
oslovakian invasion was seized on by Peking as another example of Soviet-
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After nearly six years' experience with crisis control facil-
itated by assured rapid communications on the "Hot Line," a further step
was taken in crisis control management. In March 1969 a new official
Soviet-U.S. communication system for diplomatic message traffic, paral-
48
leling the "Hot Line," was inaugurated. This new system was given its
baptism of fire during the second Middle East crisis.
During the 1970 crisis in Jordan, Sixth Fleet units were physi-
cally intermingled with ships of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean as
joint U. S. -Israeli intervention to thwart a Syrian armored probe into
Jordan was being coordinated. Thus far there has been no confirmation of
"Hot Line" usage in the 1970 crisis, perhaps because of the "redundant Hot
Line," but it is known that the Soviet charge in Washington was an impor-
tant personal crisis control link as the U.S. encouraged Soviet pressure
49
to persuade the Syrian government to desist.
Superpower crisis control in the cooperative and sophisticated
years has markedly improved. Command and control exercised by both sides
is much more positive, and mutual consultation and coordination whenever
military units are in close proximity has become established practice.
The years since 1963 have not seen nuclear weapons "rattled" by either
side against the other, nor have nuclear weapons figured directly in any
American collusion, in this case to corroborate spheres of influence. See
below, p. 223.
48
The New York Times, March 20, 1969.
49
Ibid. , October 8, 1970.
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crisis of great concern to the superpowers. Superpower armed forces
continued to operate in proximity to each other, often inadvertently em-
ploying tactics that might cause concern among opposing force comman-
ders. Yet they have, in one sense, become accustomed to each other,
and their operational rules and practices, as they survey each other's
dispositions, have become more circumspect and based on standardized
52
tactics that make opponent behavior somewhat more predictable.
Recapitulation
The primary thrust of this chapter has been to illustrate the
progress of the superpower arms race, the contradictory superpower at-
tempt to control the growth of nuclear weaponry, and the concurrent ef-
fort to deintensify or "de-fuse" crisis situations. whether any or all
of these three trends has reached a mature level is not ascertainable,
for maturity is a subjective measure. But it has been shown that the
superpowers have made remarkable advances in sophisticated and deadly nu-
An exception might be the saga of the Soviet submarine tender
in Caribbean waters in late 1970. At least, at this writing, that saga
did not seem to have crisis potential.
William H. Honan, "Russian and American Pilots Play 'Chicken,'"
The New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970, pp. 25 ff.
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Ibid . For a dissimilar but fascinating view of superpower cri-
sis control derived from the same data but observed through the lenses of
Marxist philosophy, see V.V. Zhurkin, "The United States and International
Political Crises," USA: Economics, Poli tics and Ideology , No. 12, signed
to press December 9, 1970, pp. 14-26. Mr. Zhurkin and other members of
the "Arbatov" Institute have been afforded opportunities to observe U.S.
crisis decisionmaking at first hand in Washington, further supporting our
argument of increasing improvement in Soviet-American crisis control.
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clear weaponry; that they have made some, if inadequate, progress in arms
control (albeit not to the point of an arms race reversal) ; and that they
have made often unnoticed but significant advances in their efforts to
control crises and prevent escalation.
It is possible to generalize from these trends and develop hy-






In the previous discussion of the arms race trend, passing
reference was made to the development of mathematical analogs to arms
races by Louis F. Richardson and Paul Smoker. Two important insights
i
ensuing from the equations of these scholars can be summarized as fol-
lows: Richardson was highly doubtful that arms races could end without
hostilities. The outbreak of World Wars I and II supported this conclu-
sion even if the years since World War II have not. However, Richardson
also noted the possibility that "submissiveness" by one side, or both
sides, might result in a retarding or reversal of an arms race. "Sub-
missiveness," in this sense, would be a collective national attitude be-
speaking willingness to yield or subject the community to superior au-
thority or control, whether this be exemplified by an opposing nation or
by the inexorable logic of a dangerous and deteriorating series of
international events. Smoker categorized submissiveness as a "fear fac-
tor," and said that it "causes both sides to cool off when the interna-
tional temperature gets hot."
Through the application of more recent data to modifications of
Richardson's equations, Smoker has pointed out that the nuclear era in
fact has significantly raised the importance of "submissiveness" to arms
race interaction. Therefore, in the interest of promoting peace, Smoker
prescribes that when "submissiveness" appears, decisionmakers should act
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so as to encourage any moves toward disarmament.
It is evident from the overview of Soviet-American interac-
tion in Chapter 1 that a climax of fear was reached in 1961 and 1962.
Further, the superpowers thereupon did attempt to retard the arms race.
Worthwhile arms control and crisis control activities were commenced,
and resulted in some successes. But the record of superpower interac-
tion subsequent to 1962 hardly reveals a conciliatory atmosphere. On
the contrary, Washington and Moscow have continued to have to surmount
crisis situations.
In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, fear and anxiety
motivated the superpowers to modify their mode of conduct to include
more arms control efforts and more crisis control communications—but
not to end their competition. Far from it. As President Kennedy put it
. . .while defending our vital in-
terests, nuclear powers must avert...
confrontations ... 2
Although fear of nuclear confrontation was great, it had not outweighed
the fear of the unknown possibilities in being dominated by the opposing
superpower. Neither Washington nor Moscow was ready to acquiesce to the
other's goals. Each would continue to arm, partially correlating its
did not accent submissiveness , but concluded that war was more likely
to develop early in an arms race and that a quantitative arms race ra-
ther than a qualitative arms race was likely to reach a definite end in
war, arms agreement, or victory for one side. (p. 79).
2





armament decisions with those of the other. Each would be more ener-
getic in its arms control dialogue with the other. Each would act so
as to lessen chances of misunderstanding and to improve crisis control.
Thus the three trends described in Chapter 1 can be pictured
as continuously increasing trends. Downturns, if any, are not pro-
nounced. The superpower arms race trend has been typified by increasing
numbers of more deadly weapons and increasing overkill capacity. Show-
ing few signs of leveling off, it has risen consistently across the nu-
clear era at somewhere between a linear and an exponential rate.
The arms control trend has been typified by less intense ac-
tivity, particularly before 1963. But since that time the superpowers
have been rather more engaged in arms control. Their arms control dia-
logue in 1969 came to grips, for the first time, with the problem of ac-
tually limiting numbers of nuclear weapons systems.
The crisis control trend has been typified by continuously im-
proving methods and machinery across the nuclear era, with a significant
improvement in 1963 attributable to the inauguration of the Moscow-Wash-
ington "Hot Line" crisis communications system.
The roughly parallel juxtaposition of a set of lines denoting
these trends, all of which would rise to the right if the x-axis denoted
time, lends itself to the formulation of three hypotheses on superpower
interaction. These hypotheses, which deal with series of events over
time, are predicated on the arms race trend and conpare the trend in
other actions to it.
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The recounting of events in now historic superpower crisis
situations suggests a fourth hypothesis on superpower interaction not
based on a trend but addressed specifically to superpower political-
military behavior under conditions of extreme tension.
It should be clear at the outset that our expectations from
the hypotheses are very modest. If one were to carve a totem pole of
types of hypotheses on the basis of their "scientific acceptability,"
these hypotheses would have to be somewhere near the lower end. It will
be impossible to either validate or invalidate them with precision. The
data base for inquiry is both so large and yet so incomplete (due to
contemporaneousness and to governmental disclosure regulations) that
they cannot be experimentally treated with sufficient rigor for valida-
tion. However, the hypotheses should not be regarded as "haunted house
3doctrines." At a minimum, it should be possible to assemble and cate-
gorize sufficient evidence to suggest a tendency^ toward validation. It
may be possible, in some cases, to demonstrate some support for our hy-
potheses. Insofar as this is accomplished, the hypotheses may be help-
ful to future theory building.
A further caveat regarding the hypotheses concerns causality.
Basically, the hypotheses offered here should not be regarded as con-
"Haunted House Doctrines" are assertions that neither can be
proven nor disproven. "I know there is a ghost in that old dark house
on the hill." "No, there isn't. Prove that there is one." "I can't,
but prove that there isn't."
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elusive causal statements. They are not primarily intended to de-
scribe a causal relationship between a trend of increasing strategic
weapons system inventories and a hypothesized superpower behavior.
Rather, they should be understood as describing concurrent behavioral
phenomena which may, may in part, or may not be causally connected. Ac-
tually, as might be expected, increasing nuclear weapons system inven-
tories probably are best regarded as one of a number of interrelated
causes that result in a given international behavior. whether the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons systems by a nation, or its opponent, can
be held to account for a majority, or even a plurality, of a total spec-
trum of causality behind a nation's behavior is open to speculation, be-
cause finite numbers (a percentage of variance) cannot be assigned to it
with objectivity. Insofar as we may subjectively believe that the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons does change national behaviors, however,
the hypotheses will take on a higher meaning.




Hypothesis I, which might be called the "Nuclear Crisis Avoid-
ance" hypothesis, says that
As their strategic weapons system in-
ventories increase, superpowers are increas-
ingly willing to gauge their diplomatic and
military initiatives and responses to a level




It might be conjectured that Hypothesis I, if affirmed, would mean that
heavily-armed superpowers had overcome, or passed beyond, an interest
in risk-taking to achieve national goals. However, the introductory
discussion in this chapter and the remarks in the crisis control section
of Chapter 1 were designed to indicate that despite increasing strategic
weapons inventories, some superpower risk-taking has continued. There-
fore, this hypothesis should be interpreted as saying that such risk-
taking, or "brinkmanship," that might occur in superpower diplomatic and
military initiatives and responses would be gauged below the nuclear
threshold. While this seems to be fairly accurate reflection of Soviet-
American experience, only an evaluation of the case studies of interac-
tion will ascertain whether the Chinese-American or Sino-Soviet exper-
iences support this interpretation of the hypothesis.
Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II, which might be colloquialized as the "Hot Line"
hypothesis, says that
The larger the strategic weapons
system inventory available to a superpower,
the greater the proclivity of that super-
power to develop ready lines of communica-
tion with an opponent superpower.
It is obvious that Hypothesis II may run afoul of the ambiguity
in the phrase "ready lines of communication." Each superpower may have
its own subjective view of what constitutes a ready line of communica-
tion. In the Soviet-American experience, the two governments decided on
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fixed specialized communications network, the "hot line," for crisis
communications between top decisionmakers, and later augmented this net-
work with a parallel special network for routine diplomatic traffic.
Whether developments in Sino-Soviet or Chinese-American experience have
begun to parallel this, or whether the decisionmakers concerned feel a
need to do so, will be examined in the case studies.
Hypothesis III
Hypothesis III, which might be referred to as the "SALT Talks"
hypothesis, says that
As their strategic weapons sys-
tem inventories increase, superpowers
are increasingly ready to undertake arms
control negotiations with an opponent
superpower designed to limit or reduce
arms levels.
It may be argued that Hypothesis III cannot be supported by
Chinese-American or Sino-Soviet experience. It is common knowledge that
China has not, at this point, participated in arms control negotiations
to the extent that Moscow and Washington have. Peking consistently has
regarded arms control or arms limitation efforts in what is referred to
as the Leninist tradition. However, there are two Leninist traditions
that fit under the general rubric of disarmament. Before the Bolsheviks
came to power, Lenin declared that disarmament proposals merely dis-
tracted the masses from the only valid means for eliminating war, a com-
munist revolution that would end the class struggle. Lenin subsequently
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changed this view. After the Bolsheviks had come to power, Lenin de-
cided that disarmament proposals could be used to tactical advantage to
preserve the base of socialism and to divide and embarrass capitalist
4
powers. The Chinese leadership has never acknowledged the later Lenin
position. Thus, while both Moscow and Peking have called for general
and complete disarmament, only Moscow, following the later Lenin tradi-
tion, has deemed it appropriate to enter formal arms control negotia-
tions with capitalist states.
However, there are other than formal arms control negotiating
procedures available to nations. Hypothesis III is deduced from the ac-
tual Soviet-American experience, and it is not difficult to check the
Chinese record of interaction with either the United States or the Soviet
Union for opportunities or moves to negotiate on arms levels.
Hypothesis IV
Hypothesis IV, which is not predicated on a trend, but on ex-
hibited superpower behavior in specific crisis circumstances, and which
might be called the "Submissiveness" hypothesis, says that
4
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn
Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race, Soviet Interest in Arms Control
and Disarmament, 1954-1964
,
Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, pp. 5-12. Ad-
ditional sources are noted on these pages.
Cf
.
, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet
Relations
,





which pose a clear and present danger of
nuclear warfare (such as when general pur-
pose forces are engaged and escalation seems
imminent, or strategic forces are arrayed
against each other and a dispute seems in-
soluble by other than military means,) sti-
mulate the superpowers to lessen tension through
crisis control measures or explanation of stra-
tegic postures.
Unlike the first three hypotheses, Hypothesis IV seems to need
little amplification. It seems to reflect Soviet-American experience
fairly well, and the records of Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interac-
tion should be sufficiently clear, even though they are much more con-
temporary, to facilitate the accumulation of further evidence.
These four working hypotheses on superpower politico-military
interaction ultimately may not in some cases reflect real-world interna-
tional politics with the desired degree of precision and universality.
Therefore, the right to modify them or add additional hypotheses in order
to incorporate the evaluation of the evidence in the case studies is re-
served.
Before proceeding to the examination of Chinese-American and
Sino-Soviet interaction in pursuit of this evidence, it is necessary to




Development of Chinese Strategic Warfare Capability
Can atom bombs decide wars? No,
they can't Without the struggles
waged by the people, atom bombs by
themselves would be of no avail. .
.
—Mao Tse-tung, August 13, 1945
1
The government of China has kept this maxim of Mao Tse-tung in
the forefront of the decision process concerning Chinese military force
structure. The maxim probably expresses the philosophy behind the de-
velopment of the Chinese strategic warfare capability as well as any
2
other phrase. To the Chinese, nuclear weapons are important on the
world political scene, but not as important as the national political
3
will of a unified people.
I-lao Tse-tung, "The Situations and Our Policy After the Vic-
tory in the War of Resistance Against Japan," Selected Works of Mao
Tse-Tung
,
Vol. 4, p. 21. This statement may not have been written un-
til the 1950s. Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb , New York:
Praeger, 1965, p. 30. Alternatively, the statement could have been
drafted in 1945 and amended in 1951 or 1952.
2
In 1957 Mao modified the maxim into much more colorful
phraseology:
The atom bomb is a paper tiger... It looks
terrible but in fact is not. Of course, the
atom bomb is a weapon of mass annihilation;
the outcome of a war is decided by the people,
not by one or two new weapons.
—Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers,"
NCNA, Peking, October 31, 1958, reproduced in Current Background , No-




, A. Doak Barnett, China After Mao , Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1967, pp. 38, 45, 63, 236-37, 250.
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Accordingly, the Chinese government nuclear weapons program
has been conducted with what might be termed all deliberate speed.
China's less developed economy dictated a specialized allocation of
resources to nuclear development. Unless other urgent requirements
were to be indefinately deferred, a crash program was not a feasible
alternative. Since Western commentators have remarked derogatorily on
the slowness of the Chinese program, or to lags therein, and Soviet
sources have remarked that China had established foolishly high prior-
4ities and badly misallocated resources to the program, it would be
tempting to conclude that the Chinese program must have been properly
scheduled.
Making our own evaluation, it seems reasonable to say that
the Chinese program, given the less developed economy and technology
that characterizes Chinese society, really has recorded remarkable ac-
complishments in the space of six and one-half years. The fact that
the program seemed to proceed at a fairly constant rate through the so-
cietal uproar of the Cultural Revolution accents its remarkable nature,
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) , January 21, 1970 (commentary in
The New York Times , April 27, 1970). A stronger parallel remark was
presented in Rude Pravu (Prague), July 15, 1970.
It has been estimated unofficially that Chinese expenditures
on missiles and warheads may be equivalent to $1.5 billion per annum.
Time
, March 8, 1971, p. 22.
It should be noted that in their earlier stages, neither the
U.S. nor the Soviet programs were marked by the consistently phased
series of test detonations that the Chinese program has displayed. The
U.S. tested twice in 1946, four times in 1948, and conducted two large
test series in 1951; the Soviet Union tested once in 1949 and twice in
1951. The Chinese test series will be discussed below.
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Moreover, when juxtaposed to the French development of a force de dis-
suasion
,
to which a highly developed technology and rather sophisti-
cated economic controls could be applied, the Chinese program comes off
well. But to be on safe ground, it is best merely to term the Chinese
program deliberate.
Indicative of the less than top priority of the atomic pro-
gram is the fact that even after their own initial successful detonation
of two nuclear weapons, Chinese spokesmen continued to proclaim man's
superiority over weapons. In 1965 Lin Piao said
The spiritual atom bomb which
the revolutionary people possess is a
far more powerful and useful weapon
than the physical atom bomb.
7
This phrase has continued to be prominent in Chinese pronouncements; it
may readily be found in Chinese periodicals today. It represents the
vr • • 8ongoing Maoist dictum on strategic arms.
To be sure, the allocation of resources to the nuclear program
resulted in differences in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy,
To use de Gaulle's own terminology. The more common sobri-
quet force de frappe was not used by the general, a great stylist of
French prose.
Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking
Review
, No. 36, September 3, 1965, p. 27.
Q
It may be questioned whether Chinese adherence to Mao's
thinking will continue after Mao's death. The successor Soviet leader-
ship cabal rapidly changed Stalin's line on nuclear weapons, which had
been nearly identical with Mao's, after the Soviet dictator's death.
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sometimes of crucial import. Modernizers in the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) undoubtedly pushed for improved weaponry of all kinds, per-
9haps to the point of their own dismissal. Former PLA Marshal Chen Yi,
serving as Foreign Minister, once told foreign correspondents "Maybe we
will walk around without pants, but we will have our own nuclear wea-
pons." However, these intramural disputes always have been resolved
in favor of modest but steady advance, and against a crash program. The
pattern of decisions reemphasizes historic Chinese patience and long-
range perspective. Weighing in favor of the methodical, long-range ap-
proach were distant goals which did not involve atomic war-making.
Rather, they accented the political value of a certain amount of nuclear
weaponry: deterrence of superpower attack, improved political influence
in Socialist countries, enhancement of Chinese support for wars of na-




Morton H. Halperin and John W. Lewis, "New
Tensions in Army—Party Relations in China," The China Quarterly , April-
June, 1966, pp. 58-67; David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshall
P'eng Teh-huai, The China Quarterly , No. 8 (1961), also in Roderick
MacFarquhar, ed. , China Under Mao : Politics Takes Command , Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1966; Harold P. Ford, "Modern Weapons and the Sino-Soviet
Estrangement," The China Quarterly , No. 18 (April-June, 1964), pp. 160-
73; and Ellis Joffe, "The Conflict Between the Old and the New in the
Chinese Army," in ibid
,
(The Joffe article also is in MacFarquhar,
op. cit.
, pp. 34-56); and The New York Times , January 27, 1966.
Quoted in Ivan Dimitrov, "The Spirit of Militarism, Narodna
Armiya (Sofia), July 29, 1970, p. 4. The article is a polemic against
Chinese collusion with West European nations.
Cf
.




There is persuasive evidence that Mao and his associates never en-
visaged a politico-military blitzkrieg to achieve these goals. After
the Chinese nuclear tests of 1964 and 1965, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-
lai each stated that at least another twenty years would be needed to
12
make China "really strong."
Nonetheless, steady advance over a period of less than ten
years can result in the achievement of an important nuclear capability.
A brief analysis of the growth of this capability from zero to meaning-
ful megatonnage is the subject matter of the remainder of this chapter.
The developmental process can be categorized in three stages,
I The Pre-nuclear Period, 1949-1963,
II The Bomber-Atomic Period, 1964-1967,
III The Missile-Hydrogen Period, 1967-date,
which will be discussed consecutively. The Chinese nuclear growth se-
quence then will be compared, in point of time, with the U.S. -Soviet
record set out in Chapter I. The analysis will conclude with a presen-
tation of estimates on, and the implications of, current Chinese capa-
bilities.
12
The Wash ington Post, October 1, 1965, quoted by Vergil
Berger of Reuters from Peking. Mao told Li Tsung-jen, a former acting
Nationalist President who returned to China from the U.S. in 1965, sub-
stantially the same thing. Peking Radio in Mandarin to Taiwan, August
8, 1965; C.H.G. Oldham, "China's New Technology," The Christian Science
Monitor
,
May 18, 1966, verifies the long-range emphasis of Chinese plan-
ning from knowledge gained in a 1964 visit.
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The Pre-nuclear Period, 1949-1964.
One of the ironies of history is that both of the superpowers,
each in its own way having rendered aid to the development of the Chin-
ese nuclear arsenal, then signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Soviet
and U.S. aid to China mainly was given during the 1950s. By 1960, with
13
a few exceptions, Chinese nuclear development no longer received as-
sistance. Soviet aid to China was intended and formalized, while the
American contribution was anti-intended and unstructured. Soviet aid
concentrated on material and engineering inputs and student training;
the American contribution can be characterized as one of sophisticated,
trained brainpower.
The time sequence of superpower contribution to the Chinese
nuclear capability lends itself to interesting speculation. Moscow
agreed with Peking on a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual As-
sistance on February 14, 1950, and there is little doubt that the agree-
ment contained secret provisions for military assistance to China. How-
ever, it is unlikely that Stalin was eager to disseminate advanced wea-
14
pons technology. Mao subsequently remarked that the reason the treaty
took so long to negotiate was that Stalin did not trust him and thought
13
Some Chinese atomic researchers remained at the Soviet In-
stitute of Nuclear Research at Dubna until late June 1965.
Cf
.





he might become a second Tito.
About the same time, a prominent young Chinese scientist and
engineer in America, Dr. Chien Hsueh-shen, was preparing to return home
to Shanghai. Dr. Chien holds a master's degree in aeronautical engin-
eering from M.I.T. and the Ph.D. from the California Institute of Tech-
nology, magna cum laude. He was director of the rocket section of the
U.S. Defense Scientific Advisory Board during World War II. (As a
CalTech faculty associate of Theodore von Karman, Chien went with him
to Germany just before V-E day to analyse the German scientific effort.
At Braunschweig, von Karman and Chien discovered German work on a trans-
oceanic buzz bomb.) Chien became one of M.I.T. 's youngest full professors
in 1946, at age 34. Later, he was professor of aeronautics and head of
the Gugenheim Jet Propulsion Laboratory at CalTech. He is one of the
world's leading aeronautical and jet propulsion experts.
Chien did not return to China in 1950 due to U.S. government
intervention. Five years later, however, he was allowed to depart—his
secret knowledge presumably obsolete. In 1955 he declared that he
wanted to help China "...live with honor, happiness, and in peace." He
became director of China's nuclear research program, with emphasis on
In remarks to the Twelfth Central Committee Plenum of the
CCP, reported by Mainichi (Tokyo), March 9, 1967, noted in John Git-
tings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, London: Oxford University
Press, 1968, p. 15.
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rocketry, in charge of an estimated 1300-2000 engineers and 500-750
scientists. Today Dr. Chien is a member of the Chinese Communist Par-
ty's Central Committee and the Presidium of the National People's Con-
17
gress.
Chien Hsueh-shen is perhaps the most remarkable member of a cad-
18
re of scientist-engineers trained in the United States. The intriguing
aspect of their collective story, emphasized by Chien 's own odyssey, is
that, shortly after their reassembly in Peking in the mid-fifties, China's
indigenous nuclear development program really began in earnest. American-
trained Chinese scientist-engineers thus may have been a prime motive
force behind China's decision to seek more assistance in the area of ad-
vanced weapons systems, including nuclear weapons and guided missiles.
During the period 1957-1960 Soviet assistance was forthcoming.
Stanley S. Karnow, "U. S .-Trained Intellectuals Advise
China," The Washington Post , February 27, 1966; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Chi-




The Christian Science Monitor , April 29, 1970.
18
Others include Chien Wei-chang (CalTech/JPL) , Wei Chung-
hua (M.I.T.), and Wang Kan-chang (U. of Calif., Berkeley.) The director
of the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy, Tsien San-tsiang, and his
wife were associates of Joliot-Curie. (It should be noted that not all
of the Chinese scientific cadre fared well during the Cultural Revolution.
Red Guard posters demanded that Marshal Nieh Jung-Chen, Chairman of the
Scientific and Technological Commission and Deputy Premier, be criticized
and burned to death. Liu Shao-chi's son, educated in the U.S.S.R. and a
rocket expert, was detained. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin
to China, June 25, 1968.)
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The Soviet Union earlier had provided aid to the Chinese ar-
mament industry, enabling the first Chinese-made MiG jet fighters,
tanks and light naval craft to appear in 1956. The Korean War of course
was the impetus for this early industrial support and direct arms
19
aid — for which China paid the U.S.S.R. even though China had not in-
stigated the war. The Khrushchev government also seemed to be favorably
disposed toward military assistance to China. On October 15, 195 7, the
Soviet Union and China signed an agreement that, according to Peking,
promised "an atomic bomb and technical data for its manufacture" among
other "new technology for national defense." The agreement resulted
in substantial Soviet military aid to China in the form of advanced
20
. ,
conventxonal weapons systems and, perhaps more importantly, an impetus
toward the development of the modernized industrial capabilities on
which a strategic weapons program could be founded.
19
Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power , New York:
Praeger, 1968, pp. 20-35, 40-42, describes the extent of Soviet mili-
tary and industrial aid to China in detail, asserting that the Chinese,
at a conference with the Soviets and North Koreans in August, 1950,
agreed to cross into North Korea if the Soviets provided them with
modern arms and aircraft. (p. 20). The supply of MiG-15s to China
was "seemingly endless," and a strategic bomber force (B-29 copies) and
a tactical jet bomber force (11-28 types) also was provided.
20
Including 50-60 TU-14 "Bosun" twin-jet patrol bombers and,
perhaps, short and medium range ballistic missiles in 1958. Alice Lang-
ley Hsieh, op. cit
., pp. 164-65. Also see Life , July 13, 1959, p. 36,
an account of a Khrushchev-Harriman meeting. Advanced aircraft defi-




Apparently, however, the 1957 agreement ran aground on the
rocks of conflicting purposes. Whether because the Soviets demanded
bilateral control arrangements on some advanced (read atomic-capable)
weapons systems, a concept unacceptable to Peking; because the Chinese
thought the aid insufficient; for other reasons as yet unfathomed; or
as a reflection of other matters in dispute; the agreement was termin-
21
aged in 1959. Soviet technicians and their blueprints were withdrawn
22
in 1960. China's program became the sole responsibility of its in-
digenous proprietors.
21
In Hay, 1959, one month before termination of the aid agree-
ment, Ho Chi Minh told two Italian Communists, in the presence of Chi-
nese journalists, that China was conducting nuclear research and would
soon have its own atomic weapon. Giuseppe Boffa, Dopo Krusciov , Turin,
1965, p. 61, mentioned in Kevin Devlin, The Moscow Meetings , Munich:
unpublished manuscript, 1969-1970, Part II, p. 11. This could substan-
tiate the suspicions that the 1957 agreement was very much concerned
with atomic weapons. But one of the more puzzling aspects of the
agreement is why the U.S.S.R. signed it in the first place when the So-




pp. 13-43, poses five hypotheses for the Soviet de-
cision and its reversal. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Attitude," in
Halperin (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control , op. cit .
, pp.
205-17, favors the control issue as the decisive factor. Also see
Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in ibid
.
,
pp. 269-70; Oran R. Young, "China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,"
in ibid
.
, pp. 15-28; William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift , Cam-
bridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, pp. 340-70; Halperin, China and the Bomb ,
op. cit.
, pp. 78-82; Hsieh, op. cit . ; Quester, op. cit . , pp. 180-81;





According to the Chinese, the Soviets withdrew 1,390 experts,




The Bomber-Atomic Period, 1964-67
After Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear weapons program was
withdrawn, Peking resorted to importing materials (e.g., chromium,
nickel) from Western nations and Japan to make up deficiencies in Chi-
23
nese production facilities. By late 1964, China had in operation one
nuclear "research" reactor supplied by the U.S.S.R. in 1958, two weapons-
grade plutonium producing reactors, and an enriched-uranium gaseous dif-
24fusion plant. Chinese technicians assembled a nuclear device and ex-
25ploded it on October 16, 1964. The first explosion, yielding 20 KT,
was atmospheric (as were all Chinese tests until 1969) , and thus con-
travened the Test Ban Treaty of a year earlier. But Peking had not ac-
cepted the treaty in the first place. China promised "no first use" of
the new weaponry but ignored the matter of atmospheric testing. The
second Chinese test came seven months later, on May 14, 1965. Like the
first explosion, the second yielded about 20 KT. But the second bomb
23
For an East European report on the extensive nature of the
Chinese import program from industrial Western Europe, see Dimitrov,
op. cit . An excellent example of the prevailing Soviet view on this
was carried by Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China,
April 16, 1968.
24
The Chinese probably had received Soviet aid on the large
gaseous diffusion plant, but the technology of the Pu239 reactors was a-






For a fascinating speculation as to why the Chinese test came





was delivered by a bomber aircraft, one of the TU-4's given to China by
the Soviet Union over a dozen years earlier. There has been no direct
evidence that China attempted to make this aircraft-atomic weapon system
operational in the Air Force of the PLA.
On the contrary, at a secret conference of the National De-
fense Council in Peking on January 8, 1965, after the first but before
the second Chinese nuclear test, the Minister of Machine Building, Gen-
eral Wang Pin-cheng, reported on plans for a series of land-based
27
short-range nuclear missiles. These plans apparently were approved
and presumably included provisions for hiring German aircraft designers
and rocket experts. Recruiting teams from the Military Science Academy
operating from Switzerland and Austria offered lucrative contracts to
28
German specialists in 1966 and 1967. Should they have operationalized
an aircraft atomic delivery system, the Chinese would have matched an
American capability of twenty years earlier.
Instead, China's next step, which became known one year later,
A
The TU-4 was from the PLAAF 25th Air Division at Sian, whose
bomber crews reportedly had practiced weapon delivery for three months










p. 98. It was reported that a noted German rocketry
expert had contracted with the Chinese government to build a rocket
base. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, April 16,




was to develop a bomb with a ten-fold increase in yield. The test of
May 8, 1966 resulted in a 200 KT explosion.
29
Six months later, in a test that Chien Hsueh-shen probably
found rewarding, a 20 KT weapon was sent to the target area in the nose-
cone of a short range missile. This was twenty-one months after General
Wang announced the missile program.
On December 28, 1966, the largest Chinese weapon to date,
yielding over 200 KT, detonated above the target area after a flight of
30
500 miles. Once again there has not been conclusive evidence of an
attempt to operationalize any of these weapons or delivery systems, al-
though this could have been done. China may have been striving for much
more advanced systems and thus may have avoided the expense of establish-
ing military units with equipment already inferior to that of the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. Such a decision squares with the Chinese Communist
philosophy of frugality as well as making good sense militarily. But
a decision on deployment of a nuclear weapons system soon would be
necessary, as China progressed to the missile-hydrogen period.
29
0n October 27, 1966.
30Whether this weapon was delivered to the test site target
by aircraft or missile is not known. The U.S. Secretary of Defense in-
dicated the former, but Chinese authorities told Francis James it had
been "fired" 500 miles. Francis James, "In China's Wild West,"
The Times (London), June 15, 1969.
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The Missile—Hydrogen Period, 1967-1970
In June, 1967 China tested a fusion device with a yield of
three megatons. It has been reported that this was a lithium-6 (Lie)
31
bomb. Six months later a 15-25 KT explosion in China was evaluated
as a test failure in the West, although Chinese officials subsequently
32indicated they had been testing an H-bomb trigger." In any event,
there have been no indications of failures in any subsequent Chinese
tests: December 27, 1968, 3 MT; September 23, 1969, 25 KT underground;
September 29, 1969, 3 MT; and October 14, 1970, 3 MT. These tests at
the end of the decade indicate that the Chinese were settling on a 3 MT
warhead design, and were refining the engineering of an operational
33fusion weapons system.
Chinese missile technology had matched Chinese nuclear ad-
vances. In April, 1970 a 380 pound satellite was inserted into orbit
34by a two-stage missile. The Chinese satellite, although more than
twice as heavy as the Soviet Sputnik of 1957, received less attention.
31
James, op. cit . The Secretary of Defense has indicated that
this bomb may have been delivered by bomber. Bueschel, op. cit
. ,
p. 99,
indicates that the H-bomb was delivered by bomber, and detonated at high
altitude. An RAF jet bomber dropped Britain's first experimental H-bomb
in 1957.
32
James, op. cit . However, the Chinese may have been dis-
sembling.
33
The AEC considered the eleventh test as "another step in the
continuing effort to convert experimental nuclear equipment into usable
weapons." The New York Times , October 15, 1970.
One of the better news analyses on the first Chinese satel-
lite was by Neal Stanford in The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1970.
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However, as surely as Soviet ICBMs followed Sputnik within two years,
a Chinese ICBM capability seemed imminent.
More evidence toward a complete picture of the Chinese mis-
sile capability was presented late in 1970, when it was announced in
Washington that "well-placed sources" believed that a small number of
600-1000 mile range missiles had been kept in firing readiness at Chinese
35test-launch sites. The discovery was termed "recent." How long these
ready MRBMs had been deployed is sheer conjecture. Did the twelve MRBM
test firings in 1967 mean some MRBM deployment as early as 1968?
China's missile proficiency gained further prestige when the
second Chinese satellite, launched March 3, 1971, reportedly weighed
Of.
486 pounds. Subsequently, a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman in-
dicated that the launching vehicle might have ICBM applications (e.g.,
it might be able to deliver a small payload to the United States, but
37
not a 3 MT thermonuclear warhead).
Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense reported that China
38
might have tested an ICBM on a reduced range trajectory late in 1970.
35
The New York Times , November 23, 1970. For further develop-
ment of this report, see below, p. 188.
of.
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, March 16, 1971.
The thirteen-day delay from launching to announcement is somewhat myster-
ious.
37







The Chinese atomic weapon-bomber delivery capability had been
separated from a similar U.S. development by twenty years. The initial
Chinese H-Bomb capability had been achieved thirteen years after the
Soviet capability (1954); sixteen years after the first U.S. H-device
(1951). The initial Chinese satellite launching capability had been
separated from Sputnik by thirteen years. In 1970, China was closely
approaching the technical equivalency, if not the numerical equivalency,
of U.S. and Soviet missile systems of the 1958-1960 period.
While numbers of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery sys-
tems available to Chinese strategists were not great, they nevertheless
had significant military and political meaning. The following section
of this chapter presents several estimates of current Chinese atomic
warfare capabilities and evaluates their strategic significance.
Estimates and Implications of Current Chinese Nuclear
Capabilities
In 1969, Chinese officials placed their production of Pu„_ q
at 300 kg. per year at the Yemen plant and 30 kg. per year at the Paotaw
plant. An unspecified amount of fissionable material (U235) is produced
39
at the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow. Together, according to an
American journalist, these plants might be capable of producing enough
40
material for over sixty bombs a year. Assuming production has been
39James , op. cit .
40





constant and increasing, China could deploy an inventory of 200 or more
nuclear weapons—basically atomic weapons, but a few hydrogen bombs.
The Institute for Strategic Studies, however, believing that the Chinese
supply of fissile material was limited, preferred a more conservative
estimate: about 120 atomic weapons of nominal (20 KT) yield, or a smaller
42
number of weapons if hydrogen bombs were included. The U.S. Secretary
of Defense estimated in 1970 that the Chinese U235 stockpile was suffi-
cient for only a few dozen weapons "of any type," a statistic accepted
44by S.I. P. R.I. But the U.S. estimate seemed to refer only to hydrogen
bombs suitable for ICBM warheads. In the context of IRBM or MRBM pro-
duction, the Secretary of Defense spoke of the possibility of 100 mis-
45
siles being deployed at "any time," and if each of these were fitted
with a Pu239 atomic warhead, the Defense estimate of the total Chinese
stockpile level, including U235 and Pu239 weapons, would substantially
agree with that of the I.S.S.
Using an approximation for the minimum critical mass for a
46
Pu239 explosion of 7 kg., and assuming a rising level of Pu239 produc-
41
Ibid . Also see The New York Times , October 13, 1970.
42
I.S.S. , The Military Balance, 1970-71 , op. cit ., p. 56.
43
U.S. Senate, Joint Hearings of the Armed Services Committee
on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1971, "Statement of Secre-
tary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, February 20, 1970" (Subsequent reference
will be to the Laird Statement ), pp. 37-38, 45-48, 106.
44








Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread ? Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1966, p. 38.

70
tion in China from 1963 to 1970, with the last three years at a constant
production level of 330 kg. , it can be calculated that China could have
about 230 7-kg. atomic bombs. This calculation tends to coincide with
journalistic estimates. However, it is doubtful that the Chinese would
manufacture all low-yield bombs. If the per-bomb requirement for Pu239
were higher, therefore, a lesser number of higher-yield atomic weapons
would result. This reasoning tends to substantiate the Secretary of De-
fense commentary and the I.S.S. estimate.
As far as delivery vehicles were concerned, journalistic re-
ports emphasized the possibility of a fairly large Chinese intermediate
or medium range missile force in addition to the Chinese bomber force.
After all,
...the Chinese produced their first
missiles of 450-650 mile range in 1963. By
1966 they were up to 1200 miles, and in 1969
were on the verge of an intercontinental ca-
pability. 47
There was one report of a complete Chinese IRBM complex near Nagchu Dzong
in western China which, when fully operational, would hold all the border
states from Afghanistan to Vietnam and much of the Sino-Soviet frontier
48
within range. Another missile launching complex in Manchuria was re-
49
ported in the Fall of 1970.
However, the U.S. government estimate of Chinese missile capa-
bility much more conservatively indicated that the Chinese
47
Salisbury, op. cit






The New York Times, November 23, 19 70.
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...threat is currently limited to
air-delivered nuclear weapons, but an oper-
ational medium range ballistic missile could
be deployed at any time... The start of flight
testing for an ICBM is expected in 1970...
[if so]... the Chinese could have as many as
10-25 ICBMs in 1975.50
A solid-propellant manufacturing facility has been completed, and the
Chinese ICBM of 1975 might therefore be expected to be similar to the
U.S. Minuteman.
The Soviet Union has been tightlipped about the Chijj^se nuclear
52production and delivery capability. A few rare insights hav^^ppeared
in the East European press: Soviet experts play down the militarj^^lue
of Chinese atomic missile forces and think that American journalistic
sources tend to overestimate the significance and danger posed to the
Soviet Union. The Soviet experts believe that the small number of a-
tomic and hydrogen weapons, as well as the satellite-launching rocket,
53
are all "of laboratory size." Although the Soviet experts did not refer


















Istvan Koermendy, "Soviet Union-China," Magyar-Orszag (Buda-
pest), Nos. 31-35, August 2, 9, 16, 23, and 29, 1970.
A Czech journalist, however, reported that Chinese engineers
had succeeded, during 1967-1970, in developing a one megaton warhead and
a compact warhead capable of missile delivery. Why? "To gain a hege-
monistic position within the framework of socialist society" (e.g., poli-
tical supremacy over the U. S . S.R. ). Dr . M. Dubovsky, "Why and Against Whom?
Reflections on the Launching of the Chinese Satellite," Rude Pravo
(Prague), July 15, 1970, p. 7.
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the East European journalist, chances are that agreement between them
would be fairly close.
If the Chinese nuclear capability lies between the conservative
U.S. and Soviet governmental figures and the more inflated journalistic
54
estimates, it nevertheless poses a definite threat to Soviet Far
Eastern population centers. Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nakhodka, Blagov-
eshchensk, Komsomolsk-na-Amur, Chita, and Irkutsk. U.S. installations
in Japan, Okinawa, South Vietnam, and ships of the Seventh Fleet could
be taken under fire, as could the island of Formosa. The Chi
1970 could not threaten Moscow, Leningrad, Washington, or San
cisco, but they indeed could hold substantial American overseas aflP^Bo-
viet Far Eastern populations "at risk." As Chou En-lai put it, China
had broken the nuclear duopoly of the superpowers.
54
The author tends to favor the higher estimates. The Secre-
tary of Defense has said "...with only a relatively few shots the Chi-








p. 108. It is valuable to compare Soviet nuclear
stockpile development in the early 1950s. A 1951 estimate called for
60 atomic weapons; a 1952 projection indicated 130 warheads by 1953,
200 by 1954, and 270 by 1955. Associated Universities, Inc., Report
on Project East River , New York, 1952, quoted in Quester, op. cit . p. 77
Chou En-lai interview with French correspondents Debre and
Parbot, July 14, 1970, reported by Peking, NCNA International Service
in English, July 28, 1970. Chou f s remarks subsequently were officially
disseminated in his message to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Na-
tions' Chiefs of State and Heads of Government in Lusaka, Zambia. This
prompted a Soviet counterargument . Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in
Mandarin to China, September 9, 1970.
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Those arguing against the credibility of the Chinese nuclear
force in 1970 could point out that since China had always sworn to a
doctrine of "no first use" and that since the Chinese force was rather
primitive by U.S. or Soviet standards, it was probably vulnerable to a
first strike—and not a credible deterrent. However, this appraisal
seems of doubtful validity. The Chinese opportunity for dispersal is
excellent. The Chinese historically have been adept at deception. The
Chinese bomber force, twin-jet TU-14s and Il-28s as well as even more
obsolete TU-4s, is sufficiently large in numbers to facilitate a de-
ceptive dispersal of the small number of Chinese weapons. Dispersion
and deception would be further enhanced if the weapons were sized so as
to be deliverable by Chinese Air Force MiG-17s in the fighter-bomber
version. Moreover, there were some tentative indications of Chinese
hardening:
By the end of 1970 all atomic instal-
lations must be hidden underground. . -Military
industries have been relocated to Sinkiang and
Szechwan provinces. . .Hoffmann, a representative
of West German monopolies. . .has. . .visited mili-
tary plants in which not a single representative
of a socialist state. . .has .. .set foot... 56
According to the Institute for Strategic Studies,
Dimitrov, op. cit . Additionally, Japanese, Canadian, and
British reporters in China reported many instances of Chinese excava-
tion, probably for civil defense purposes, in early 1970.
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The practical difficulty of eradicating
the Chinese nuclear potential may help to en-
courage Soviet reluctance to launch any major
attack on China. 57
The strong possibility that even one Chinese nuclear weapon
58
in one obsolete bomber, or in one MRBM, or on the single Chinese mis-
sile-launching submarine, would survive a superpower preemptive strike
and then successfully destroy a superpower city probably is enough
59
to deter that superpower. The essence of the persuasive thesis of
McGeorge Bundy is that not one world political leader will knowingly ac-
60
cept the total destruction of even one of his cities. There are de-
finite indications that the Soviet leadership would not be willing to
risk Vladivostok, and, according to Bundy, no U.S. president in the
I.S.S., Strategic Survey, 1969
,
p. 72. Similar practical
difficulties probably had been envisaged by the U.S.S.R. during consi-
deration in the late 1940s of whether to try a preemptive strike against
the U.S. stockpile in New Mexico, and by the U.S. during consideration
in the early 1950s of whether to try a preemptive strike against Soviet





PLAAF bomber crews are generally well-trained and have exten-
sive air force service. Most senior personnel were trained in Soviet
flight schools. Bueschel, op. cit
. , pp. 33-34.
59
In the U.S. -Soviet interaction, early U.S. deployment of
vulnerable liquid-fueled ICBMs complicated the Soviet attack problem and
made the Kremlin think of losing Leningrad or Moscow. The Atlas test
missiles were still malfunctioning when operational Atlases were being
deployed.
60
McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," Foreign Affairs , Vol.
48, No. 1 (October, 1969), pp. 1-20.
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nuclear age has been willing to contemplate sacrificing any U.S. or
allied city. Decisionmakers are aware that it is utterly impossible
to accurately calculate a strategic exchange, and that, therefore,
there is always a high probability that one weapon could get through to
destroy one of their cities.
Thus very small numbers of nuclear weapons, and even very ele-
mental delivery systems, can be sufficient as a deterrent.
By the mid-1970s, of course, when the Chinese probably will
have deployed some twenty-five or even seventy-five ICBMs , the strategic
situation prevailing in the world would be much more tenuous than in
1970. For instance, this Chinese force could put, at a minimum, eleven
million, and at a maximum, twenty-three million, U.S. citizens to death,
But, for the immediate purposes of this inquiry, knowledge of the growth
of the Chinese nuclear capability during the years 1964-1970, and Chi-
nese strength in 1970, is sufficient.
York, op. cit




p. 168. This philosophy, of course, was the basis of
de Gaulle's decision on the force de dissuasion , and is a useful argu-
ment for those who favor nuclear proliferation. The Chinese, however,
probably had more justification for developing their force de dissuasion
than did the French.
For a thought-provoking essay on the increasing inutility of
force as an option for national leaders, see Klaus Knorr, On The Uses of
Military Power in the Nuclear Age , Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966.
Laird Statement , op. cit . , p. 43. The figure is based on
25 ICBMs, each with 3 MT warheads, and a 40% reliability. Thus the
casualty estimate is highly sensitive to the reliability assumption.
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During the years 1964-1967, when Chinese forces clashed with
U.S. forces and Peking may have evaluated the U.S. as the major threat
to' China, the Chinese nuclear capability was very small and limited to
atomic weapons delivered by aircraft. By 1968-1970, however, when Chi-
nese "forces clashed with Soviet forces and Peking probably evaluated
the Soviet Union as the major threat to China, the Chinese nuclear
force had incorporated thermonuclear weapons and missile as well as
bomber delivery capabilities. The succeeding two chapters will attempt
to ascertain whether these changing capabilities were reflected in dif-
fering modes of Chinese conduct toward the superpowers and in their
modes of conduct toward China, as major conflictive political-military




The Chinese-American Interaction, 1964-1967
Introduction
Chinese-American relations over the decades since Yankee clip-
pers sailed the far Pacific have proceeded in "love-hate" cycles. In
the late 1930s and 1940s the Roosevelt-Chiang Kai-shek coalition against
Japan moved relations to a high point on a "love" node. But Mao's ac-
cession to power on the mainland in 1949 caused a great reactive swing
to a "hate" node. By and large, Chinese-American relations have been
marked with mutual and often noncomprehending public hostility ever
since. The period 1964-1967 provides a valuable example, because hos-
tilities then reached a pitch equal to, if not greater than, that at
any other time since the Korean War. Only in 1968 and 1969, after Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam
and Richard Nixon's conciliatory campaign remarks concerning China, would
fever lessen and the two giant states relax into a wary and hostilely
suspicious interactive pattern—but without bloodshed.
This chapter will examine in detail the fevered period, 1964-
196 7, of Chinese-American relations. The presentation will be topical
rather than chronological. A similar topical presentation of material
on Soviet-Chinese interaction will be made in Chapter 5 in order to
facilitate the comparison and conclusions of the study. However, before
proceeding with the presentation on these critical years, it will be





The Interaction in Perspective: Hostility Since 1949.
It is probably the epitome of wishful thinking to entertain
any hope whatsoever that the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung
would ever have adopted a conciliatory and at least partially forth-
coming attitude toward the United States, the "imperialist aggressor."
One way to have tested the concept of a "live-and-let-live" Chinese-
American Utopia would have been for Washington to renounce the battered
Chiang government and extend recognition to the new Peking government in
1949. With the Cold War deepening day by day and the prevailing concep-
tion of a monolithic International Communism directed from Moscow almost
a dogma in the West, this simply was not a reasonable option. Instead,
"containment" of the Soviet Union was extended to China. As it turned
out, "containing" Communist China required nearly as much military equip-
ment, and many more American lives, than did "containment" of the Soviet
Union. Interacting policy decisions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union
soon brought Chinese and American troops into battle in Korea. Casual-
ties resulting from this bloody war left permanent scars on both parti-
cipants, even on their top leaderships. Mao An-ying, an air division
commander in the PLAAF, was either shot down by U.S. fighters, or caught
on the ground in his headquarters by U.S. bombers, in 1950. He did not
survive. Mao Tse-tung would not readily forget the loss of his son.
While there was no corresponding bitter occurrence involving very top-
level decision-makers on the U.S. side, American casualties were so high
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as to leave an unwritten but firm resolve in the U.S. that the Chinese
regime would never knowingly be allowed future benefit from any U.S. ac-
tion.
In order for Washington to remain currently appraised of Pe-
king's activities, close surveillance of China was established by U.S.
air and naval units. By nature passive, this surveillance effort occa-
sionally by accident, and sometimes by design, became provocative.
Interceptions and air and sea battles resulted, with some casualties in-
flicted on both sides. The U.S. surveillance/patrol effort, conducted
by Task Force 72 of the Seventh Fleet and by special Air Force units
operating "Flying Platform" RB-47s, extended for the length of the Chi-
nese coastline—a continuing expensive major military effort that, while
informationally and in some ways politically valuable to Washington, un-
doubtedly continued to provoke the Chinese.
In addition to the occasionally provocative peripheral sur-
veillance effort a second development in the late 1950s thoroughly ag-
gravated Peking. Nearly concurrently with the Chinese-Soviet agreement
on aid for "advanced" weapons systems (1957), the U.S. commenced high
2
altitude deep penetration flights over China with U-2 aircraft. For
For instance, to check on Chinese air defense reaction times
and to ascertain Chinese combat radar frequencies, a surveillance aircraft
might suddenly turn toward the Chinese coast rather than paralleling it.
2
Francis Gary Powers, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot
Tells His Story for the First Time , New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1970, pp. 67-68, 129; also see Bueschel, op. cit . , pp. 57-58.
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several years the U-2's were beyond reach of Chinese interceptors or
missiles, highlighting Peking's impotency against rapidly advancing
American technology. Moreover, the U-2 penetrations over China, unlike
those over the Soviet Union but similar to all incursions by U.S. air-
craft or ships on the China periphery, were legal if Taipei's interpre-
tation of rights stemming from its claim to be the sole legitimate
government of China is accepted.
In the early 1960s U-2 surveillance operations were turned over
to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force: Chinese aviators flew U-2s over
their homeland and were sometimes shot down by PLA missiles.
One area of China especially concerned the United States: the
coast opposite Taiwan. With the Korean truce barely a month old, U.S.
naval aircraft made a special reconnaissance in force—some 300 carrier-
based fighters and bombers were employed—over'Chekiang and Fukien pro-
vinces. Flying low directly over the mainland in a flamboyant maneuver
to check on Chinese air dispositions and strength, they were unopposed by
Mao's interceptors. However, this was not always the case. The Formosa
Strait, like the entry corridors to Berlin, became a permanent locus of
confrontation.
The Strait was a more frequent graveyard than the corridors.
It is possible to describe Chinese-American relations since Korea as a





pp. 28-30. The author provides a vivid




crises occurred quadrennially: 1954, 1958, and 1962. The crises were
patterned very similarly: China threatened the Nationalist offshore is-
lands; the U.S. countered with a force level build-up sufficient to in-
sure Chinese failure; the Soviet Union refused to make up the Chinese
deficit. Although individually and collectively these special con-
frontations must have been grossly disheartening and disillusioning on
three counts, Washington's intransigence, Moscow's lack of support, and
Chinese Nationalist military successes, Peking's resolve to bring Taiwan
back under the ancient hegemony of the mainland has never faltered. Thus
the Formosa Strait remained a critical area during the Chinese-American
interaction in 1964-67. It continues as the foremost problem area be-
tween China and the United States today.
Perceptions of the Early 1960s
The Kennedy Administration succeeded to office convincingly
briefed to the effect that the Far Eastern situation, particularly in
Indochina and especially in Laos, was critical, and that few U.S. options
4
The crises are described well by, inter alia , Hinton, op. cit .
,
and Hsieh, op. cit . Also see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
The Control of Local Conflict: Case Studies
,
Vol. IV, "Far Eastern Case
Studies," Waltham, Mass: Browne and Shaw Division of Bolt, Beranek, and
Newman, Inc., August 15, 1969, pp. 59-105.
Charles A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political
Controversy: the Quemoy Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution
,
Vol. 6,
No. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 201-13.
Between May 11, 1954 and February 16, 1961, the Nationalists







there were promising. There was not much validity remaining in the
1954 Geneva settlement. The fraternal hand, if not the paternal gui-
dance, of Peking was seen behind most moves of the Indochinese, Laotian,
Thai, and Burmese Communists. Tibet had been seized and taken behind
the "bamboo curtain," and the Chinese-Indian border conflict looked
ominous. Indonesia under Sukarno was militant and sympathetic to China.
Doctrines of "people's wars of national liberation" emanating from
Peking, embellished by Hanoi, and seconded by Moscow, seemed difficult
to counter with any readily available weapons. Looming above the threat
of Chinese-backed guerrilla warfare was the spectre of an imminent Chi-
o
nese nuclear capability, undoubtedly substantiated by U-2 photography.
Nothing in the U.S. -Chinese record of the 1950s indicated a possibility
of change in the 1960s. President Kennedy said
Our problem now, of course, is that
with the rise of the Communist power in China
combined with an expansionist, Stalinist phi-
losophy, our major problem... is how we can
contain the expansion of Communism in Asia so
that we do not find the Chinese moving out
into a dominant position in all of Asia...
There are a billion people in the Communist
empire operating from central lines and in a
belligerent phase of their national develop-
ment. So that I think this is a period of
great danger for Asia...
9
Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days , Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett Crest, 1967, pp. 299-302.
Q
Stuart Alsop, "A Conversation with President Kennedy," The
Saturday Evening Post , January 1, 1966, p. 9, reported that this subject
troubled President Kennedy more deeply than any other.
9
Public Paper s of the Presidents of the Uni ted States: John F .
Kennedy, 1962, pp. 850-51.
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and predicted that his successor would have to deal with an expansionist
China armed with nuclear weapons and missiles.
These American perceptions certainly were based on evidence
other than military moves, for the PLA, not particularly mobile in the
first instance, and possessing increasingly obsolete equipment, remained
quiescent. The U.S. actually was seeking a valid mode of response to a
predominantly political offensive of Peking's which opportunistically
capitalized on military moves by any and all Asian communist parties and
governments. But the U.S. response finally determined was perhaps more
heavily weighted on the military side than the political.
Thus it was not unreasonable for Peking to perceive a defini-
tive and growing threat to China being prepared by a much more dynamic
American administration than its predecessor. President Kennedy opted n'
for a temporary settlement for Laos, but sent a large number of military
advisors (1961) and helicopters and crews (1962) to South Vietnam.
Building conventional forces to a level that hopefully would be effective
in two simultaneous major wars and one localized operation, the U.S. con-
currently embarked on a tremendous increase in its strategic warfare
capability. Minutemen and Polaris missile systems rapidly entered the




p. 887. Quester, op. cit.
,
p. 191, opines that it was
the imminent Chinese nuclear capability rather than Peking's political
offensive that brought about a "significant [U.S.] alteration of resource
allocation vis a vis China..."
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pansion was directed against Chinese aspirations. The President's per-
sonal involvement in an expansion of Army Special Forces, whose mission
had been drastically modified from behind-the-lines post-nuclear strike
operations to counter-guerrilla operations, anywhere, any time, also
was correctly assessed by Peking as a development dangerous to Chinese
interests.
In the 1962 to early 1964 period, Special Forces operations in
Indochina were stepped up, the Seventh Fleet exercised in the Formosa
Straits, peripheral surveillance of China was intensified, high altitude
penetrations of China by Nationalist U-2s were augmented by USAF RB-57
and A-ll (now SR-71) operations, fifteen B-52s were deployed to Guam, and
Polaris missile submarines began to deploy to the Western Pacific, all
of which substantiated Peking's perception of an increasingly militant
opponent.
The U.S. also extended its containment effort to include the
far southwest border area of China. Although a U.S. -Indian mutual defense
treaty did not exist, incidents on the disputed Sino-Indian border result-
ed in U.S. military deliveries to India in 1963, and, in November 1963,
a joint U. S. -U.K. -Indian air defense exercise. This exercise was roundly
rebuked by Peking; apparently it greatly disturbed the Chinese leader-
ship. Peking's weak southwestern neighbor also was being given poli-
"War Drums Beat Louder," Peking Review , No. 44, November 1,
1963, pp. 21-22; "The Truth About How the Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Have
Allied Themselves With India Against China," Peking Review , No. 45, Novem-




tico-military support by more frequent excursions of U.S. Seventh Fleet
12
warships into the Indian Ocean, and it was becoming highly likely, in
Peking's view, that any expansionist moves on the part of China or
Southeast Asian communists would be countered by U.S. military force.
13While the U.S. feared a "major push" by Communism in Asia,
Peking had accused Washington of "making active preparations for a new
"1 / 1 F
war," and of preparing a war base in Asia. In 1966 a retrospective
evaluation of the developments of the early 1960s by the Chinese, and
also by responsible officials in Washington, emphasized an eastward shift
in U.S. global strategy. Washington contended that the eastward shift
12
"Indian Press Embarrassed," Peking Review
, No. 2, January
10, 1964, pp. 23-24.
13
The New York Times
, July 31, 1963.
14
"Commentator," "Warning to U.S. Aggressors," Peking Review
,
No. 37, September 14, 1962, pp. 8-9; also see "U.S. Aggressors in the
Dock" in the subsequent issue of ibid
. , p. 6.
"Brinkmanship in Laos," Peking Review
,
No. 24, June 23, 1964,
p. 34.
"Correspondent," Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)
,
Peking, Febru-
ary 1, 1966. In the U.S., Secretary of Defense McNamara said on February
23, 1966 that
...The focus of the U.S. defense
problem has shifted to the Far East. Overt
aggression by the Warsaw Pact countries in
Europe. .. seems increasingly unlikely as long
as we maintain our military strength and
unity.
—Testimony before a Joint Session of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense
Appropriations and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
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was entirely a reaction to Chinese expansionism that had taken the form
of indirect aggression by proxy guerrilla forces; Peking would hold,
with some justification, that what little the Chinese had done by them-
selves did not warrant a large-scale U.S. eastward shift. In Chinese
eyes the increased U.S. activity spelled aggression. Peking subsequently
has never failed to insist on this interpretation.
The Chinese commenced indigenous military operations against
high altitude penetration flights in the 1962-63 period, probably with
Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles. Nationalist-operated U-2s
were downed in China in September 1962 and November 1963. But mili-
tary action involving U.S. forces and Chinese Nationalist forces did not
18
commence in earnest until mid-1964, when the Chinese-American confron-
tation, in its Indochinese aspect, began to escalate. Once started, how-
ever, Chinese-American military engagements continued, with varying fre-
quency and intensity, until early 1968.
As this crisis period is discussed in detail, it will be im-
portant to remember two things. First, that American operations in Viet-
nam had been undertaken, according to the retrospective view of former
Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, because
...great power forces within the
area were seen in starkly bi-polar terms:
the "East Wind" of China was blowing strong-
A Chinese Nationalist RB-57D had been downed in October, 1959,
and an RF-101 downed in August, 1961, both at lower altitudes.
18




ly and thrustingly versus a "West Wind"
which was pretty much American alone.
Indonesia was tilted far to the left, al-
most wholly aligned with China ,.. .Then, if
ever, a Hanoi takeover of South Vietnam
seemed likely, in conjunction with other
trends, to make probable not only North
Vietnamese domination in the Indochina area
but a wave of Chinese expansion into the
rest of Southeast Asia. 19
Thus, while the brunt of U.S. operations fell on North and South Vietnam,
operational exigencies sometimes involved Chinese territory and Chinese
forces directly. This did not necessarily mean that they were erroneous,
misplaced, or untimely, as far as Washington was concerned. It was China
20
that was being countered, after all. However, in Peking's view, the
entire U.S. operation in Vietnam was aggressive, and direct operations
against China or Chinese forces only made matters worse.
Second, it will be important to keep in mind that Chinese ini-
tiatives and responses vis a vis the U.S. in the South probably were al-
ways tempered in some way by the developing conflict situation with the
19
William P. Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," Foreign Af-
fairs
,
Vol. 49, No. 2. (January, 1971), pp. 187-88. (Italics added.)
An indication of the predominance of Chinese aid to Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese troops was revealed in a report on weapons and ammunition






p. 270: "To refute Peking while fight-
ing Hanoi might be... just as reasonable as Hanoi's policy of allowing the
















Soviets in the North. The Soviet-Chinese disagreement was developing in
intensity throughout the 1964-67 period; its early military manifesta-
tions on the border must have given Peking pause as to how definitive
Chinese actions could or should be in the South. Moreover, Peking often
has viewed Soviet moves in Vietnam as objectively anti-Chinese and there-
fore collusive with the U.S., while Moscow has opined that the Vietnam
war long would have been settled in Hanoi's favor had China acted in
coordination with the international communist movement. Developments
in the split provided opportunities as well as dangers for Washington
throughout the critical period. Some special ramifications of the Soviet-
Chinese disagreement for the U.S. -Chinese interaction will be presented
in more detail in the penultimate section of this chapter, but an aware-
ness of the relevance of the Sino-Soviet rift is a necessary backdrop to
the intervening sections.
Third, it should be understood that the succeeding sections of
this chapter, the Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Military
Engagement, the Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Political
Dialogue, and the Tacit Exchange, constitute different modes of observa-
tion, or observation from different vantage points, of very closely in-
terrelated political and military events. The reader is invited to review
our introductory remarks in which an analog, in the form of a telegraph
21







to listen in on the messages and events passing along each strand and
each filament of that cable of interaction. As we monitor these various
channels, our review will be chronological. Thus when we have completed
the 1964-1967 period in one channel, it will be necessary to step back
in time, picking up the next channel in 1964, and then taking it through
1967, etc. It is acknowledged that this procedure may result in some
duplication and overlap. The reader will recall that our analog indi-
cated that the poor insulation of the cable meant that inductance or
"cross- talk" would occur. However, despite this overlap, the categorized
mode of presentation that results from applying a method of chronological
monitoring to the analog ultimately will result in a complete and clear
understanding of a very complex international interaction.
I. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Military Engagement
The Conventional Engagement
U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia generally is dated
from the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August and September, 1964, involving
U.S. destroyers, North Vietnamese torpedo boats, and U.S. carrier air-
craft. The Tonkin Gulf scenario by now must be familiar to everyone.
But more important to this presentation is an earlier direct U.S. -Chi-
nese clash in June, 1964, in Laos.
U. S. -sponsored air activity against the Pathet Lao had been
increased in Laos in the late spring of 1964. On June 8th, U.S. fighter-
bombers attacked a communist installation, the Chinese Economic and Cul-
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tural Mission, at Khang Khay on the Plain des Jarres. A Chinese official
was killed in this raid, and Peking loudly protested. The Chinese verbal
response was vehement: the U.S. was warned of a Laotian war; emergency
talks were demanded; the Chinese people went into mourning; and a great
military review was held in Peking. But a counteractive Chinese mili-
tary response was not forthcoming. Instead, Peking asserted that the
U.S. would be "punished" and promised more aid to Hanoi.
Chinese defenses were sharpened and Chinese missilemen began
to exact an increasing toll of Chinese Nationalist, and later, U.S. sur-
veillance aircraft. A Nationalist U-2 was shot down in July, 1964,
followed by a reconnaissance drone aircraft in November, 1964, an RF-101
22
in December, and another U-2, the fourth, in January, 1965.
In February, 1965, responding to rocket or mortar attacks on
U.S. facilities in South Vietnam, the United States began bombing mili-
tary installations and supply routes in North Vietnam. This automati-
cally routed U.S. aircraft near China's southern border. Chinese terri-
tory was overflown, Chinese targets were hit (usually by accident), and
both Chinese and U.S. aircraft were shot down.
Peking has described the ensuing Chinese-U.S. military struggle
on numerous occasions. A recent version states
Especially noteworthy is the in-
creasing frequency and ferocity of U.S.
22
Wreckage of the four Nationalist U-2s shot down between 1961




intrusions into China's territorial waters
and air space since 1964, when U.S. imper-
ialism expanded its war of aggression in
Indo-China. On many occasions, American
warships and aircraft went so far as to
recklessly shell, strafe, or bomb Chinese
airplanes, fishing boats, merchant ships,
and inhabitants living in border areas.
They destroyed Chinese civilian houses,
killed or wounded Chinese fisherman and
once shot down a Chinese plane in train-
ing flight. They have posed a grave
threat to the Chinese people and caused
serious losses to them in life and pro-
perty. 23
The account continues with an accurate catalog of U.S. and Nationalist
aircraft losses to Chinese air defense units. But for purposes of this
study, a record of U.S. losses and Chinese losses has been compiled
from U.S. sources and is presented in tabular form:
American, Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist Losses,
1964-1968*








6-8-64 Khang Khay, Laos,
strafed, official
killed





"Anti-PRC Provocations Continue," Peking, NCNA International
Service in English, June 27, 19 70. Also in Peking Review , Vol. 13, No.






















































12-17-66 Embassy in Hanoi
bombed
2-22-67 Fisherman killed
6-29-67 Ship in Haiphong
seriously dam-
aged




























*Note: Data taken from the M.I.T. Center for International Studies Pro-
ject on Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution files, except for the en-
try on Liu Ya-lou, reported in Bueschel, op. cit
.
,
p. 83. Bueschel also
includes an exciting journalistic account of many of the engagements
listed above, on pp. 61-66.
The table is valuable as much for what it does not show as for
the information it presents. Considering the size of forces involved,
and the numbers of air and naval sorties conducted by each side in prox-
imity to the other, remarkably few losses were incurred by either. The
enormous sortie level of the U.S. in the Vietnam War is well known.
For their part, Chinese fighter aircraft also occasionally
flew from Vietnam. In January, 1966, during an American bombing suspen-
sion, Chinese MiG-21 fighters reportedly were rotated between Red China
and Vietnamese airfields northwest of Hanoi. But they returned to China
24







nese air exercises along the borders of southern China and at the three
main airfields on Hainan Island since May, 1965. More than 200 Chinese
25interceptors could be scrambled at any time. But they normally were
not scrambled, because U.S. units normally did not penetrate Chinese
airspace. China promulgated serious warnings number 300 through number
452 from June 30, 1964 to March 19, 1968 in response to alleged U.S. in-
trusions. But many of these flights were over Chinese-claimed islands
in the South China Sea, not over the mainland.
Thus the overt conventional military interactive pattern is
mainly characterized by mutual restraint. Those engagements that did
occur were basically in an air-to-air, air-to-sea, or air-to-ground pat-
tern, with a few rather traditional but small-scale sea battles in the
Formosa Strait, with no ground-to-ground actions on the record even
7 ft
though some Chinese construction battalion troops were in North Vietnam.





Such ground combat actions as did occur during the period
were of a covert nature, either Nationalist commando raids or intelli-
gence gathering units launched from Formosa, Quemoy, or Matsu, or CIA
directed intelligence teams of non-U. S. personnel operating from Laos
into China. Peking complained repeatedly about these operations. See
the NCNA broadcast of June 27, 1970, noted previously, for a good exam-
ple. Another typical broadcast referred to the release of 64 captured
"U.S. -Chiang Kai-shek armed agents and 12 boatmen." Peking, NCNA Dom-
estic Service in Chinese, December 15, 1965. Regarding Chinese con-






concerns the introduction into combat of new weapons systems. Once again,
the pattern is one of marked mutual restraint. VThat noticeable upgraded
equipment introduced by the Chinese during the 1964-67 period was limited
to aircraft systems. There were no introductions of improved ground or
naval weapon systems. As it was, China mainly operated Shenyang air-
craft factory versions of the MiG-17 and MiG-19 throughout the period.
A few Chinese manufactured MiG-21s were introduced in February, 1965.
Even the MiG-21 was hardly a match for the sophisticated and powerful
F-4 operated by USAF and USN squadrons.
For its part, the United States introduced a considerable
variety of new military hardware into the Vietnam conflict. But some
new weapons systems were on a trial basis (e.g., the five-plane F-lll
unit) and few of them were operated in combat situations with Chinese
units. (A new Navy attack bomber, the sub-sonic but sophisticated A-6,
did operate near the Chinese border. Two straying A-6s were promptly shot
27down by the PLAAF. ) U.S. Navy guided missile destroyers, operating in
the Tonkin Gulf, were equipped with new surface to air missiles effective
against aircraft over 80 miles away, threatening Chinese operations above
Hainan Island and the mainland. These SAMs were not fired against Chi-
nese aircraft.
7
The New York Times
,
August 22 and 23, 1967.
28




The Nuclear Warfare Option
What about the possible introduction of atomic weapons systems
into this critical situation? This would not have been a difficult
military problem for the United States. Both tactical and strategic nu-
clear weapons delivery systems were readily available in the Far East.
B-52s were operating over Vietnam from Guam and, later, Utapao, Thailand.
F-105s in use against North and South Vietnam were capable of delivering
tactical nuclear weapons, as were a series of carrier-based naval air-
craft including the A-3, A-4, F-4, and A-6. Three and often four air-
craft carriers were operating close to China throughout the crisis per-
iod—ships in which the Navy will "neither confirm nor deny" the pre-
sence of nuclear weapon armories. Backing up this available tactical
atomic capability, of course, was the Strategic Air Command's growing
missile and bomber force based in the United States. This cumulatively
massive striking force unquestionably could have been well targeted,
counterforce or countervalue, on Chinese targets. The high altitude re-
connaissance flights previously mentioned provided extensive targeting
information.
For their part, the Chinese did not have a nuclear option
early in the period. It will be recalled that the first Chinese nuclear
test was in October, 1964, the second in May, 1965. Assuming reasonable
plutonium production and warhead manufacturing rates, an inventory of,




end of the period. There is little doubt that some of these weapons
could have been delivered on American overseas installations during the
period late 1966 to early 1968, had the Chinese been so inclined, and
despite the limitations of their obsolete delivery systems.
Yet there is no authenticated information available to the
effect that either the U.S. or China even commenced, and then recalled,
military moves against the other with nuclear-armed forces. This is not
to say that such military moves were not rumored, particularly among U.S.
circles. Several reports circulated in 1965 and 1966 (they occasionally
are heard even today) that the U.S. was preparing to mount a strike on
Chinese nuclear installations from Formosa. But the evidence to back up
these reports is slim indeed. For instance, in a New Year's Day message,
1965. Chiang Kai-shek noted an obligation to destroy Communist nuclear
installations and advised all scientists and technicians to stay away
30from their jobs for their own safety. In March, 1965, it was revealed
in military testimony in the House of Representatives that the U.S. defi-
nitely had plans for the objective destruction of Chinese communist mili-
tary and industrial installations, including nuclear facilities, in case
31
of general conflict. In November, 1965, reports circulated that six






Taipei, CNA in Chinese, December 31, 1964.
31
Testimony of Major General John D. Lavelle, USAF, in U.S.,
Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Armed Services




U.S. attack. But these reports were not given credence by U.S. govern-
32
merit spokesmen. Whether there was substance to them, and, if so, whe-
ther an evacuation was commenced for fear of an imminent U.S. atomic
strike, has not been ascertainable as of this time.
Therefore, we are left with the facts that while there could
have been atomic-armed moves initiated by either side against the other,
there is no evidence that these moves occurred, or that they were even
started. The only evidence is that they may have been contemplated,
planned on a contingent basis. In the record of military interaction
concerning nuclear-armed units, there is considerable information on
capabilities
,
particularly on the U.S. side; there is both direct and
deductive information on the intentions of both sides; but there is
meagre, infinitesimal information on actual military moves of atomic-
armed units of either side. Did the secret PLA Second Artillery Division
move men and equipment nearer Formosa? Nearer to the Indochina fron-
tier? Did the PLAAF 25th Air Division at Sian load atomic weapons? Did
the USAF deploy these weapons to Formosa? To Thailand with the B-52s
there? Was there a retargeting of SAC ICBMs onto Chinese targets? We do
including H.R. 4016, Military Procurement for Fiscal Year 1966 , March 10,
11, and 12, 1965, Paper No. 7, p. 1169.
32
Le Monde (Paris), November 25, 1965, reporting a CBS telecast
by Marvin Kalb that was later declared unsubstantiable by the State De-
partment. On January 4, 1966 the Peking Daily disclosed that the PLA in






not know the answers to these questions. Perhaps such information never
will reach the public domain.
However, as a judgment, it can be held that the atomic confron-
tation of the U.S. and China was limited to verbal moves by both sides;
statements, such as Chiang's, probably were made for psychological ef-
fect. Therefore, the nuclear confrontation, like the conventional forces
confrontation of the two powers, can be characterized as a pattern of
continuing general mutual restraint.
Since the atomic confrontation dwelled in the realm of inten-
tions and capabilities, but not actions, it was perhaps as much a com-
ponent of the political interaction as of the direct military interac-
tion. Therefore, it will be addressed, once again, in the following
chronicle of the political dialogue between the powers.
II. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Political Dialogue
In marked contrast to the military interaction between China
and the United States during 1964-67, which was characterized by re-
straint at both the conventional and nuclear levels, the political inter-
action, or dialogue, between the two states during the same period is
best characterized as extensive and volatile. The political dialogue
between any two great nations, of course, consists of many components.
To simplify this presentation, a threefold categorization of the dialogue,
using a criterion of communication channels, has been selected: the first
is the irregular dialogue; the second, the public political dialogue;
and, the third, the diplomatic dialogue. Such a broad spectrum of pos-
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sibilities for dialogue surely reflects its extensive nature. But the
volatility of the dialogue must be illustrated in the presentation of
material for each category.
The Irregular Dialogue
The irregular dialogue includes material on political interaction
that might not necessarily enter the public domain as well as the ex-
change of information from one side to another by accident rather than
design. In the first instance, of course, would be the exchange of
delicate and important information between governments through their se-
cret intelligence channels. In the second instance would fall events
such as unattributed news releases, speculative news stories, semioffi-
cial commentary on, perhaps, related or even exotic matters, messages
passed through unusual channels of any kind and other exchanges of an
informal, irregular, unusual or accidental genre.
It will not be possible, as a general rule, to collect meaningful
information on the Chinese-U.S. dialogue in the intelligence channel for
many years. While we may be sure that such channels exist (the Soviets
33pointedly tell us so ) , there is no way to ascertain what information
they are carrying. On the other hand, information on the content car-
33
A. Dronov, "Peiping's Undercover Contacts," New Times , No. 9,
March 5, 1969, pp. 20-22. The undercover U.S. -Chinese contacts were
given as in (1) Japan, (2) Hong Kong, and (3) Warsaw, outside the embassy
environs. There is some reason to suspect other highly confidential U.S.-
Chinese links in Paris, Copenhagen and Geneva.
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ried in other irregular channels often becomes known, usually through
the work of an inquiring reporter. This type of information is availa-
ble for perusal. It is not necessarily complete, but is often indicative
in several ways.
There are numerous precedents or examples of important political-
military information being passed between the U.S. and China over irregu-
lar linkages. The most noteworthy occurrence was during the Korean War,
when Washington, noting that Chinese bombers and fighters could attack
U.S. bases and logistics routes the length of Korea, informed Peking,
probably through the Indian diplomatic representative in Washington, that
if this was done, mainland China would be attacked. Peking responded,
through unrecorded channels, that if China were attacked, U.S. bases in
34
Japan as well as Korea would be fair game. The result was an unwrit-
ten but binding limitation on the conduct of the war that served until
the truce—which may have been reached either because the Chinese were
near exhaustion, because President Eisenhower threatened to extend atomic
war to China, or both.
It is possible that a similar unwritten but binding understanding
on the limitation of U.S. and Chinese conduct during the 1964-67 crisis
period was reached quite early in the period. If this is so, the under-
standing may have been at least initiated through irregular channels.
Jack Anderson, "What Really Happened in Korea," Parade , Septem-
ber 22, 1963. Based on unreleased documents and interviews.
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The instant case is that of an interview of Mao Tse-tung con-
ducted by his American friend of long standing, Edgar Snow, on January
9, 1965, during a lengthy Peking visit. Snow's published report of the
discussion included the following important information:
...he[Mao Tse-tung] repeatedly thanked for-
eign invaders for speeding up the Chinese revolu-
tion and for bestowing similar favors in Southeast
Asia today. He asserted that China has no troops
outside her own frontiers and has no intention of
fighting anybody unless her own territory is at-
tacked .
. . .Mao said that forces of history were also
bound, eventually, to bring the two peoples together
again; that day would surely come. Possibly I was
right that meanwhile there would be no war. That
could occur only if American troops came to China . .
.
..."I do not believe that makers and admin-
istrators of United States policy understand you,"
I said. Why not? China's armies would not go be-
yond her borders to fight. That was clear enough.
Only if the United States attacked China would the
Chinese fight . Wasn't that clear? ...Fighting be-
yond one's own borders was criminal. .. 35
35
Edgar Snow, "Interview With Mao," The New Republic , February 27,
1965, pp. 17-18 ff. (Italics added.) Other statements by Mao in this in-
terview to the effect that the U.S. would not expand the Vietnam War into
\
North Vietnam ("Mr. Rusk had made it clear") and that American forces
would be ready to leave Vietnam in one or two years looked incongruous
when the interview was published after the U.S. had bombed North Vietnam.
Thus Mao was thought to have been a poor prophet who had "miscalculated
completely" and "whose personal prestige must have suffered considerably."
Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy "Debate,'' 1965-1966," in Ping-ti Ho
and Tang Tsou (eds
. ) , China in Crisis , Vol. 2, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1968, at pp. 29 and 33. However, it seems legitimate to




Mao's statement of Chinese guidelines, as reported by Snow,
was of course available much earlier than its publication in the United
States, certainly prior to the commencement of U.S. air raids on Dong
Hoi and Vinh Dinh, North Vietnam on February 7, 1965. A week after
these raids had started, intelligence sources in Hong Kong reported no
information indicating Chinese preparations for war— the Chinese army
37
remained in defensive positions, thus verifying Mao's remarks. Accord-
ing to these same sources, Peking may have been playing the Vietnamese
situation rather cooly as a means of forcing the Soviet Union either to
take a militant stand on Vietnam and jeopardize peaceful coexistence
with the United States, or a soft stand and thus jeopardize its leader-
38
ship of the international movement. This Machiavellian analysis of
the Mao guideline well may contain an element of truth. In any case,
Moscow was not taken in— the Soviet Union provided noteworthy assistance
to North Vietnam while maintaining a semblance of peaceful coexistence
with the U.S.—and Washington proceeded to act as if Mao's statement
could be taken at face value. The Mao-Snow interview subsequently has
been regarded by Moscow as a primary example of U.S. -Chinese collusion
against the Moscow brand of world, communism, and Chinese radio listeners
E.g., the Mao-Snow interview was published in the London Sun-
day Times of February 14, 1965.
37
The Christian Science Monitor , February 15, 1965, a report





have not been allowed to forget it.
Mao's single criterion for Chinese entry into the Asian con-
flict was neither modified nor amended in the irregular dialogue for
quite some time. About a year later, the Chinese government warned the
U.S. that it would treat any U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong with
great seriousness. The warning was issued by Foreign Minister Marshal
Chen Yi and transmitted to the U.S. through a Senator of the Philippine
40
Congress. This warning assumed acute importance when the U.S. intensi-
fied the bombing campaign over North Vietnam in 1967.
The next exchange in the irregular dialogue, and the next modi-
fication of Mao's criterion, was surfaced by Rene Dabernat, the foreign
editor of Paris Match
,
in January, 1967. According to Dabernat, in the
spring of 1966 a Chinese diplomat in Paris asked the Quai d'Orsay to in-
form Washington that Peking had three conditions for not engaging U.S.
forces in Southeast Asia: that North Vietnam not be invaded; that the
Red River dikes not be bombed; and, as before, that China proper not be
invaded. However, Washington scoffed at the story, particularly at the
contention that any limitation on the conduct of the Vietnam War had re-
sulted from it. Washington acknowledged only that the U.S. had received
numerous "third party" messages to the effect that China wished to avoid
a head-on collision with the United States over Vietnam. One Washington
39
See, for example, Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, February
20, 1970; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, March 16,
1970; and Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, May 9, 1970.
40
The Washington Post, March 25, 1966.
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report held that the United States was well aware of risks through its
own intelligence and therefore repeatedly signalled a reciprocal atti-
41
tude to Peking.
Several months later, the more authoritative voices of U.S.
Senators Gore and Clark revealed that China had established three condi-
tions for abstaining from open warfare "a long while" earlier, through
hitherto undisclosed channels. Two of the conditions paralleled Daber-
nat's report: that North Vietnam not be invaded and that China proper
not be attacked. The third condition did not relate to the security of
the Red River dikes, but to the continued solvency of the North Viet-
namese government. According to Senators Gore and Clark, the third con-
42dition was that if Ho Chi Minh fell, China would intervene.
There is no record of denial of this senatorial comment by the
Adminis tration.
Concurrently with the Gore-Clark episode another instance in
the irregular dialogue added still another variation to the previously
reported Chinese policy guidelines. Simon Malley, an Egyptian-born
naturalized U.S. citizen in China as an accredited representative of
Jeune Afrique (Tunis) , reportedly interviewed Chou En-lai and three other
senior Chinese leaders. He was told that China was ready to send volun-
teers south, and that China would engage U.S. forces if they either en-
41
Rene Dabernat was interviewed in U.S. News and World Report
,
January 23, 1967, pp. 93-97. Also see The Washington Post and The New
York Times for January 16, 1967.
42





tered North Vietnam or approached the borders of China. Additionally,
and as a new criterion, Chou reportedly said Peking would act if there
was a "sell out" peace settlement arranged by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
43
and agreed to by, or imposed upon, Hanoi.
Perhaps because of the purported statements regarding the So-
44
viet Union, Peking immediately denied the Malley report. Hsinhua said
that Malley had never seen Chou, Chen Po-ta, Chen Yi, or Yang Cheng-wu
during his two-day sojourn in Peking in March, that his report was "sheer
fabrication," and a
political plot deliberately con-
cocted by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet
revisionists ... to smear the solemn stand
of the Chinese government and people on
Vietnam. . .and to estrange the fraternal
relations between China and Vietnam. -*
In Washington, the State Department said simply that "nothing new" was de-
tected in Malley 's account, and indicated that Chinese denial of the in-
terviews probably was dissembling on Peking's part. Malley, who resides
in New York City, stands by his report.
These glimpses of the irregular dialogue between Peking and
Washington tend to indicate that irregular channels are vitally important
in the totality of communication between the two powers. These visible
occurrences in the irregular dialogue seem to have been important in de-
43
The Times (London) , Daily Sketch (London)
,
and The New York
Times, all of May 15, 1967; The Chicago Daily News , May 16 and 18, 1967.
44




Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 28, 1967.
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limiting the patterns of military conduct between the two during a cri-
tical period of their continuing interaction. The dialogue in this chan-
nel was fairly restrained and businesslike. Evidence does not indicate
an overshadowing presence of "gamesmanship" or polemicising. The Chi-
nese stated their positions, the United States acknowledged, directly
or indirectly, and that was that. This type of procedure therefore can
be said to have many virtues. Unfortunately, the same did not hold true
for the public political dialogue between the two powers.
The Public Political Dialogue
The public political dialogue between the two powers operates
on two levels, which may or may not be in agreement, either with each
other or with the irregular dialogue discussed previously. The first
level of the public political dialogue is that of official statements
of the various members of the top national leaderships, expressed in
speeches, written directives, press conferences, and similar formalized
presentations which are designed for the immediate release and dissemin-
ation of information. The second level of the public political dialogue
includes the continuing commentary by important media of each nation
—
broadcasts, telecasts, and editorials. There is a possibility of overlap
A particularly important official speech may have polemic aspects which
endure in the media for some time. There is also an option of one side
polemicizing on a formal and non-polemic speech by a leader of the other




be vitally important in understanding policy maneuvering. But Chinese
media polemicizing, closely controlled by the party, always is an impor-
tant indicator of Peking's position.
A thorough examination of the public political dialogue engen-
ders a need for categorization, for the material is voluminous. Cate-
gorization of the dialogue indeed is possible, even though each side took
internally contradictory positions, for both Washington and Peking tended
to operate in a self-reiterative manner. Washington's major themes dur-
ing 1964-67 were:
1) A hard-line anti-Chinese attitude; containment; China the
"top threat" to world peace.
—AMELIORATED BY—
2) No desire for war with China; no combat on Chinese soil.
3) Calls for an unconditional conference, including China, to
bring the Vietnam War to a halt.
4) Hope for peace with a less militant China in the future.
5) Tentative willingness to improve people-to-people contacts,
such as exchange of journalists and scholars.
Peking's major themes were:
1) U.S. imperialist aggressors provoke war by continuing their
piratical actions.
46
This comment, of course, excludes consideration of the output
of the USIA and such U.S. outlets as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
But for this thesis, the output of the USIA was neither available nor
considered necessary because of the superabundance of material from the
private sector of U.S. media operations.
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2) U.S. is frantically preparing for war; U.S. attack, nuclear
and conventional j is imminent.
3) U.S. challenged to invade; Chinese readiness proclaimed.
4) If war occurs, it will have no boundaries.
5) Official warnings to U.S. not to do a variety of anti-
Chinese actions.
6) Unreserved support for U.S. opponents.
7) Exhortation for widespread anti-U.S. action.
—AMELIORATED BY—
8) No Chinese forces in combat unless China invaded or attacked.
9) Wars of national liberation should emphasize self-reliance.
10) The tense situation between the U.S. and China is not per-
manent.
The presentation of this section will be chronological and
selective of material, allowing an intermingled exchange of official
statements and media polemics, and thus illustrating the ongoing public
interchange of views between the two sides. The material presented is
not an all-inclusive account of the dialogue. Rather, selections from the
dialogue have been made to illustrate major themes. It should be noted
that it is possible to dissect certain speeches or certain sequences of
speeches much further than is done here. For instance, a number of
speeches by various members of the hierarchy in Peking cited herein have




endo, in order to theorize on factional alignments in the CCP. How-
ever, for our purposes, the importance of the dialogue seems to lie in
how certain statements were perceived, in the aggregate, by the other
side rather than how they were perceived in detail by domestic listeners
or the party or governmental hierarchy.
The thread of political dialogue will be taken up at the time
of the U.S. bombing of Khang Khay, Laos, in June, 1964, when a Chinese
official was killed. Peking's vehement responses to the incident have
48been noted above. It may be conjectured that China's righteous umbrage
was in part a reply to a particularly firm anti-Chinese speech by Secre-
49
tary of State Rusk on May 10, 1964, a speech that exemplified one ma-
jor pattern for U.S. official statements for the next several years.
However, official U.S. comment on the Chinese verbal blasts
of June, 1964 was not noteworthy. U.S. media noted that China was in-
tensifying a "war of nerves in Southeast Asia."





pp. 23-71. The same speeches also have
been analysed by Harold C. Hinton to try to ascertain Chinese policy to-
ward North Vietnam and by Donald Zagoria to try to fathom the development
and modification of Chinese high strategy. See their articles in Ping-





In England, over BBC. The State Department Bulletin , Vol.
50, No. 1300, May 25, 1964, p. 818.
The New York Times, June 21, 1964.

Ill
parently decided to eliminate world surprise, and, incidentally, to ac-
cent an aura of U.S. omnipotence, by announcing Peking's first nuclear
test before the Chinese had conducted it.
After the test on October 16, 1964, Chinese commentary was
generally restrained. There was no boasting. But Peking took the oppor-
tunity to publicly suggest a general summit conference to discuss world
nuclear disarmament. Chou En-lai circularized heads of state with this
proposal.
The U.S. response to the test and the disarmament initiative a-
mounted to a calculated "put down." President Johnson immediately de-
52
plored the test and called on Peking to sign the Test Ban Treaty. He
also reaffirmed "readiness ... to respond to requests of Asian nations for
53help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression." Moreover, the U.S.
flatly rejected a disarmament conference, State Department officials
terming it "a sucker proposal." The Secretary of Defense then publicly
reaffirmed the U.S. capability to destroy China with nuclear forces.
Chinese media responded that the atomic test had shocked and
irritated the United States, assailed the President's rejection of a
Statement by Secretary of State Rusk, September 29, 1964.
The State Department Bulletin
,
Vol. 51, No. 1321, October 19, 1964, pp.
542-43.
52
The New York Times , October 19, 1964.
53
Ibid. , October 17, 1964.
54




, October 26, 1964.
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conference, and accused him of belittling the Chinese feat.
Seemingly taking Secretary McNamara's statements on capability
as declarations of intent, and combining his statement with the Western
Pacific deployment of the SSBNs Daniel Boone and Tecumseh
,
the Chinese
loudly and officially protested a "naked war provocation" by the U.S.
Chinese media deplored the Polaris move strenuously. U.S. war provoca-
tion became a continuing theme in Peking.
This Chinese outcry hardly compared to the deafening din of
official statements and media polemics emanating from Peking when U.S.
bombers attacked North Vietnam the following February. "U.S. piratical
CO
actions" were officially condemned. Peking media proclaimed that North
Vietnam and China were close brothers, that aggression against one was
aggression against the other, and that 650 million Chinese would not re-
main indifferent. President Johnson's justification of the action was
59
termed "gangster language" by the Chinese press. "Concrete action
fid
against the U.S.," another typical Chinese position, was urged.
c c
"Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons,"
Peking Review
,
No. 44, October 30, 1964, pp. 5-6.
Chinese protest of December 29, 1964, carried in ibid . , Jan-
uary 1, 1965, p. 20. Also see a related article, pp. 21-22.
CO
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, February 9,




February 10, 1965; Peking Review , No. 7, Febru-
ary 12, 1965, pp. 19-20.
"Call for World Support for People of Vietnam and Indo-China,"
Peking Review
,
No. 8, February 19, 1965, pp. 5-6.
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As the U.S. bombing campaign continued and assumed a regular
rhythm of its own without provocations by Viet Cong or North Vietnamese
troops, and as Marines landed in South Vietnam, Premier Chou En-lai
"officially warned" Washington. Chinese media indicated that volun-
teers were ready to move south. Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi of-
ficially reaffirmed Chinese support for North Vietnam.
Washington's Vietnam strategy included both carrot and stick
aspects. In April and May, 1965, President Johnson offered massive aid
to all Indochina and an unconditional conference to bring the war to an
64
end. Both Hanoi and Peking labeled this initiative a hoax, and Peking
media spoke of President Johnson's "Neo-Hitlerist doctrines." The
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Communist China
resolved to give unreserved support to the Vietnamese struggle.
President Johnson's April 24th designation of a combat zone,
which, perhaps unthinkingly, included portions of China proper, Chinese
territorial waters, and Chinese islands, was roundly deplored by Chi-
(\ 1
The Christian Science Monitor
,
March 26, 1965.
Renmin Ribao, March 25, 1965; Peking Review, No. 14, April 2,
1965, pp. 11-12.
"Aiding Vietnam, is China's Sacred Internationalist Duty," in
ibid., pp. 10-11.
64
For the text of the initial Johnson proposal, see The State
Department Bulletin
, April 26, 1965, p. 606.
Renmin Ribao editorial, "Johnson Doctrine is Neo-Hitlerism,"
Peking Review
, No. 21, May 21, 1965, pp. 9-10.




Whether directly related to the U.S. escalation in Vietnam or
for other substantial reasons, the Chinese leadership then officially
promulgated the Mao criterion, given informally to Edgar Snow four months
earlier, for Chinese entry into an Asian war. The official statement was
made by Deputy Premier General Lo Jui-ch'ing in Red Flag , the CCP theore-
tical journal. It was widely disseminated by the government press agen-
do
cy. General Lo's position in this regard was strikingly similar to
Mao's own; undoubtedly it was given close scrutiny in Washington.
Perhaps in response, or perhaps as a different brand of carrot,
the Administration undertook a temporary bombing halt in Vietnam, but
69
this was termed "a form of war blackmail" by Chinese media.
In June, 1965, when President Johnson consecutively invited
the socialist countries to "reason together" and ordered U.S. troops to
participate in the Vietnamese fighting, Premier Chou called the United
f.
-i
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 1, 1965.
General Lo Jui-Ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory over German
Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!,"
Peking Review
, No. 20, May 14, 1965, pp. 7-15; The New York Times, May 11,
1965.
69
"Statement of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 21,
1965," Peking Review
,
No. 22, May 28, 1965, pp. 10-11.
Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Morality of Nations," The Department
of State Bulletin
,
Vol. 52, No. 1357, June 28, 1968, pp. 1026-28.
White House Statement of June 9, 1965, in ibid . , p. 1041.
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States a "peril to security" and said that China was ready for a full war
72
in Vietnam. The distinction in regard to location, and the rather ob-
scure treatment of the word "ready" (e.g., was China ready for a war not
involving China to happen?) distinguished Chou's statement from Lo's.
Canadian correspondents reported no sign of preparations for imminent war
73
in China.
As Washington dispatched more troops to Indochina, Chinese media
74
asserted that a geographic expansion of the war was contemplated. The
U.S. troop level had reached 125,000 men when Lin Piao delivered perhaps
the major public pronouncement from Peking during the critical period.
His famous speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," featured
a major exhortation to the Chinese people to prepare for a U.S. attack
75
that could be imminent. Lin also used the speech to publicize, in less
detailed form, defensive doctrines to be used in the event of a U.S. nu-
clear attack followed by ground invasion that had been promulgated by
1
'ft
General Liu Yun-cheng somewhat earlier.
As the "hardline" containment of China was a major American
public theme, the threat of imminent American attack became a major Chi-
nese public theme.
72
Paris, AFP in English, June 3, 1965.
73




August 3, 1965; Peking Review , No. 32, August
6, 1965, pp. 17-19.
Lin Piao, op. cit .
76Liu Yun-cheng, "The Role of the People's Militia," Peking
Review
, No. 6, February 5, 1965, pp. 19-20.
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In September, 1965, Washington warned China that the United
States would respond to any intervention in the Indian-Pakistani fight-
ing over Kashmir. But Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi, in a virtuoso
78performance, challenged the United States to begin a war with China.
Vietnam fighting continued to escalate. Scrapes between U.S.
and Chinese forces became more frequent, and Secretary of State Rusk of-
79ficially termed China the "top threat" to peace. At the close of the
year, while a British observer stated his
. . .view that the danger of aggression
by the Peoples Republic of China is... remote
and that claims 'to conquer the world' are
mere rhetoric, 80
some U.S. aides reportedly were contemplating the risks of a direct
81
clash with China.
War preparedness was the major preoccupation of the Chinese
82
media in 1966, preparedness against a U.S. attack. President Johnson's
The New York Times , September 16, 1965. The warning was
passed at Warsaw.
78
"Press conference of September 29, 1965," Peking Review , No.
41, October 8, 1965, pp. 7-14. The challenge theme was often reiterated.
See Peking Review
,
No. 4, January 21, 1966, p. 6, No. 38, September 16,
1966, p. 7, and No. 39, September 23, 1966, p. 26.
79
The New York Times , October 21, 1965.
80












State of the Union message, according to the Chinese publicists, "smelled
o o
heavily of gunpowder." Peking was sure that Taiwan was being strength-
ened as a war base, and, at an army conference on political work, Chou
En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen told the army to make preparations
Q /
for a nuclear or conventional attack "at an early date." Popular songs
in China included "Deal Ruthless Blows at the Yankees" and "Resolutely
Fight Side-by-Side With Vietnamese Brothers." Secretary of Defense
McNamara's capability statement to the effect that the U.S. "could ruin
86
China" probably did little to alleviate Chinese apprehension.
According to the director of the Chinese Army's general poli-
tical department, the United States
. . .has always wanted to impose war on
the Chinese people. . .We must make full prepar-
ations against the war of aggression which U.S.
imperialism may launch at an early date, on a
large scale, with nuclear or other weapons, and
on several fronts... All our work must be put on
a footing of readiness to fight If the United
States dares to attack, we can definitely drown
87
the U.S. aggressors in an ocean of people's war.
However, by recognizing that U.S. conventional capabilities had been up-
graded by the Democratic Administrations, the Chinese people also were
urged by their media to give greater attention to improving their own
o o
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Hsiao Hua speech reported from Peking by NCNA International




conventional weapons. Peking thus seemingly v/anted to deemphasize the
possibility of nuclear war.
In February, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af-
fairs William P. Bundy, in a major policy speech, reiterated the U.S.
commitment to a policy of containing China and hoped that a new genera-
tion of Chinese leaders would see that China's best interest lay in pur-
suing peace. He said that the U.S. and China were "antithetic" through-
89
out the world. In response, a high but unnamed Chinese official agreed
to the antithesis, saying that "to be opposed by our enemy is not a bad
thing; it adds to our honor," and, quoting an ancient scholar,
everybody knows that the enemy is hate-
ful, not that he is also most useful;
that he is harmful,
but not that he is also most beneficial.
Concurrently, Chinese media blasted the testimony of Secretary of State
Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, 1966.
Mr. Rusk's description of the Administration's search for peace in Viet-
nam was termed a declaration that the U.S. "was determined to seize South
Vietnam by force." He was accused of threatening the Vietnamese and Chi-
91
nese people with a "big war," for which the Chinese were "fully prepared."
8R
"Correspondent," Renmin Ribao , February 1, 1966.
89
Text of the speech, given at Pomona, California on February
12, 1966, in The State Department Bulletin , Vol. 54, No. 1392, February









Peking, NCNA in English, February 20, 1966.

119
In a move perhaps designed to take some of the steam out of
Chinese apprehension, and in his first public voicing of a possible
U.S. -Chinese arrangement reached in private channels, President Johnson
then announced what was to become another major U.S. theme in the poli-
tical dialogue. On February 23, 1966, he explicitly denied any desire
92
to risk war on the vast land areas of China. However, the tempo of
Chinese exhortations for war preparations, as well as Chinese official
speeches and polemicizing about the threat of U.S. aggression, continued
unabated.
When Chinese media had once again accused Washington of plan-
93
ning to start a war in Asia, Secretary of State Rusk commented that
peace with China could be foreseen:
. . .We do not want war with China. . .We
do not intend to provoke a war. There is no
fatal inevitability of war with Communist Chi-
na...94
This can be regarded as a most explicit statement of the Johnson policy
of no land war in China.
92
The New York Times , February 27, 1966; The Washington Post ,
March 5, 1966. An earlier intimation of this position appeared in Al-
sop, "A Conversation With President Kennedy," op. cit . : "President John-
son has apparently ruled that.. .the U.S. simply cannot mount an unpro-
voked nuclear first strike, however surgical its execution and limited
its purpose."
93
Renmin Ribao , April 7, 1966; Peking Review , No. 15, April
8, 1966, pp. 6-8.
94 Statement before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pa-
cific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1966, The State
Department Bulletin
,
Vol. 54, No. 1401, May 2, 1966, p. 694.
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Peking, however, was adamant. Chou En-lai once again pledged
all-out support for Vietnamese communists and officially spurned a U.S.
95
offer for peace talks. On May 9, 1966, Chou initiated a new, more
threatening, line which was to continue in the series of Chinese state-
ments until the Vietnam War deescalated. Reiterating that China would
not take the initiative in starting a war, Chou said "Once the war breaks
96
out, it will have no boundaries..." Whether this was a forecast of
world-wide guerrilla war against U.S. facilities or a threat to use atom-
ic weapons against U.S. forces in the Far East remains obscure to this
day. Probably Chou was contemplating the former; but the PLA could have
been capable of the latter by this time.
Deciphering Chinese intent was further complicated by other re-
marks made by Chou at approximately the same time. Speaking at a fare-
well banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation headed by Mehmet Shehu
given two days after China's third nuclear test, Chou En-lai commented
...We will never submit to the nu-
clear blackmail of anyone, nor will we ever
use nuclear weapons to blackmail others. .
.
we declare again... that at no time and in
.
no circumstances will China be the first to
use nuclear weapons... 97
95
Renmin Ribao , May 1, 1966; Peking Review , No. 19, May 6, 1966,
p. 24.
96
"Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Towards
U.S.," Peking Review
,
No. 20, May 13, 1966, p. 5. The statement was given
initially to the .correspondent of the Pakistan paper Dawn on April 10,
1966. It was repeated in an official defense ministry statement of May
13, 1966 -after a Chinese MiG was shot down by USAF fighters on May 12,




Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 10, 1966;
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In midsummer the U.S. greatly intensified the bombing campaign
over North Vietnam—and commenced bombing close-in to Hanoi and Haiphong.
This obviously violated one Chinese criteria for entering the war, that
had come in the irregular channel from Chen Yi through the Philippine
98 99Senator to Washington. A high Chinese spokesman denounced the raids,
and Chinese media indicated that the raids freed China to act in Vietnam.
Chou En-lai consistently opposed peace in Vietnam and pledged full sup-
port to Hanoi once again. But U.S. intelligence reported no movement in
102
China that foretold military action.
In fact, Peking reemphasized the historic Maoist line of "self-
reliance" to Hanoi. China would extend support to the Ho regime, but the
103
North Vietnamese would have to win their war by themselves.
The summer continued with little variation on the various
themes promulgated by each side thus far. But all themes were played, by










"Commentator," Renmin Ribao , July 1, 1966.
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Johnson reiterated a policy toward China of "Peace in Asia and the Paci-
fic Area," but told the American Legion that he could not ignore Chi-
nese threats. For their part, the Chinese continued to predict a U.S.
attack, said that if a Sino-U.S. war broke out, "...all Asian countries
offering bases to the U.S. will be turned into battle sites...," and
108
continued strong propaganda support to the Vietnamese communists. Chi-
109
na was Vietnam's "vast" or "reliable rear area." U.S. bombing of a
Red River dike was condemned, as were U.S. attacks on Chinese fishing
boats and shipping.
In September, however, came the first official indication that
at least some elements of the Chinese leadership had accepted the by then
often reiterated U.S. position that an attack on China was not being con-
104Nationwide radio-TV address, reported in The New York Times
,
July 12, and 13, 1966; The State Department Bulletin , Vol. 55, No. 1414,
August 1, 1966, pp. 158-62.
Transcript in The New York Times , August 30, 1966.
I At
Chen Yi, reported in Asahi (Tokyo), July 13, 1966; also see
Peking Review
,
No. 29, July 15, 1966, pp. 27-28.
Tokyo, Kyodo in English, August 29, 1966, amplifying Yomiuri
(Tokyo) report of August 11, 1966.
108
Peoples Liberation Army Daily
,
July 19, 1966; China Youth
News, July 19, 1966.
109
Ibid ; also see Renmin Ribao , September 2, 1966. The "relia-
ble rear area" phrase is in use today.
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 16, 1966.




sidered. The spokesman was Chen Yi, the occasion a conversation with an
eight-man delegation from the Japanese diet. Said Chen:
I do not think that the present tense
situation between the U.S. and China will last
forever. . .China supports the idea of Sino-U.S.
talks on the settlement of the Vietnam dispute.
The idea of peaceful settlement is Chinese for-
eign policy.
..
[but] China will not impose its
thinking on the Vietnamese people... H2
Although this Chinese initiative undoubtedly was well received in Wash-
ington, the subsequent trend in Chinese official statements continued to
be highly militant for several months. By mid-November, however, obser-
vers in Hong Kong noted a slight moderation of Chinese threats to inter-
113
vene in Vietnam. Peking was becoming less belligerent while continu-
ing to proclaim a strongly anti-U.S. stand.
Thus Peking incidentally, while addressing another subject,
would allege that
...The possession by the Chinese people
of guided missiles and nuclear weapons is a great
encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who





but would not, so far as can be ascertained, mention the possibility that
112
Tokyo Domestic TV Service in Japanese, September 6, 1966. A
variation of the statement was in Mainichi (Tokyo), September 7, 1966.
Also see The New York Times , September 7, 1966. There subsequently was a
dispute over whether Chen's remarks had been correctly interpreted. Japan
Times (Tokyo), September 9, 1966.
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nuclear weapons might be applicable in the Vietnam war.
On the other hand, despite public statements denying intent to
attack China, the U.S. did not significantly lessen political pressure
on Peking. President Johnson pointedly warned the Chinese against nu-
clear blackmail of Asian countries, and, as is well known, the U.S.
bombing campaign near China's southern border continued at a high level.
By the end of 1966, therefore, the evolution of various themes
in the Chinese-American political dialogue was essentially complete. The
themes of each side continued to be played throughout 1967 and into 1968;
some of them continue in use as of this writing. Peking continued to
condemn U.S. actions in Vietnam, especially an alleged bombing of the Chi-
ll f>
nese Embassy in Hanoi. Chinese aircraft or ships accidentally hit by
U.S. aircraft, and any intrusions into Chinese airspace, brought vehement
protests from Peking. The U.S. was accused of "blatant provocations" and
Chinese media held that the Chinese were ready to "fight to the end."
President Johnson's "brinkmanship," according to Peking, was doomed.
For its part, Washington continued to insist that there was no intent to
attack China, and President Johnson continued to indicate a desire to re-
118
lax tension between the countries. The White House said "We're confi-
dent Peking is aware that the U.S. does not seek involvement of Red Chi-
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"Commentator," "Johnson's 'Brinkmanship' is Doomed to Fail-
ure," Peking Review , September 1, 1967, pp. 29-30; The New York Times ,
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na. But other high administration spokesmen, including Vice Presi-
dent Humphrey and Secretary of State Rusk, continued to note the threat
, , r , . r .120posed by Chinese Communism.
In 1968, when President Johnson ordered a partial bombing
halt in Vietnam that effectively removed the presence of U.S. aircraft
from proximity to China's border, Peking publicly labeled the move "a
fraud."
121
In this presentation, emphasis has been placed on the public
dialogue specifically concerning vital intentions of war and peace. The
major thrust of the information provided, which is not all-inclusive but
does present most of the highlights of those years, is that neither side
wanted war with the other but that each initially feared that the other
might attack. Although a mutually delimiting arrangement for the conduct
of matters in Asia might have been reached in 1965, it was not until late
1966 that both sides had publicly acknowledged it. Confusing any wide-
spread public recognition of the important arrangement was the tenor of









, October 16, 1967. The Vice President was perhaps
more militant than Secretary Rusk, who had raised a spectre of a billion
Chinese "armed with nuclear weapons" in what became known as the "Yellow




April 12, 1968, p. 14.
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Thus it is opportune to take up the third level of political
dialogue at this time—a dialogue that usually proceeded without inflam-
matory rhetoric but which, in the long run, may have been even more im-
portant than either the irregular or the public political dialogue in




This section deals with the progress of Chinese-American diplo-
matic meetings during the 1964-1967 period. What is known of these meet-
ings indicates that they dealt with many topics other than the immediate
vital issues of war and peace, such as disarmament and improved bilateral
contacts—e.g., the exchange of correspondents, scholars, and seed grains.
Many of these less vital issues became public knowledge soon after, or
sometimes before, a particular diplomatic meeting, whereupon they were
subject to official public comment and polemicizing.
In our chronicle we will include some information on disarma-
ment because of its relevance to Hypothesis III, but will largely ignore
122
This section is largely dependent on Kenneth T. Young, Nego-
tiating With the Chinese Communists; The United States Experience , New
York: McGraw, Hill, 1968, and, also by Young, Diplomacy and Power in
Washington-Peking Dealings, 1953-1967 , Chicago: The University of Chicago
Center for Policy Study, 1967. There has been some conjecture that Am-
bassador Young, a distinguished American diplomat who has negotiated with
Chinese diplomats at Panmunjom and Geneva, may have referred to the re-
cord of U.S. discussions with China in Geneva and Warsaw. However, he
acknowledges drawing only from secondary sources. See the Preface, pp.
xi-xiv, to Negotiating With the Chinese Communists .
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information on improving bilateral contacts since it is somewhat ancil-
123
lary to our argument. It is accepted that certain material included
in this section might also have been given emphasis in the preceeding
section on the public dialogue. This is another manifestation of the
overlap inherent in the categorization being used.
Although Washington has never recognized Peking, Chinese-Amer-
ican diplomatic meetings commenced in August, 1955, in Geneva. In 1958
they were shifted to Warsaw. U.S. and Chinese ambassadors to Poland were
designated as the respective plenipotentiaries for the meetings. Each
meeting followed a stereotyped "Panmunjom" format, with each side in turn
stating a position on an issue. There have been no discussions. Com-
muniques have not been issued. By 1964, over 120 of these stolid, myster-
ious meetings had been conducted.
During the 1964-68 period negotiators for the two states pro-
gressed through meeting number 134, held on January 8, 1968 after a two-
month postponement. The frequency and sequence of meetings is important.
123
The conciliatory U.S. initiatives involved improved bilateral
contacts, such as
a) easing of passport restrictions on travel to China,
b) admission of Chinese newsmen to the U.S.,
c) permission for U.S. doctors, scholars, businessmen and
athletes to visit China,
d) admission of Chinese scholars to the U.S., and
e) intimations of a relaxed restriction on trade (i.e., in
pharmaceuticals), occurred in late 1965, throughout 1966, and into 1967.







Five meetings occurred in 1964, five in 1965, three in 1966, two in 1967,
and one in 1968, following which a two year hiatus occurred. It was as
though the official negotiators had less and less to discuss as the Asian
crisis escalated more and more. This hardly seems reasonable—unless the
Warsaw Meetings in fact had reached an early agreement concerning the mu-
tual delimitation of moves in Southeast Asia for the purpose of preventing
war between China and the U.S. If this proposition is true, it would seem
that much of the threatening and poisonous public dialogue illustrated in
the previous section was simply superfluous—or, in reality, pointed to-
ward domestic or sympathetic foreign consumption rather than to influence
the opponent.
The Soviet Union has taken the position that both these propo-
sitions are valid. According to Moscow, shortly after the Mao-Snow con-
versation in January, 1965,
...a Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talk was
held. . .Apparently , it was to determine the Chi-
nese leadership's stand in the event of an es-
calation of the Vietnam war. Judging from all
events, the Chinese reiterated the policy of
noninterference as indicated by Mao in his con-
versation with journalist Snow. Besides, at a
later date Peking openly turned down the Soviet
proposal for united action to counter the U.S.
aggression in Vietnam. 124
Inasmuch as the Warsaw Talks during this period were conducted in Poland's
Myslewicki Palace, and thus were subject to Polish-Soviet surveillance
19/
Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, February 20, 1970. This




(in 1970, the resumed talks were held alternatively in the U.S. and Chi-
nese embassies), there may be some truth in the Soviet propaganda claim.
It would be valuable to ascertain whether a Chinese-U.S. arrangement was
hammered out at the February 25, 1965 Warsaw meeting, at a series of meet-
ings extending through 1965, or an even longer series extending into 1966.
Available evidence indicates that the prevention of open war was a major
topic at an extended series of meetings, and that by the time of the 131st
meeting on September 7, 1966, an arrangement had been consummated.
According to Emile Guikovaty, a former Agence France Presse cor-
respondent in Peking, on September 6, 1966:
...Throughout 1965 and the beginning of
this year, Soviet diplomats and correspondents in
Peking insisted in private conversations that Chi-
na and the United States, at their periodic ambas-
sadorial-level talks in Warsaw, were discussing
the conditions for broad negotiations on problems
separating the two countries. . .The Soviet represen-
tatives. . .said they were convinced that China and
the United States were striving by all means to a-
void a direct clash.
...Informed sources [also Soviet?-W.P. ] said...
that the Chinese and American ambassadors had clearly
outlined the conditions which would prevent a colli-
sion of the two countries in Vietnam. Thus, U.S. pi-
lots received formal orders not to approach the Chi-
nese borders, and the Chinese agreed to consider any
errors which might occur as regrettable incidents.
The Chinese, on the other hand, said they would not
intervene in Vietnam unless U.S. forces adopted an
offensive attitude threatening Chinese territory.
China publicly echoed this attitude by stating that
Vietnam would be able to defeat the United States
with its own forces... 125
125
Paris, AFP in English, September 6, 1966.
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From Warsaw in early 1967, experienced New York Times corres-
pondent Henry Kamm reported a much less definitive Chinese-U.S. diploma-
tic exchange that extended through 1965 into 1966. According to Kamm's
diplomatic informants,
...The conversations here have enabled
the Chinese and the Americans to assess each
other's intentions as well as to transact minor
business. A guarded exchange is said to have
been made last year to avoid a direct encounter
over Vietnam. 126
Writing from Warsaw at the same time, Yugoslav feature writer
V. Popovic noted no specifics on an agreed Chinese-U.S. arrangement but
commented significantly
. . .According to what is published, these
talks furnish no results. Nevertheless they are
being held and both sides want to continue holding
them. It is paradoxical, but there is an air of
confidence reigning at these meetings. Their most
important characteristic is that they make it pos-
sible for both sides—for example despite the war
situation in Vietnam— to prevent making a drastically
wrong move with respect to the other. 127
Ambassador Gronouski, the U.S. envoy at the talks during the
later part of the crucial period, (he assumed the post in late 1965) has
publicly stated only that discussions with the Chinese ambassador were
"frank and serious." In 1967, Gronouski reaffirmed faith in the utility
of the Warsaw meetings but said they had not yet served their principle
1 9f)
The New York Times , January 26, 1967. For nearly identical
language in a Max Frankel dispatch emanating from Washington ten days
earlier, see ibid
.
, January 17, 1967.
127
V. Popovic, "The Washington-Peking "Hot Line,"" Vj esnik
(Zagreb), February 7, 1967. This story is valuable also for an excellent




I continue to hope that in time they
will be instrumental in reducing tensions in
East Asia, and thus in the world generally. ^8
However, there was little opportunity for the Ambassador's hope to be
fulfilled. Only two more meetings of the series occurred after his state-
ment, one in mid-June, 1967, and the last on January 8, 1968. By that
time Ambassador Gronouski had resigned to aid the Humphrey campaign and
the Chinese representative, Wang Kuo-chuan, had been recalled to Peking.
Obvious downgrading of the talks in 1967-68 provided an oppor-
tunity for publication of a thus far definitive resume of the thirteen-
year history of the Warsaw Talks in the United States. This account,
129
prepared by Kenneth T. Young, is based on an evaluation that the talks
were dichotomous. Chinese-U.S. diplomacy was typified by "stalemate and
1 • "130 A U A - •«-elusion, and by missed opportunities.
For instance, after the first Chinese atomic test, Peking pro-
posed privately at Warsaw, on November 25, 1964, that China and the Uni-
ted States exchange pledges on the "no-first-use" of atomic weapons. The
pledges were to hold until the world disarmament conference, that Peking
had publicly and concurrently proposed, had convened. It will be recalled
that the U.S. immediately termed the Chinese-sponsored disarmament con-
ference "a sucker proposal." In the same frame of mind, therefore, the
U.S. evaded an exchange of "no-first-use" pledges and spoke instead of in-
1 io
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spection and verification matters, staged disarmament, and Chinese fail-
ure to adhere to the Test Ban Treaty of the previous year.
However, the Chinese "no-first-use" proposal was significant
in two ways. First, it was not tied to the Taiwan issue. It was the
first "untied" proposal since 1961! Second, it was made privately. A
month later, after Polaris submarines had deployed to Asia, Peking ob-
liquely referred to the Chinese initiative—and the U.S. rejection, but
did not polemicize on the proposal-rejection sequence until mid-1966.
Washington's decision to reject serious discussion of the proposal meant
that
. . .we shall never know whether this one
gesture on the part of Peking away from stale-
mate would have engaged both parties in a mean-
ingful dialogue for the first time since the
Taiwan crisis of 1958. 131
Moreover, the strategic implications of Washington's demurrer on "no-
first-use" well could have been benumbing to the Chinese leadership, which
at that time could not mention a Chinese deterrent.
In any case, the abortive "no-first-use" initiative ended what
may have been an educational exchange on disarmament for the Chinese that
132had preoccupied the 1962-63 series of meetings. Attention turned to
Vietnam.
At the 126th meeting on February 25, 1965
[recall the publication date of the Mao-Snow in-
terview], just after American bombing of North









parently communicated a fairly long state-
ment to Peking to make clear its position
with regard to South Vietnam, North Viet-
nam and Communist China . . . 133
The following meeting, in April, was occupied by an official conveyance
of public statements made by both capitals in the interim. The June
30th meeting amounted to another "switchboard" operation to officially
communicate the views of each side. After the September 15th meeting,
departing U.S. ambassador Cabot said the talks had served a "useful pur-
pose," but had made little or no progress in reducing Far Eastern ten-
sions. However, by the end of 1965, American diplomats had made it "crys-
tal clear" that the United States did not intend to invade China or crush
North Vietnam, and was seeking only a peaceful settlement on acceptable
terms.
The three Warsaw meetings of 1966 continued the series of "no-
tifications on Vietnam." A serious talk with no progress was held on
March 16th. At the May 25th meeting, the U.S. reportedly proposed a re-
ciprocal lessening of hostilities as a basis for Vietnam peace negotia-
tions (e.g., the U.S. would halt bombing North Vietnam if Hanoi, etc...).
Peking soon publicly replied with charges of "peace swindles" and then
rejected Washington's proposal privately at the September 7, 1966 meet-
ing. This final meeting of 1966 was unusual in that the Chinese ambassa-
dor immediately read the secret transcript of the meeting to the press




p. 269. (Italics added.)
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p . . 134assertions of his own.
From Ambassador Young's account, the two meetings of 1967 ac-
complished little. He therefore concludes with the following evaluation:
...At least, Washington's attempt to de-
fine the meaning and limit the scope of United
States policy there [Asia], unambiguously and
comprehensively, is on the record, whatever its
interpretation by Peking may be. And Peking's
intentions and warnings .. .have been hammered
onto the same record. It seems reasonable to
conclude that having the medium for exchange
of views at Warsaw regarding Vietnam has helped
each side sketch out the rough parameters of
what the other might or might not do. In view
of the deadlocks in the Talks on all issues
and the divergence between Washington and Pe-
king concerning Vietnam, the nature of this ex-
change could only be general and inferential,
not involving any explicit understandings or
round-about deals. . .maintaining even this im-
precise, limited and uncertain extent of re-
sponsible restraint was decidedly preferable to
outright hostilities. .. 135
There are substantial areas of agreement in all of these reports and
analyses. Placing more weight on Ambassador Young's more authoritative
presentation than on the press reports from many sources, it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that the formal diplomatic dialogue in Warsaw most
likely
(a) Did include the achievement of an "understanding"
or "arrangement" regarding the limits of military
confrontation in the Far East.
134
Pp. 268-75 of ibid contain a more detailed presentation on
the 1965-66 meetings. For Ambassador Wang's polemics, see Peking Review ,




p. 332. Also, in part, in Young, Diplomacy and
Power..., op. cit., pp. 17 and 32.
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(b) Had probably largely completed this process
during the 1965 series of meetings, some-
what ahead of press indications that the pro-
cess had occurred in 1966, but behind the
Soviet assertion that it was completed in one
meeting.
(c) Had neither addressed problems nor indicated
respective courses of action in explicit quid
pro quo terms as several press reports would
seem to indicate.
The political dialogue, when traced through its irregular, public, and
diplomatic progressions, despite numerous twists and turns, side excur-
sions, and manifold dichotomies and uncertainties, comes out paralleling
the events of the military engagement presented earlier.
Perhaps more significant is the fact that remarkably parallel
types of information were running in each channel of the political dia-
logue. Chinese and U.S. leaderships were not saying things in irregular
or diplomatic channels that they also did not say, sooner or later, in
their public dialogue.
However, our understanding of this ongoing interaction, although
improved by isolating the military engagement and the political dialogue,
is incomplete unless the tacit exchange is examined.
The tacit exchange includes both political and military ac-
tions undertaken by one side, either unilaterally or in conjunction with
a "third" nation, that are significant to the other side. Also included
are important political developments within each superpower that exert
significant influence on its external actions. The distinguishing char-
acteristic of these actions or developments is that although they are
significant to the opponent, they are neither aimed directly at nor re-
quire a response from him.

136
III. The Tacit Exchange
The tacit exchange in the Chinese-American interaction will be
examined in the following sequence:
A. Actions by, or developments in the U.S. of significance to
China.
U.S.
B. Actions by, or developments in China of significance to the
The Kennedy Administration's decisions to build up strategic
delivery forces and conventional warfare forces to new plateaus of strength
and versatility in the early 1960s were made not in response to a speci-
fically Chinese threat but on the basis of an evaluation of the general
world strategic picture in which China played only one part. Yet it is
understandable that Peking, as has already been mentioned, could take the
force posture increase as a direct threat to China, particularly when the
first SSBN's deployed to the Pacific and B-52s were staged forward to Guam.
However, during the critical period 1964-1967, employment of
these U.S. forces was such that Peking probably became reassured, without
ever taking U.S. public protestations of non-intent for war with China into
account, that the U.S. was not going to attack. While the U.S. deployed
over half a million troops in Vietnam and the South China Sea often seemed
crowded with U.S. warships and auxiliaries, most of these units went about
their business without endangering China. The record of mutual restraint
in military engagements, particularly those involving aircraft operations,
has been discussed previously. Not mentioned was the unilaterally issued




border between North Vietnam and China, which kept forces apart fairly
well despite the high speeds and great turning radii of modern aircraft.
This geographic limitation was decreased to ten miles late in the period,
after U.S. intentions presumably were thoroughly understood in Peking,
and vice versa.
A corollary of the self-imposed U.S. geographic limitation on
aerial warfare was Washington's decision to announce inadvertant intru-
sions by U.S. units into Chinese airspace or waters as soon as possible.
These announcements unquestionably were of some propaganda value. Since
they were generally truthful, even though errors occasionally occurred and
Peking would charge U.S. duplicity and obfuscation, the Chinese probably
took their total impact as reinforcing the impression of U.S. unwillingness
to engage China.
Peking also can be supposed to have closely analysed the overall
political conduct of the Vietnam War by Washington. Of great importance
probably were the repeated attempts by the U.S. to invoke ceasefires,
truces, and bombing halts. Although Peking derided and abused President
Johnson's highly publicized searches for peace, the Chinese leadership eas-
ily could have seen in them powerful evidence of a lack of American enthu-
siasm for the Vietnam War—and then deduced an even greater U.S. disen-
chantment with the prospect of a China War.
Observing the U.S. -Chinese confrontation from an objective stra-
tegic vantage point permits the observation that if the U.S. were planning
The New York Times, August 22, 1967.
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an attack of significant and lasting impact on China (e.g., not a hit-and-
run raid), it would probably be three-pronged: from Indochina, from Tai-
wan, and from Korean or Japanese staging points into Northeast China.
(Mao reportedly had been preoccupied with the possibility of a simultan-
eous U.S. attack on South China, a Soviet move into Sinkiang Province, and
137
an Indian attack on Tibet since 1962. ) Peking must have been reassured
when significant U.S. buildups did not occur elsewhere than in Vietnam.
Even more reassuring must have been the dampening of Chinese Nationalist
1 38hopes for a return to the mainland by Washington.
Moreover, the Far Eastern military picture was reinforced by
events in the United States. As the Vietnam War continued to escalate but
the Johnson Administration consistently refused to mobilize the nation,
Peking probably took the official U.S. insistence on pursuing the war with-
out mobilization of reserves or the economy as a prime indicator of limited
U.S. intent.
137
Stewart Alsop, "The Mind of Mao," The Saturday Evening Post
,
January 15, 1966, p. 14. Alsop* s report was subsequently substantiated in
1968 in an account of an interview given to a group from the Japanese Com-
munist Party by Mao on March 28, 1966. Mao reportedly told the Japanese
that if a U.S. -Chinese war occurred, Moscow would occupy China under the
pretext of mutual defense. In this contingency, Mao intended to order the
PLA to defend China against the Red Army, attempting to hold the area
south of the Yangtse River. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma
of Mao Tse-tung," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 59-
60, 67.
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The Chinese also probably noted with interest that a mobiliza-
tion attempt by Washington might not have been easily accepted by the
American people. Characterizing themselves as keen students of American
society and as experts on its internal contradictions, the Chinese were
well aware of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War in America. Peking ap-
plauded anti-war manifestations in the United States, in part because they
verified historic Chinese premises that the East had a monopoly on pa-
tience while Western nations, committed to quick victory, would not coun-
139
tenance a long-drawn-out war. Captured North Vietnamese documents of
1966 claimed that Peking was urging Hanoi to play for time, fighting on
indefinitely until China's nuclear. and conventional power totally defeated
140
the United States.
While Peking was interpreting domestic developments in the Uni-
ted States as favorable to long-range Chinese aspirations, Washington un-
questionably read domestic developments in China as favorable to American
short-term goals in Southeast Asia. The Great Chinese Cultural Revolution,
141
proclaimed by Chou En-lai on May Day, 1966, indicated to Wasbington an
intense Chinese preoccupation with domestic reorientation that could as
139
H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsp rings of Chinese Communist Foreign
Policy," American Journal of International Law , Vol. 44, No. 1 (January,
1950), p. 99.
140
Young, Negotiating . .
.




Mao reportedly gave the initial impetus for the Cultural
Revolution at a September, 1965 meeting of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo. "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party
(May 16, 1966)", Peking Review , No. 21, May 19, 1967, p. 6. It was for-
mally launched on April 14, 1966, at a meeting of the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress.
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easily keep China from foreign adventures as it could ultimately require
a foreign adventure to resolidify the country. On balance, the domestic
preoccupation seemed a more persuasive prediction than foreign adventure.
In any case, Chinese media proclamations of impending attack by the United
States and/or the Soviet Union might have persuaded the Chinese populace
that they in fact were involved in a great foreign struggle.
China's domestic turmoil began earlier than did noticeable anti-
war opposition in the United States. Social unrest in China antedated the
142
official proclamation of the Cultural Revolution by six months. Re-
143
ports of guerrilla warfare and widespread sabotage, purges of corrupt
144 145
officials and cadres, and mounting tension in Peking all were noted
with interest by Washington before the Cultural Revolution officially had
been so named. After it had become official Chinese policy, turmoil in-
creased. An "anti-party group" was purged in Peking as China "swept away
146
a horde of monsters," and the purges were broadened into the provinces.
General Lo JUi-ch'ing disappeared early in 1966, and was reported purged
142
Taipei, CNA in English, October 28, 1965. An extensive re-
port filed by hopeful Nationalist editors.
I/O
E.g., Delhi Radio, December 14, 1965, reported widespread
sabotage in Swatow.
The Washington Post , January 20, 1966. Stanley Karnow dis-
patch from Hong Kong.
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The Washington Post , March 9, 1966
1966, pp. 4-5.
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in July 1966. Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, also would be
purged, as would President Liu Shao-chi, Party Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping,
Peking Mayor Peng Chen, and other top leaders. Red Guard organizations
were rampant in the summer of 1966, and strife caused by their activities,
and the subsequent necessity to stop them, continued into 1968.
The end of the Cultural Revolution can be pegged to the Twelfth
Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, October, 1968. It subsequently
has been described as a grand factional struggle for power between Red
Guards, revolutionary rebels, revolutionary committees, Maoists, anti-
Maoists, military professionals, military politicians, various bureau-
cratic elements, and top-level cliques surrounding various leading politi-
cal figures. From this enormous and lengthy disruption Lui Shao-chi be-
came "China's Khrushchov," the scapegoat for China's troubles, Mao was re-
stored as an active top political figure in lieu of his earlier role as an
object of veneration, and Lin Piao emerged as the number two man in China
148




July 15, 1966. Speculation as to why
he was purged is contained in ibid
.
, March 9, 1966. A recent and detailed
analysis is by Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, The Purge o f Lo Jui-Ch'ing:
The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning , Rand Memorandum R-548-PR, San-
ta Monica: The Rand Corporation, February, 1971.
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Regarding the Cultural Revolution, see Benjamin Schwartz,
"The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the
Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly , No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp.
1-17;
,
"The Reign of Virtue—Thoughts on China's Cultural Revolu-
tion," Dissent , May-June, 1969, pp. 239 ff. Tang Tsou, "The Cultural
Revolution and the Chinese Political System," China Quarterly, No. 38
(April-June, 1969), pp. 63-91; "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
in China," Survey
,
No. 63 (April, 1967); A. Doak Barnett, China After Mao ,
op. cit . : and Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute; Back-
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provided the United States with an opportunity to act, for although no
known faction in China wanted to come to immediate terms with Washington,
their inability to invoke an opposite decision also was evident.
It must be noted, however, that Washington's course was firmly
set, and the essence of a Chinese-American arrangement for conducting mili-
tary operations already fairly firm, before the Cultural Revolution became
a matter of strategic importance. Thus it follows that Washington's stand
in Vietnam may be thought of as one causal factor behind a domestic phen-
omenon in China which Washington then was able to turn to advantage. But
the question of whether the U.S. action was more important than other
causes of Chinese turmoil must be answered in the negative.
In fact, the mainsprings of the Cultural Revolution probably were
domestic, rising in the perhaps quixotic effort of Mao to insure revolu-
tionary elan in the Chinese Communist Party even after his passing. The
domestic causes were amplified by a series of drastic foreign reverses
elsewhere than in Vietnam. Events in Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Cuba, and
149
even relations with Hanoi, in 1965 and 1966, contravened Chinese aspira-
tions and must have caused deep chagrin in Peking.
ground, Development and the March 19 69 Crisis , Santa Monica: The Rand Corp,
RM-6171 PR, August, 1970, pp. 48-56. Regarding Lin Piao, see Dennis Blood-
worth, "Lin Piao, the Tiger Cat Stalking in Mao's Shadow," The Observer
(London), April 20, 1969; and the Editor, "Lin Piao and the Cultural Revo-
lution," Current Scene
,
Vol. 8, No. 14, August 1, 1970.
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The New York Times , November 16, 1966.
On March 7, 1966, Renmin Ribao warned CCP members against
sinking into "passivity and despair" because of recent setbacks suffered
by revolutionary forces abroad and said "sometimes the leadership of the
revolution itself may make mistakes of one kind or another." Also see The
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However, of all strategic and foreign policy problems facing
Peking during the period, the one that might have shared top billing with
the "U.S. threat" was the "Soviet threat." Much of the argument of the
Cultural Revolution, as experienced by top Chinese leadership circles es-
pecially in late 1965 and early 1966, was focussed on the question of which
enemy to deal with first. It is most important to recognize that when fac-
tions solidified in Peking and one faction became dominant, those taking a
"soft" line toward Moscow were the purge victims while the anti-Moscow
"hard-liners," who were willing to defer the struggle with "imperialism"
until the Socialist campground was restored to order, dominated the scene.
Washington unquestionably kept the apparently deepening Sino-
Soviet struggle under close scrutiny. But the perceptions of even the most
acute observers were insufficient to pierce the veils of uncertainty sur-
rounding the complex Sino-Soviet interaction. Washington decisionmakers
needed to know whether the split was temporary or permanent and what ac-
tions by the United States might accent or diminish it. Would escalating
the Vietnam war cause Peking and Moscow to reunite? Would an attack on
China, even an accidental foray of low intensity, cause them to stop quar-
reling and activate their 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance? Or would escalation of the Vietnam War drive China and the
New York Times
, March 8, 1966.
Cf
.
, Ra'anan, op. cit
.
; "The Soviet Union and the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution in China," Survey, No. 63, (April, 1967), pp.
3-8; also see Maury Lisann, "Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle,"
Problems of Communism , Vol. 18, No. 6 (November-December, 1969), pp. 32-
41, at pp. 34, 36, and 38j and Harding and Gurtov, op. cit .
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Soviet Union further apart? Might an attack on China by the U.S., if it
were limited in scope and intensity, be viewed benignly by Moscow?
At the time, there were no firm answers to these questions. Of
a distinguished group of consultants and advisors to the U.S. government
concerned with these questions, it seems reasonable to suppose that, re-
garding Vietnam, some thought that escalating the war would drive a larger
wedge between Peking and Moscow while others did not, and, regarding China,
very few favored any sort of U.S. attack even though the Soviet response
probably would not mean activation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty.
Therefore, Washington always was forced to be prudent, to operate
on the assumption that the split was temporary, and that any hyperactivity
might either drive Moscow toward Peking or Peking toward Moscow.
Hindsight indicates, of course, that the split was indeed a deep
crevasse, not readily subject to solutions mutually arrived at or encour-
aged from outside by either allies or opponents. Further, it has become
fairly evident that the Vietnam issue intensified the split between the
Communist governments. Washington was able to act with the freedom it did
have because Peking and Moscow, competing for favor and influence in South-
east Asia, especially with Hanoi, could not agree on a combined course of
action. Washington, watching closely for any sign of a Chinese-Soviet
rapprochement during 1964-1967, instead observed that split broadening
and deepening.
Additional background material on the Sino-Soviet dispute will be
presented in the following chapter, when the dispute becomes the main sub-

145
ject of attention. At this time, hov/ever, in order more completely to
illustrate the relevance of the Sino-Soviet dispute to the Chinese-Ameri-
can interaction, we shall note several important instances in the worsen-
ing dispute that undoubtedly were regarded as important in Washington.
Hostility between Chinese and Soviet personnel probably was
more serious in 1964 than was generally realized. Although there had been
reports of earlier clashes along the border in 1961 and 1962, and even a
few as early as 1959, these had not always taken on the appearance of
armed clashes between uniformed troops. Rather, they often were small,
minor violations of border regulations by the civilian populace. Some-
times, as in 1962, they involved large scale flight of refugees. Later,
they took the form of obvious political provocation. And sometimes, the
clashes did involve uniformed troops. Incidents over the years occurred
from one end of the border to the other. Each side kept a log of the in-
t A . 152cidents.
Moscow claims that it initiated a proposal for border talks on
May 17, 1963, and the two sides began secret consultations on the border
problem on February 25, 1964. However, the consultations were not destined
to lead to talks. It was thought that the consultations had failed as of
152
The U.S.S.R. promulgated its log in 1969: Moscow Radio in
Mandarin to China, March 6, 1969; Moscow Radio in English to South Asia,
March 25, 1969; B. Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions," New Times , March 26,
1969, pp. 8-10; Pravda, March 30, 1969 (also CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 13,
April 16, 1969, pp. 3-5); Yuri Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," Trud ,
March 16, 1969, p. 3 (also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 11, April 2, 1969, p. 4);
and Konstantin Simonov, "Thinking Out Loud," Pravda , May 3, 1969. China's
log appeared in Renmin Ribao , March 3, 1969; "Report on Border Film," NCNA
Domestic Radio, April 13, 1969; and Renmin Ribao , May 24, 1969. For an
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May 8, 1964, when the Chinese negotiator walked out. According to a CPSU
letter of late 1965, the Chinese representative threatened to solve the
problem "with other means," adding "It is not excluded that China will
153
attempt to restore her historic rights."
In late May, 1964, the Soviets accused Peking of stirring up a
border feud and committing "gross provocations." On July 10, 1964, Mao
Tse-tung told visiting Japanese socialists that
Some people have said that the Sin-
kiang area and the territories north of the
Amur River must be included in the Soviet U-
nion. The U.S.S.R. is concentrating troops"
along its border. *--"
In the same conversation, Mao tried to stir the irredentist aspirations of
both Japan and West Germany, for he suggested that the Soviet Union not
only had no right to the Kurile Islands and to the territory annexed from
Poland when that nation's borders were shifted westward at the expense of
•I CfL
defeated Germany, but should relinquish them.
"
earlier account of some of the "5000" incidents in 1962, see Griffith, The
Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit
.
, pp. 141-42, 172-76.
153Quoted in a "secret" letter from the CPSU Central Committee
to East European ruling parties and lower party echelons in the Soviet
Union, published in Die Welt (Hamburg), March 21, 1966, Le Monde, March 23,
1966, and The New York Times , March 24, 1966. Much of the letter was
known in the West in January, 1966. The New York Times , February 1, 1966.
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Sekai Shuho (Tokyo), August 11, 1964, quoted in Doolin,
op. cit






Moscow must have been immediately aware of Mao's alarming
speech, although it seems to have been missed in the West. The speech
1 58
was not widely promulgated until mid-August, and was not reported in
Pravda until September 2, 1964. Therefore, the significance of the re-
marks of Khrushchev's influential son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, regarding
the increasingly military nature of the dispute, in early August, was
overlooked. Adzhubei said
...on the Soviet frontiers, not
only our entire military might but the
heart of all our people stand guard—in
the West and in the East. 159
By this time Chou En-lai,had been interviewed by a Japanese
newsman and had given essentially the same Chinese line. Under the
circumstances, it was deemed necessary that Moscow respond directly and
officially.
Mao's remarks were mentioned in Asahi Evening News
,
July 13,
1964, quoted in ibid .
158 — —
E.g., note the date of Sekai Shuho , fn 155.
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Adzhubei' s remarks were made during a visit to Germany. Per
Spiegel (Hamburg), August 3, 1964. The Adzhubei visit may be considered
a precursor of Soviet moves in 1969 and 1970. Adzhubei was trying to im-
prove Soviet relations with the West at a time when the Chinese situation
looked bleak. He may have been "taking soundings" preparatory to a major
Soviet policy shift. Moscow eventually would follow through on this
Westpolitik when the Chinese situation reached a crisis stage at the turn
of the decade, signing a renunciation-of-force agreement with the Brandt
government in 1970.
Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), August 1, 1964, quoted in Doolin,
cit
.
, pp. 45-46. (Document 16).
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Accordingly, Pravda published Mao's July 10th statement and set
out to argue the matter publicly. In its refutation of Mao's position,
Pravda declared that his demands on the Soviet Union were similar to Hit-
1 61
ler's requirement for Lebensraum
. Khrushchev personally entered the
fray in a speech in Prague a few days later. He challenged Chinese title
to Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, said Soviet frontiers were inviolable,
and, noting that Moscow now wielded weapons of unlimited destructive
power, said it was dangerous, even criminal, to seek wealth through ter-
.. . , .162
ritonal expansion.
Despite this escalating war of words and intimation of troop
movements, and despite their reported breakdown, Sino-Soviet consultations
apparently did continue during the summer. According to Moscow, the two
sides did reach "agreement in principle" and Moscow proposed, in a note
of September 26, 1964, that border talks begin on October 15, 1964. How-





Khrushchev's speech in Prague was reported in Pravda , Septem-
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For a more detailed examination of this Sino-Soviet summer exchange in
1964, see William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 , Cambridge:
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For 1969 retrospective views on the 1964 secret border talks,
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the October 15th convening date, Khrushchev was sent into compulsory re-
tirement. Brezhnev and Kosygin have not acknowledged receiving a Chinese
reply. Perhaps Peking considered the consultations overcome by events.
The aggregation of evidence on the border dispute, including
reported massing of troops by the Soviets and the prolonged but sporadic
consultations, has led to speculation that Khrushchev was contemplating
a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear installations and that this, the
most "hairb rained" of all Khrushchevian schemes, was the proximate reason
164
for his removal by Brezhnev and Kosygin.
While this speculation may be true in part, it is also true, and
perhaps more valid, that Khrushchev's on-going attempt to convene a meet-
ing of the international movement of communist and workers' parties, the
purpose of which was to "excommunicate" Peking, was encountering serious
opposition among the non-ruling parties—and some of the ruling parties
1 f\ s
(e.g., Rumania). In short, Khrushchev was open to accusations of al-
Moscow's September 26, 1964 proposal for border talks on October
15, 1964 should not be confused with Peking's February 29, 1964 proposal
for wide-ranging Sino-Soviet talks, to meet October 10-25, 1964, to try to
resolve outstanding problems of ideology prior to the Soviet-sponsored in-
ternational communist conference. On this subject, Moscow then replied to
Peking on March 7, Peking answered on Hay 7, and Moscow again replied on
June 15. Devlin, op. cit
.








By Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics , Bos-
ton: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1966, Chapter 17. Hinton has claimed that the
speculation is confirmed by yet unreleased material of which he obtained
knowledge. Clemens persuasively disputes the thesis. See Clemens, op. cit .,
pp. 273-74. Earlier, Griffith had opined that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support Hinton 's conjecture. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965
,
op. cit
., p. 59, fn. 157.
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For a more complete account of the varying attitudes of the

150
lowing party discipline to deteriorate, and this also may have been a
factor in his overthrow. Further, continuing discontent over the econ-
omy, the crisis in agriculture and continuing opposition to Khrushchev-
ian domestic reform programs, particularly in the bureaucracy, had co-
alesced. Perhaps most important, the Politburo probably had come to be-
lieve that Khrushchev was preparing to abandon the concept of collective
leadership. Therefore, he was forced into retirement.
Peking must have been relieved by Khrushchev's replacement.
But it quickly became evident that the new group in Moscow was not dis-
posed to cater to Chinese wishes. Nor was Peking willing to accommodate
Chinese positions toward Soviet requirements merely to impress Brezhnev
167
and Kosygin. Both sides had too much at stake.
Neither the border dispute nor the major problem posed by
Peking's unyielding sponsorship of factions and undisguised competing op-
position Marxist-Leninist parties around the world were readily suscepti-
1 68
ble to resolution. Brezhnev and Kosygin 's policy of "no open polemics"
non-ruling and ruling parties toward the conference and its obvious pur-
pose, see Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 , op . cit .
,
pp. 31-
41, and Devlin, op. cit
.
, Part VI, pp. 4-9, 33-43. Those parties oppo-
sing the conference were not only the pro-Chinese parties but other par-
ties who wished, for reasons of their own, to accent their autonomy from
Moscow.
This interpretation follows Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations
,
1964-1965




pp. 68-72, 97, 101; Griffith, Sino-Soviet
Relations, 1964-1965
,




, Part VI, pp. 10-16.
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failed resoundingly. In Peking, Chou En-lai said that the new leaders
169
were "much worse than ' Khrushchev.
The border situation probably became worse. In 1966, reports
circulated in Eastern Europe of over 150 border clashes in 1965. On De-
cember 25, 1965, Peking protested to Moscow through diplomatic channels
that Soviet troops in Mongolia were harrassing the Chinese border.
Renewal of the Soviet-Outer Mongolian Mutual Defense Treaty on January
15, 1966, and subsequent stationing of a 10,000 man Soviet armored unit on
the Mongolian-Chinese frontier indicated to Washington that the border
dispute continued to be a possible locus of major conflict and that Peking
had not moved to ease the situation there. Confirmation came during suc-
ceeding months. In March, 1966, Peking rejected an invitation to the CPSU
23rd Congress because the Soviet Party had alleged that China had been
encroaching on Soviet territory. On April first an incident occurred on
the Sino-Mongolian border. Peking accused the Soviets of trying to find a
pretext for aggression. In May, 1966 Chen Yi described the Russians as
169
The New York Times
,
May 2, 1966. Chou had travelled to Mos-
cow to meet Khrushchev's successors. Moscow unenthusiastically described
their talks as "frank" and "comradely." [Pravda, November 14, 1964], and
Peking later described the Brezhnev-Kosygin policy toward China as no dif-
ferent from Khrushchev's. ["Why Khrushchev Fell," Hongqi , November 21,
1964, English text in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 , op. cit . ,
pp. 387-92.]








"thieves" who had annexed 1.5 million kilometers of Chinese terri-
tory. According to Soviet reports, Chinese troops fired indiscriminately
on Soviet ships on the Amur River, and by December, after both sides had
reinforced the border, the Soviet Union was estimated to have twelve di-
visions along the frontier.
In January, 1967, after reports of a clash on the Ussuri River,
Moscow accused Peking of wildly provocative behavior in connection with
172
the Cultural Revolution. Soviet border guards reported other incidents
173
in December, 1967. Peking complained of a Soviet "intrusion" onto
Chenpao ("Treasure") Island in the Ussuri River on January 23, 1967, and,
in 1969, published its version of other border problems during 1967.
In February, 1967, as Mao reportedly warned Chinese frontier
174
guards of a new Soviet build-up, Washington also closely watched the
Sino-Soviet dispute over aid to Vietnam. Once again there was to be an
initial dispute—and an intensification of it between 1965 and 1967. Mos-
cow has stated that twice during 1965 the Soviet Union proposed a trilater-
al summit meeting on Vietnam, to consist of North Vietnamese, Chinese, and
Soviet leaders, and that Hanoi was agreeable but Peking refused to cooper-
ate. The question of importance here is "What was Moscow's major reason
for urging a trilateral summit conference?" Was the Soviet proposal pri-
172
Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," op. cit . Also see "Dan-
ger of Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Grows," Borba (Belgrade), January 29,







The New York Times, February 12, 1967.
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raarily aimed at increasing aid to North Vietnam? Or was Moscow trying to
euchre Peking into a position where the Chinese had to stand up and be
counted in order to retain a semblance of worthiness in the eyes of the In-
ternational Communist Movement? It seems reasonable to accept affirmative
answers to both these questions, but it is difficult to rank one Soviet
motive above the other.
Peking refused to come to the meeting, thus accenting the depth
of the split with Moscow, but continued to reiterate its whole-hearted sup-
port for Hanoi. The Chinese refusal probably resulted in a "devaluation
of Chinese stock" held by the Communist parties of the world, except for
the strongly pro-Chinese parties. .It was becoming possible, at this stage,
to begin to see the Vietnam War as a coincident cause for a decline in Chi-
nese prestige and an elevation of Soviet prestige.
Moscow tried to accent this impression by asserting that China
hoped to provoke war between the United States and the Soviet Union and
then "sit on a hillside and watch the battle of the tigers." Thus Chi-
na allegedly was obstructing overland shipments from the Soviet Union to
Vietnam in order to force more Soviet shipping into the combat zone.
Peking vigorously denied Soviet charges of obstructing shipments
and in turn accused Moscow of slandering China. While denying an alleged
Soviet request to send four thousand Red Army troops to North Vietnam, to
Die Welt (Hamburg), March 21, 1966, the CPSU C.C. "secret




"occupy and use" several air bases in China, and to grant uninhibited
overflight rights to the Red Air Force (for reasons of sovereignty) , the
Chinese nevertheless claimed to have done their "utmost" to facilitate
1 -j c
delivery of Soviet military goods free of charge. However, it is
fairly certain that the Chinese did restrict Soviet use of Chinese air-
space and landing facilities, and may have harassed transient Soviet
personnel at these facilities in cases when landing permission was given,
moves that must have been very significant to Washington observers. Un-
confirmed reports also circulated that Peking had sidetracked Soviet ship-
ments to paint out Soviet identifications and substitute Chinese markings
and, in some cases, replace crated 'new Soviet fighter aircraft with used
178
Chinese fighter aircraft. If true, this was a phenomenon of immediate
military significance as well as of mid-range political import.
Military assistance to Vietnam was closely connected to inci-
dents on the Sino-Soviet border. By 1967 the Soviet press was reporting
unpleasant incidents between Chinese train crews and Soviet customs offi-
179
cials in connection with its charges of Chinese obstructionism.
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, December 23,
1965; Peking Review for January 1, January 15, May 6, July 15, 1966, Jan-
uary 27, 1967. The July 15 issue summarizes events until that time. For




Edward Crankshaw in The Observer (London), November 14, 1965;
Bernard B. Fall, "The Year of the Hawks," The New York Times Magazine , De-
cember 12, 1965, p. 48.
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Mikhail Maguta, "The Far Eastern Frontier," Novosti News A-
gency, March 13, 1967, in Survey , No. 63, April, 1967, pp. 53-54.
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It has been suggested that Peking and Moscow eventually managed
to routinize procedures for transshipment of war material across China
1 on
that were so prominent in 1965. If so, this did not stop polemics
181
concerning Chinese obstructionism.
Additionally, polemicizing on other subjects continued into
1967. Moscow accused Peking of selling steel to the U.S., a charge angri-
1 on
ly denied by Peking. Pravda said "Chinese policy was a stab in the
back of the heroic Vietnamese people," in response to which Peking
termed the Muscovites "New Disciples of Goebbels." ' Pravda suggested
IOC
that China had an understanding with the U.S. over the Vietnam War and
Izvestia accused China of agreeing -to refrain from helping Vietnam in re-
turn for immunity from U.S. invasion.
Peking responded to Soviet charges of U.S. -Chinese collusion by
180
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Peking Review , No. 1, January 1, 1967, pp. 33-34. The Soviet






Peking Review, No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 25.
"Concerning Events in China," Pravda , November 27, 1966, car-
ried in CDSP , Vol. 18, No. 47, December 14, 1966, pp. 3-6, at p. 5.
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Izvestia, March 29, 1967.
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reiterating charges of U.S. -Soviet collusion. Peking spoke of a "big
187
U.S. -Soviet Conspiracy" and accused the Soviets of "trying to sow dif-
1 QQ
ferences" between Peking and Hanoi.
There was a variety of other aspects to the growing Sino-Soviet
dispute as it was caught up in and amplified by the excesses of the Cul-
tural Revolution, including hostile demonstrations near the Soviet Embassy
189
in Peking, Red Guards beating up Soviet personnel in Shanghai, and a
reciprocal expulsion of students in October, 1966. But the thrust of the
major features of the dispute, the border problem and cooperation regard-
ing Vietnam, well illustrated to Washington chat Peking was neither chang-
ing positions nor giving in to Soviet pressures. As the dispute continued
into 1967, CCP factional arguments were reflected and increasingly ampli-
fied in the Cultural Revolution. As a result, and upon the achievement of
dominance by the Mao group, there was a great sharpening of Chinese policy
against the Soviet Union.
187
"Observer," "Smash The Big U.S. -Soviet Conspiracy," Peking
Review
,








September 17, 1966. Large wall posters called for
the "burning and skinning of Soviet revisionist personnel." L. Andronov,
"Behind The Chinese Cultural Revolution," New Times , December 14, 1966,
pp. 11-13. The official Soviet protest over "outrages at the Embassy"
was rebroadcast by Moscow Radio Domestic Service in Russian on October 27,
1966. There also were anti-Soviet incidents staged by Chinese students
in Moscow. Accounts of these episodes make fascinating reading. See
Survey
, No. 63, April, 1967, and Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relat ions, 1964-
1965
,
op. cit., pp. 88-91.
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It thus can be concluded that Chinese intransigence toward the
Soviet Union, which increased throughout the 1964-1967 period, was an ele-
ment of major significance in the tacit exchange between Peking and Wash-
ington. The deduction by the U.S. was simple: so long as Peking intensi-
fied its dispute with Moscow, it would not seek war with Washington— in
Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia.
Washington's evaluation of the strategic picture in the Far
East in 1964-67 can be regarded as a mirror image of Peking's evaluation.
That is to say, if Peking were planning overt military action against the
U.S., it probably x^ould not be limited to the Southern perimeter. Rather,
a simultaneous advance in the Southwest, South, East, and Northeast would
present the U.S. with very serious problems. As the situation developed,
prospects for this occurrence became very slim. Not only did the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army under Lin Piao become deeply committed domestically
in the Cultural Revolution, it was preoccupied with events on the Sino-So-
viet frontier. Peking's consequent unwillingness, or inability, to keep
trouble stirring on the Himalayan frontier, to send more than 40,000 con-
struction workers to North Vietnam, to institute effective harassment of
190
The following books are especially useful in providing a
more detailed picture of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the period 1964-67:
Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965
,
o p. cit . ; Gittings, op. c it.
,
pp. 232-86; Clemens, op . cit. , Chapter 6, with notes; Robert A. Rupen
and Robert Farrell, Vietnam and the Sino-Sovie t Dispute, New York: Prae-
ger, 1967; Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin,
New York: Viking, 19 70; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The His-




Hong Kong, or to rally with the North Koreans, constituted meaningful
tacit signals to Washington that China fully intended to adhere to Mao's
early statement that China would not fight unless attacked by American
forces. By the end of 1967, Chinese actions had also seemed to substan-
tiate the opinion of some Western experts that Lin Piao's famous speech
"Long Live the Victory of People's War" was not as had been commonly ac-
cepted, an expansionist doctrine but, rather, a prescription for tempor-




Remarks on the Chinese-U.S. Interaction, 1964-1967
The foregoing presentation verifies that Chinese-U.S. relations
remained deep in a "hate" node of their historic "love-hate" cycle during
the 1964-67 period. Had the Sino-Soviet dispute, a major factor in the
tacit exchange, not been intensifying during the period, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that Chinese-U.S. interaction could have been much more
191
Peking did protest to London the port visits to Hong Kong of
U.S. nuclear powered ships and submarines but more or less tolerated U.S.
forces' use of Hong Kong as a rest and recreation center. U.S. purchases
of material and supplies from Hong Kong vendors ostensibly scandalized
Moscow, which used the situation as an example of Chinese-U.S. "collusion"
and a Chinese "stab in the back" to North Vietnam.
192
Lin Piao, op. cit . , Cf
.
, David P. Mozingo and Thomas W. Robin-
son, Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes A Second Look At Vietnam
,
Rand Memorandum RM-4814-PR, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965, and
Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965 , op. cit .
, pp. 110-12. These
analyses point up Lin's emphasis on self reliance and caution as opposed
to the inflammatory allegory of the speech to the effect that the rural
areas of the world would encircle and conquer the cities of the world.
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dangerous. As it was, events in the military engagement and in the three
channels of political dialogue were characterized by continuing high but
controlled tension.
The evidence from the military engagement and political dialogue
sections of this chapter can be arranged in a simple international tension
matrix. The arrangement process is lengthy and space-consuming; therefore
the complete matrix will not be set out here. But impressions gained from
the process, which has been conducted in draft, can be briefly portrayed.







Perceived by U.S. Perceived by China
Date Event Date Event
Date Event Date Event
When events are entered in the matrix, it immediately becomes
obvious that there were surprisingly few tension diminishing events in Chi-
nese--U.S. interaction. Almost all entries fall in the tension amplifying
row. Those events that objectively might have been described as tension
diminishing often were not perceived as such by the opposing side. Their
classification as fraudulent, subterfuge, or dissembling by the perceiver
effectively moved them to the tension amplifying row of the matrix.
Nonetheless, the two sides were able to stabilize their interac-
tive process at this high level of tension, slipping neither into a major
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war nor back toward a more calm and reassuring mode of interaction. It
has been shown that the stabilization was a result of considerable overt
as well as tacit military and political maneuver by both sides.
Before proceeding to the Sino-Soviet case, it may be well to
juxtapose at least the Chinese side of the Sino-American interactive pro-
cess to the hypotheses on superpower behavior—a partial review prior to
the next phase of the analysis. A complete review of both sides of the
interactive process from both case studies will be made in Chapter 6.
Hypothesis I proposed in effect that as its nuclear weapons
inventory increased, Peking would gauge its initiatives and responses to
a level below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder.
During the period 1964 to 1967, when the Chinese nuclear capability was
small but beginning to grow, Peking cannot be said to have taken an ini-
tiative toward nuclear warfare or invoked the prospect of a nuclear re-
sponse. Chinese military moves at no time seemed to pose the prospect of
a surprise nuclear strike.
Although Peking regularly proclaimed the likelihood of a U.S.
nuclear attack on China, a Chinese nuclear response was not specifically
mentioned. As close as the Chinese leadership ever came to this was the
issuance of ambiguous threats, such as "If war breaks out, it will have
no boundaries," and "If a Sino-U.S. war breaks out, all Asian countries
offering bases to the U.S. will be turned into battle sites...," or e-
quivocal statements such as "The North Vietnamese appreciate our growing
nuclear strength." Peking was neither overtly "rattling rockets" nor in-
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voking serious threats of nuclear war in these statements, which men-
tioned neither timing nor method of retaliation.
Were Chou and Chen thinking of people's wars or guerrilla
fighting near U.S. bases in the Far East rather than nuclear engagements?
We do not know the answer for certain, but must evaluate it as "probably
so." Thus, when the Chinese weapons inventory was small, and even after
several years of its development, Peking was gauging its initiatives and
responses below the nuclear threshold.
Hypothesis II says that as the Chinese nuclear capability grew,
Peking would try to develop ready lines of communication with an oppo-
nent superpower. Since the Chinese nuclear capability was increasing
during the period, it would be expected that Peking would at least keep
the communication channels it did have with Washington open, and per-
haps try to improve them. The evidence for this hypothesis is ambiguous,
but we know that as far as diplomatic channels (the Warsaw ambassadorial
meetings) were concerned, Peking publicly had closed them down by 1968
rather than taking steps to improve them.
On the surface, it seems that Peking was acting contrary to
the hypothesis, but the facts that either ambassador in Warsaw could sum-
mon an emergency meeting at any time, and that both Washington and Peking
also could rely on the irregular dialogue or the public dialogue to pass
information may mean that Peking halted formal meetings as a political
propaganda point in the knowledge that other channels were always open.

162
In short, Peking cannot be said to have really tried to main-
tain a ready line of communication. Instead, the Chinese were content
to rely on less regularized procedures. By 1968 there was little indi-
cation that the larger Chinese nuclear capability had impressed Peking
with the need for anything approaching the "Hot Line" concept.
Hypothesis III says that as superpower strategic weapons sys-
tem inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly ready to under-
take arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower designed to
limit or reduce arms. There is little in the Chinese-American record
during the 1964-1967 period that would tend to support this hypothesis.
The Kennedy Administration conducted several "instructional" or "infor-
mational" sessions on the U.S. attitude toward arms control during the
1962-1963 Warsaw meetings with China. However, there is no available
evidence to indicate that any of the philosophy of arms control or lim-
itation, as opposed to the Utopia of general and complete disarmament
of nations, was ever assimilated by Peking. Thus in 1964, on the occa-
sion of the first Chinese nuclear test, Peking called for general and com-
plete disarmament. This position was maintained during the remainder of
the period.
Hypothesis IV says that when there is a clear and present dan-
ger of nuclear warfare, Peking would try to lessen tensions with the oppo-
sing superpower through discussion of strategic postures or crisis con-
trol measures. Since China's nuclear capability had only begun to grow
during 1964-1967, it might be expected that Peking would not really try
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to lessen tensions. The political and military interaction has revealed
that this is so. Peking, by almost any measure, seemed to prefer a high
tension level. Chinese political initiatives and responses were demand-
ing, provocative, and sometimes ambiguously threatening, constituting al-
most a "zero-sum" dialogue. Chinese military initiatives and responses,
while cautious, were nonetheless often defiant and firmly accented the
political position taken by Peking that China would fight if attacked.
The policy of military restraint could be changed at any time. The over-
shadowing potential of Chinese military intervention in Vietnam was never
long out of Washington's estimates. Although an arrangement was achieved
between the two sides, it was not of such rigor or permanence that it
could not be unilaterally altered at the whim of hostile Chinese govern-
ment. Although Peking did not alter its restrained position, its public
stance almost always indicated that it might do so. —And thus tension
continued very high.
Having reviewed Chinese actions vis a vis the hypotheses in
1964-1967 during conflictive interaction with the U.S., we now turn to an




The Chinese-Soviet Interaction, 1968-1970
Introduction
Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction during the period 1968-
1970 culminated a dispute with as numerous and complex a set of ante-
cedents as the earlier Chinese-American conflictive interaction. The
record of disagreement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) can be traced well back into
the period when Chinese-American intergovernmental relations were at
least superficially good. Many Western scholars have looked at the early
CCP-CPSU interaction; Mao's often disappointing experience with Stalin
has been outlined with some precision, although details from Kremlin and
Peking archives remain to be filled in.
It was unlikely that, having gained power only in part through
Soviet assistance, the Chinese Communists would forget Stalin's past
slights, misinformation, blundering, and perhaps outright treachery, and
permanently embrace Moscow as a great champion and brother. After all,
Moscow's commitment to Mao had been so weak that Soviet diplomacy, whether
or not specifically directed by Stalin, managed to insult Mao on the eve
Among the usually recommended presentations on the early CCP-
CPSU period are Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists , Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1963, and Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Mos-
cow
,
New York: Putnam, 1963. Aside from these and numerous standard his-
torical accounts, some recent research by Barton Whaley, including Guer-
rilla Communications and Soviet Journalists in China , Cambridge: M.I.T.
Center for International Studies, 1967 and 1969 (C-67/4 and C-69/31)
,
provides fascinating insight, as, in another sense, does the novel
Man's Fate by Andre Malraux, New York: Vintage, 1961.
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of his triumph: the Soviet ambassador remained with the fleeing Chiang
government after Mao was established in Peking, until Chiang left for
Fo rmo s a
.
But the trauma of the "loss of China" caused the West, par-
ticularly Washington, to discount the past CCP-CPSU record. As far as
Washington was concerned, there was a Sino-Soviet monolith. The Korean
War cast this view in concrete.
Chinese-Soviet Interaction in Perspective: Increasing Hostility
Since 1956
Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s were superficially quite
good, although some indications of political disagreement commenced with
the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. We now know that even in
the early 1950s an incipient dispute lay just below the surface. Asked
why Soviet leaders did not detect a strongly nationalistic and chauvin-
istic line in Mao's policies much earlier, an influential Soviet policy-
maker has written that they did, but ignored it in the hope that over
2
the long run the tendencies would be overcome. Khrushchev, who seemed
to be fairly forthcoming with Peking between 1954 and 1958, has revealed
2
Mikhail S. Kapitsa, People s China: Two Decades, Two Poli-
cies , Moscow: unpublished, 1969. Kapitsa is director of the South-
East Asian department of the Soviet foreign ministry and a member of its
collegium. His book, unflattering to Mao, reportedly was withheld in
view of imminent Soviet-Chinese negotiations in Peking. See The Observer
(London), January 11, 1970.
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that the Chinese were very difficult to deal with, and that he "was
3
never exactly sure I understood what he [Mao] meant." By 1960 a split
was imminent, but the parties themselves, and the knowledgeable member-
ship of the international communist movement, managed to disguise it
4 5
until 1962-1963, when border clashes occurred and both sides began
to publicly air their grievances in now famous lengthy letters and
often pungent statements.
3
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers
,
Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1970, Chapter 18. The quote is on p. 466. A panel
of experts convened by the State Department has termed these memoirs
authentic although British experts have disagreed.
4
Disguising the split perhaps was not as difficult as it
would seem to be on the surface. The manifestations of the split were
observable only to those members of the international communist movement
who were delegates to major conferences. The delegates kept their own
counsel, conference proceedings were closely guarded, and public report-
ing on the conference proceedings preserved the facade of unity for all
but the most astute outside observers. The most extensive treatment
of the conferences, with accent on the attempt to preserve the appear-
ance of unity, is in Devlin, op. cit
.
, Part I, p. 3, Part II, p. 8,
Part III, p. 38, and Part IV, p. 6.




now know that during the 1962 disturbances a Chinese general officer of
Turkic nationality, Gen. Zunun Taipov, and part of his Sinkiang Fifth
Corps Army fled to the Soviet Union. Taipov subsequently organized the
Turkestan Liberation Army and lately has been broadcasting from Alma Ata
into Sinkiang Province. The New York Times , February 2, 1970.
One of the more quotable statements was in the editorial "The
Fearless Cuban People Are The Most Powerful Strategic Weapon," Renmin
Ribao
, November 5, 1962:
The least that should be expected of a
Communist is that he should make a clear
distinction between the enemy and his own
comrades; that he should be ruthless toward
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From the border clashes of 1962 until the turn of the decade
it has been obvious to everyone, and the Soviets have publicly admitted,
that Sino-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated. We have observed part
of this deterioration, during the 1964-1967 period, in the previous
chapter. Before continuing the examination of Sino-Soviet interaction
into the 1968-1970 period, when it becomes of crucial importance to this
thesis, let us digress momentarily to identify the underpinnings of
the great dispute.
We have noted the ideological aspects of the Chinese-American
conflict— the communism vs. "capitalist imperialism" struggle. It is
plain that the ideological chasm between China and the Soviet Union is
as intense and perhaps as insoluble. Yet it hardly can be postulated
that ideology caused the Sino-Soviet split; rather, common ideology prob-
ably permitted the two powers to maintain a superficial amicability longer
the enemy and amiable towards his own
comrades. But some people do just the
opposite.
. .They make "sensible compro-
mises" and exercise "moderation" in the
face of the sabre-rattling enemy, but
refuse to be conciliatory towards fra-
ternal Parties and fraternal countries.
To be so "amiable" to the enemy and so
"ruthless" towards fraternal socialist
countries is obviously not at all the
stand a Marxist-Leninist should take.
This paragraph did not appear in the Peking Review abridgement of the
editorial. Peking Review
,
No. 45, November 9, 1962, pp. 12-13.
Kapitsa, op. cit
.




than they otherwise could have. Once a split occurred, however, ideo-
o
logy intensified it. Basic differences were, and continue to be,
portrayed in ideological terms, whether they concern grand strategy,
foreign or domestic policy, "socialist community" responsibilities,
negotiating with capitalist states, or territorial boundaries. Ideo-
logy, therefore, can be seen as one of at least five major causes of
the dispute, the others being, in broad terms (1) foreign policy
issues, (2) nationalism issues, particularly irredentist issues,
(3) differing stages of economic development, and (4) a dynamic
9
escalation fed by a series of errors of judgment.
Of these five causes, irredentist issues are of most interest
to this study. Although compounded by each of the other causes, irre-
dentist activities of several kinds became the proximate cause for the
military crisis phase of the dispute in 1969. The two communist nations
o
Cf_. , Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift , op. cit ., p. 20; Uri
Ra'anan, The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs: Problems of a "Communist"
Foreign Policy
,
Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies,
June, 1968, pp. 1-3; Benjamin Schwartz, "Ideology and the Sino-Soviet
Alliance," in Howard Boorman et_ al_ . , Moscow-Peking Axis , New York:
Harper, 1957, pp. 112-41. The essence of the phenomenon is that for
a true Communist, as for a true Christian, there should be no distinc-
tion between theory and practice.
9
This reflects the conclusions of Zbigniew Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc
,




share a 4,375 mile border which remains governed by treaties drawn up
in the 19th century between Tsarist Russia and the Manchu Dynasty. Since
the turn of the century, successive Chinese regimes have regarded these
treaties, of Tientsin and Aigun (1858), Peking (1860), and St. Petersburg
(Hi) (1881), as "unequal." Through them China surrendered some 600,000
square miles to the Tsars. After the October Revolution, Lenin intimated
that the treaties were unequal and in need of renegotiation. His author-
ship of the Karakhan Declaration of 1920 continues to provide Peking
with priceless ammunition. Lenin was preoccupied with more pressing
matters; Stalin and his successors conveniently forgot, or discounted,
Lenin's "offer." Moscow fell back on the argument that the treaties
were the product of historic evolution, were not unequal, and could
be modified or changed, but not discarded completely. Between 1949 and
1964, no attempts were made to redefine the border, and, as we have seen,
the 1964 negotiations aborted when the Chinese walked out. In the latter
half of the 1960s, then, Peking, more and more aggravated over the border
The Sino-Soviet border runs for 7000 kilometers or 4,375 miles,
give or take a few, not including the Chinese border with Outer Mongolia.
The Soviet-Outer Mongolian defense pact dates from 1966. If the Chinese-
Outer Mongolian border of 4,000 kilometers (2500 miles) is added to the
Sino-Soviet common border, each side is responsible for defending 6,875
miles of frontier.
The Government of China and the Soviet Government did sign an
agreement in 1924 to hold a conference "within a month" to "redemarcate
national boundaries" and to annul and replace all treaties, conventions,
etc. It was never held.
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and events along it, had no readily available diplomatic recourse.
Tension smouldered.
Paralleling the tension between Peking and Moscow over their
disputed common frontier was a historic discontent in China over Outer
Mongolia, even though China had accepted the Mongolian border in 1962.
Moscow's sponsorship of Mongolian independence after World War II
rankled Peking; Mongolia's mutual defense pact with Moscow added insult
to injury. Peking covets the great land area governed from Ulan Bator.
If China and the Soviet Union should go to war, Mongolia might be the
ultimate stake in the conflict. It may not be far off the mark to call
13Mongolia "the hinge of the earth." But Peking's opportunities to
turn back the clock on the Mongolian issue were nonexistent. Mongolia
was a bone stuck in China's throat, and, in the 1960s, China could not
dislodge it.
In the previous chapter, as part of the analysis of the tacit
exchange between the U.S. and China during the period 1964-1967, we
12
The authoritative work on the territorial dispute is Dennis
J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Maps and
Analysis
,
Stanford: Hoover Institute Publications, 1965. Also see
John W. Wolf, "The Bear and the Dragon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol. 95, No. 11 (November, 1969), pp. 84-91; Robinson, op. cit ., pp. 2-23;
and the highly readable account by Salisbury, op. cit
.
, pp. 54-63, 135-
37. A capsule summary that lays the blame for the dispute on Genghis
Khan, who "introduced" the Chinese to the Soviets, is in The Washington




, Chapter 1. Chapters 2 and 3 develop
Russian and Chinese attitudes toward Outer Mongolia in detail.
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chronicled clashes on the Sino-Soviet border that greatly increased
tensions between the two powers. Clashes during those years also were
shown to have dovetailed into the internal political process of China,
including the great disturbance of the Cultural Revolution; and to have
reflected significant policy differences between the two states over
the best course of action in South-East Asia. In fact, the 1964-1967
period of the Sino-Soviet dispute is an excellent example of how the
five major causes of the dispute mesh with each other, effectively
reinforcing the dispute and making it a truly Gordian knot.
By the end of 1967 neither Peking nor Moscow had found an
Alexandrian solution to their problem. They were deeply bogged down
in mutual recrimination that had descended to gutter level. Each saw
the other as a vicious slanderer guilty of shameless perfidy; comrade-
ship had been forgotten.
To Moscow, Mao and company were leftist, dogmatic, adventuris-
tic "splitters" who had wrecked the unity of the world communist movement.
Moreover, they then had the insolence to proclaim themselves the right-
ful leaders of the movement! In Peking's view, Kremlin rightist revi-
sionists had revived the line of Bernstein and Kautsky and thus had
forfeited all rights to leadership. The Maoists, despite maltreatment
at the hands of Stalin, considered themselves the true heirs of Marx,
Lenin and Stalin. In Moscow's eyes, however, they were masquerading as
Marxists and Mao was a petit-bourgeois with reactionary-utopian leanings
who practiced social-chauvinism and glorified authoritarianism, the cult
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of personality, and great-Han chauvinism. Moscow saw a threat of "new
Khans" to the east while Peking, well aware of Soviet intransigence and
opportunism in all border matters, spoke of the arrogance of the "new
Tsars." Each seemed sure the other was colluding with imperialists
(e.g., the United States). To Moscow the Maoists were "bourgeois pro-
vocateurs," while to Peking, Brezhnev and Kosygin had become "hand-
maidens of the capitalist-imperialists."
It is unnecessary to pursue the matter of mutual recrimination
in greater depth at this juncture, for it continued deep into the 1968-
1970 period of interaction. We will see more of it. It is important
to recognize the severe strain on the Sino-Soviet relationships as the
two states entered the period. Conflict potential between them was
very high, perhaps higher than that existing between Peking and Washington
at the outset of the 1964-1967 period. As in the first case, there was
an existing record of conflict, albeit not including an equivalent to
the Korean War, and not as yet to our knowledge involving aerial inter-
ceptions and casualties. Still, the threat of land battles involving
major army units had hung over the borderlands for at least four years,
and, unless a way was found to alleviate tensions, threat might become
reality.
The most important factor in the conflict situation concerned
possible use of nuclear weapons. By 1968, the Soviet decision to aug-
ment Red Army strategic and tactical nuclear forces, that probably had
been taken some time soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was bearing
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fruit. Soviet forces were armed with a variety of nuclear weapons that
far outclassed the meagre nuclear stores of the PLA. By 1968, however,
the Chinese nuclear arsenal also had grown. The PLA might have had
available between fifty and one hundred nominal-yield weapons and a
few thermonuclear weapons. Despite its comparatively primitive delivery
capability, Moscow had to take the Chinese force into account.
Recrimination and argumentation were not a means for either
side to cut their Gordian knot. Was force, even nuclear force, a
better answer? Could astutely managed combinations of force and diplomacy
solve, or alleviate, the problem? Could Peking achieve an arrangement
with Moscow similar to that which apparently had been reached with
Washington two to three years earlier? In view of China's increasing
nuclear capability, would Peking want an arrangement or a final solution?
Would nuclear forces help or hinder diplomacy in achieving an arrangement
or a solution?
The examination of Sino-Soviet political-military interaction
during the period 1968-1970, which follows, is designed to shed light
on these questions. The format of this examination is the same as that
employed in Chapter 4. Patterns and progress of military engagement
will be examined initially, followed by a detailed account of the poli-
tical dialogue between the two. The chapter will conclude with a
chronicle of the Sino-Soviet tacit exchange. In carrying out this plan,
as will be recalled, it is necessary to present a chronological account
of events in each section and sub-section. At the end of a section or
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sub-section, therefore, the reader must be prepared to flash back in
time to the beginning of the 1968-1970 period to begin the next section.
We are sub-dividing the total Sino-Soviet political-military interaction
and examining each component with a view toward increasing our knowledge
of the whole.
I. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-Soviet Military Engagement
The Conventional Engagement
The Chinese-American pattern of military engagement during
the years 1964 to 1967 emphasized aerial activity. The Chinese-Soviet
pattern in 1968-1970 is significantly different in that combat between
ground units was the center of attention. This is not to say that air
and naval forces (or merchant shipping) were not occasionally involved,
for they were. But ground conflict predominated, and unlike the small,
covert activities conducted by Chinese Nationalist and possibly U.S.
intelligence organizations which came in contact x^ith mainland defense
forces, the Soviet-Chinese ground engagements often involved major units
of uniformed troops sometimes supported by air, armor, and artillery.
In developing this account of the Chinese-Soviet military
engagement, it has not been possible to derive a table similar to that
in Chapter 4 because the data is much less specific. It has been possible
Supra
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to determine when most of the major engagements occurred with some,
albeit imperfect, reliability. But accurate accounts either of the
forces involved in those engagements or of the losses sustained by each
side are not available. Yet it is surprising that we have even a little
information from the two "closed" societies. As their dispute intensi-
fied in 1969, each side released information on military clashes for
polemic purposes, making the Western researcher's job somewhat rewarding.
Undoubtedly incomplete, it is believed that available Sino-Soviet data
nevertheless is sufficient to provide legitimate assistance to this
study.
There seems to have been a rather common impression that 'the
major Sino-Soviet military clashes in the Spring and Summer of 1969 were
a sudden phenomenon following a lengthy lull along the border.
There have been attempts to impute special significance to
them for that reason only. For instance, the March 2, 1969 engagement
at Chenpao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River has been analysed in
light of the political dispute between East and West Germany over West
German presidential elections in West Berlin. The March 2nd engagement
also has been described as the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations because it
seemed to be the most serious battle between them thus far, therefore
Peter Mayer, Why The Ussuri? Reflections on the Latest Sino -
Soviet Fracas
,
Waltham, Mass: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Advanced
Studies Group, December 1969. ASG Monograph No. 1. The Soviets made the
same connection: D. Volsky, "The Peking Anti-Sovieteers ," New Times
,
No. 11, March 19, 1969, pp. 3-5.
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requiring considerable speculation as to why it occurred. This section
attempts to place the 1969 incidents in context, after which it might be
agreed that all the 1969 incidents, not simply the March clashes, consti-
tuted a nadir of Sino-Soviet relations.
The reader will recall the border clashes on the Ussuri River
1 o
islands in December, 1967, mentioned in the previous chapter. These
eastern clashes evidently continued into January, 1968 when border units
reportedly engaged each other with "cold weapons," knives, bayonets, and
19
other blades. Casualty figures are not available. In Sinkiang, also
around New Year's Day, 1968, a contemptuous but not bloody clash occurred
when Chinese officers in a jeep tried to ram a human chain of Soviet bor-
der guards. The guards did not move so the Chinese tied oily rags to the
20jeep and smudged the Soviet uniforms. Incongruous as this incident
might be, it exemplified the generally deteriorating situation. Reports
from Hong Kong in February indicated that the frontier was deeply trou-
21












Kapitsa, op. cit .
20
The Wall Street Journal , January 2, 1968. Dispatch by Robert
Keatly from Alma Ata entitled "Hate Thy Neighbor."
21
The Washington Post, February 26, 1968.
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District wrote that "the ceaseless provocations of the Mao Tse-tung
clique now, more than ever, revive the real danger of a new world
,,22
war. . .
Also in March, 1968, Sino-Soviet attention turned to marine
matters. Chinese port officials detained the Soviet tanker Komsomolets
Ukrainy in the Wampu River. After ten days' detention, Moscow regis-
23
tered a diplomatic protest. Peking responded with a protest charging
24
a Soviet mate with photo-espionage, which was hotly denied by Moscow.
The tanker was released on April 5, along with its alleged spy. Mos-
cow retaliated by expelling a Chinese citizen who had "taken unauthorized
25pictures" near Tashkent.
There were other marine problems. During the summer naviga-
tion season in the Amur Basin, Peking subsequently charged
Their Soviet gunboats on the Heilung
and Ussuri Rivers have more than once borne
down at full steam on small wooden fishing
' sampans, overturning them... They have
22
Col. Gen. Losik, the Commander of the Soviet Far Eastern
Military District originally published the statement in the Dalniy Vostok
(Khabarovsk). It was broadcast by Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian
on March 16, 1968.
23
Moscow, Tass International Service in English, April 3, 1968;
The New York Times
,
April 4, 1968. This was the third Soviet ship detained
in 18 months.
24
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, April 5, 1968;
Le Monde
,
The Times (London), and The New York Times , April 6, 1968;
The Washington Post
,
April 13, 1968; Izvestia , April 13, 1968.
25
Moscow, Tass International Service in English, April 8, 1968;





unbridledly intercepted Chinese ships going
about their normal business. They went so
far as to open fire on Chinese buoy boats...
The summer of 1968 must have been tense. Chinese officials
27
alerted all border patrols to guard against Soviet sabotage attempts.
Soviet air activity seems to have become increasingly provoca-
tive during the summer. Whether either the PLAAF or the Red Air Force
suffered losses during air battles is not known. Soviet air action may
have been designed to deter or disperse Chinese demonstrations or other
activity along the border. On September 16, Peking registered a diplo-
matic protest with Moscow charging 29 intrusions into Chinese airspace
over Heilungkiang Province between August 9th and 29th, and 119 airspace
violations during the preceeding year. Soviet aircraft, Peking said,
penetrated three kilometers at the farthest, and five kilometers at the
p Q
longest. After a lengthy delay, Moscow categorically denied the
29
Chinese allegations. Chou En-lai mentioned the Soviet violations of
Chinese airspace in a speech of September 30, 1968, stating that they
"constantly created border tension." Moreover, he charged that Moscow
was building-up massive troop concentrations on the Sino-Soviet and
7 f)
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 27, 1969.
27
Taipei, CNA in English, May 17, 1968.
28
The Christian Science Monitor , September 28, 1968.
29




, . ^ . 30Sino-Mongolian frontiers.
Reflecting Chou's apprehension, General Wang-mao , Chinese
Northeastern Sinkiang Regional military commander, said
Should the Soviet revisionists dare
to attack us, we will wipe them out reso-
lutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely.
On the Soviet side of the border authorities also began to stress pre-
32
paration for conflict.
In the late fall, Sino-Soviet tension was manifested overseas
Chinese and Soviet sailors reportedly skirmished in Haiphong and North
33Vietnamese authorities had to schedule alternate liberty days.
By year's end, Peking had become strident over an alleged
continuing heavy Soviet military build-up, further airspace intrusions,
34
and constant tension on the border.
Winter brought heavy ice to the waterways of the Amur Basin
and, with it, an opportunity for direct clashes between frontier forces
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Island during January and February. Soviet helicopters, armored
cars, and vehicles apparently also patrolled disputed Chili Ching and
Kapotzu Islands, near Chenpao Island, during the winter, further aggra-
vating Peking. Soviet troops allegedly assaulted and wounded Chinese
frontier troops, seized arms and ammunition, demolished houses and
destroyed their furnishings. Moscow later charged "repeated" viola-
tions of the Soviet border by Chinese troops near the island in January
A V U 37and February.
Before the Spring thaw, an armed clash on Chenpao Island
resulted in more than bruised or wounded participants. On March 2,
1969, in what has since been commonly regarded as an ambush (echoing the
argument of the Soviet press), but which Peking regards as a legitimate
and heroic defensive stand, (the Chinese press gave much less informa-
tive and more hysterical coverage), a two hour engagement resulted in
the death of thirty-one Soviet Border Guards and an undetermined number
35
Peking, NCNA, Film Report on Border, April 18, 1969.
Ibid
.
; "Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique Directs Soviet
Frontier Guards Flagrantly to Intrude Into Areas of Chenpao Island,
Heilungkiang Province, China, and Open Fire, Killing And Wounding
Chinese Frontier Guards," "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China," Renmin
Ribao
, March 4, 1969 (translation in Survey of the China Mainland Press
(SCMP) 4372, March 10, 1969, pp. 19-20); "Statement of the Government
of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969;" and "Down With The
New Tsars," Renmin Ribao
,
March 3, 1969 (translation in SCMP 4373, March
11, 1969, pp. 17-19.) The cited incidents occurred before the March 2
clash which triggered the Chinese protest.
37
Pravda, March 8, 1969; Sovetskaya Rossia , March 9, 1969.
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of Chinese Frontier Troops. Fourteen Soviet guards and perhaps forty
Chinese troops were wounded. About 300 Chinese camouflaged troops
initially opposed a Soviet patrol of eight or nine men. However, the
patrol was augmented by additional troops in armored cars after the
battle started. Soviet forces apparently drove the Chinese off the
-so
island, and then vacated it themselves.
After a fortnight during which Soviet forces in the Far East
were put on alert and both sides rushed reinforcements to the area,
Chenpao Island was the scene of a major battle. Armor and artillery
was employed, and the units involved were of regimental size (around
2000 Chinese reportedly participated; a colonel commanded Soviet forces).
The battle lasted seven to nine hours, after which casualties were about
39
800 Chinese and sixty Soviet soldiers (including the Soviet commander)
.
Neither of these battles, as far as we know, involved the use
of close air support. However, it was revealed in Washington sometime
later that after the battles Soviet aerial reconnaissance of the border
40
was markedly increased, to about 20-25 flights per day.
38
A resume of this incident has been compiled from a compre-
hensive list of Soviet and Chinese sources by Thomas W. Robinson,
op. cit
. , pp. 35-37. U.S. coverage was in The New York Times , March
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Further eastern border clashes occurred, including another
in March at Sui-fen-ho, where the Harbin-Vladivostok railway crosses
the border, but the focus of conflict moved to the Sinkiang border.
Whether these Sinkiang incidents, on April 16, 17, and 25, and May 2,
1969, were as bloody as those on the Ussuri River is not known. On
May 12-15 action switched back to the Amur Basin: there was a major
battle at Weipalao Island in the Heilungkiang River. Reverberations
occurred on May 25 and 28. Back on the Sinkiang border, incidents oc-
curred on May 20th near Yehhsikai and Tahcheng.
On June 10, 1969, near the north end of the Dzungarian Gates
in the Barluk Mountains of Sinkiang Province, according to Peking, a
Chinese shepherd was killed and another kidnapped. Moscow's version
agreed on locale but said a Chinese citizen and a group of Chinese ser-
41
vicemen had entered Soviet Semipalatinsk Province illegally.
Pacha (Goldinsky) Island in the Amur River near Khabarovsk
was the scene of a battle on July 8, 1969. Soviet gunboats as well as
troops were involved. Moscow announced the death of one river worker;
41
An official record of Sino-Soviet border clashes from March
2 through June 10, 1969 is contained in Chinese and Soviet diplomatic
notes and official statements of mid-June. See "Chinese Protests to
U.S.S.R. Over Border Incidents of June 10," Peking Review , No. 24, June
13, 1969, pp. 4-5, which contains Peking's diplomatic notes of June
6th and 10th; "Note of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Pravda, June 12, 1969, and "Statement
of the U.S.S.R. Government," Pravda , June 14, 1969. These documents
are translated in CDSP
,
Vol. 21, No. 24, July 9, 1969, pp. 9-13. For




three more were wounded. Chinese casualties were not reported, but
Peking accused the Soviet landing party of burning a house.
According to Peking, Pacha Island continued to be the scene
of Soviet provocation. Red Army aircraft and Red Navy gunboats report-
edly "harrassed" the island throughout July. Peking also complained
of forty serious Soviet intrusions of Chinese airspace, and, in inimitable
Chinese fashion, statistically recorded Soviet firing:
Date Place Firing Activity
June 1—July 31 Weipalao Island,
Heilungkiang Prov. 1743 bursts, 1067 single shots
June 1—July 31 Chenpao Island 1116 bursts, 943 single shots
July 22—July 31 Chili Ching Island
Heilungkiang Prov. 303 bursts, 18 single shots
July 26 Chili Ching Island Heavy artillery fire
The month of July ended with a reported Soviet incursion into China in
the Hochiaok area, Toli County, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. A
Soviet helicopter, military vehicles, and approximately one hundred
43
soldiers were said to have entered China and opened fire.
Probably the greatest military engagement in the 1968-1970
period occurred on August 13, 1969 in the Tientiekti area of Yumin County,
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Chinese forces, attacked by two
42
"July 8 Protest Note," Peking Review , No. 28, July 11, 1969,
p. 6; The New York Times , July 9, 1969; The Christian Science Monitor ,
July 11, 1969.
43
"Chinese Government Lodges Strong Protest With Soviet Gov-
ernment," Peking Review
,
No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 4-5.
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Soviet helicopters, dozens of tanks and armored vehicles, and several
44hundred troops, suffered many killed and wounded. Had the Soviet
striking force wished to go further, it probably could have done so.
After the August 13th engagement Peking accused Moscow of
429 provocative incidents on the border during June and July, ranging
45
from flights of aircraft to attacks by troops. Not to be outdone,
46
Moscow charged 488 border provocations by China during July and August.
While the opponents were exchanging these charges, however,
major events in train on the diplomatic front soon halted the pattern
of military engagement. (These diplomatic events will be examined below
in the section on the political dialogue.) For all practical purposes
military engagements had ceased by September. On October 1st, an author-
itative source reported that both sides were withdrawing from "...neu-
ralgic points on the Ussuri and Amur Rivers and on the Kazakhstan and
44"Chinese Protest of August 13," Peking Review , No. 33, August
15, 1969, p. 7; SCMP 4479, August 20, 1969, p. 29; The New York Times ,
August 14 and 17, 1969. The best situation maps for following the March
to August incidents are in the I. S. S .' Strategic Survey , 1969 , p. 69.
A number of The New York Times reports cited are accompanied by excellent
maps.
"Peking August 19 Note," Peking Review , No. 34, August 22,
1969, pp. 4-5; The New York Times , August 20, 1969.
Tass International Service in English, September 10, 1969; The
New York Times
,
September 11, 1969. In 1970, sources in Moscow referred
to 6,000 incidents on the border from January through August, 1969.




During the remainder of 1969 and through 1970 little infor-
mation on Sino-Soviet military engagements can be found. There may-
have been a few clashes along the frontier, but their number and ser-
48iousness remains concealed from public view. Military escalation,
fed by a five-month series of infantry/armor firefights, with dead and
wounded on both sides, was ended. This is not to say that tension
automatically diminished. The possibility of further escalation, however,
was greatly reduced.
One of several factors that pointed to continued high tension
on the frontier was the apparently continuing large-scale reinforcement
that had been conducted by both sides. In the earlier Chinese-U.S.
case, we observed a tremendous build-up of U.S. forces in Vietnam that
was not matched by a corresponding movement of Chinese troops or naval
and air forces. In the Chinese-Soviet case, however, both sides conducted
major force redispositions . (The redeployments, or what we know of them,
will be examined mere thoroughly below in the section on the tacit ex-
change.) As a result, by the end of 1969 the border confrontation involved
much larger, stronger, and more versatile units glaring at one another
47
Belgrade, TANJUG International Service from Moscow, October 1,
1969.
48
The Chrisitan Science Monitor , March 21, 1970. Charlotte
Saikowski from Moscow. Ljubljana Delo (Belgrade), July 16, 1970, p. 4,
a report by Moscow correspondent Marjan Sedmak. Koervendy, op. cit
.
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reported 30 incidents between September 1969 and August 1970, none in-
volving shooting. I have been unable to find any references to actual




We must presume, in view of our inadequate information, that
the force build-up included the introduction of new conventional weapons
systems by a least the Soviet side, although Peking also may have up-
graded Chinese forces wherever possible. It is fairly certain that
the Red Army was completely re-equipped, sometimes twice, between 1960
49
and 1969. In view of the deteriorating situation on the border during
the 1968-70 period, Red Army commanders would have been unwise not to
bring their latest equipment to troubled areas. On the other hand,
the PLA was not completely re-equipped during the 1960s, largely because
the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 seriously crippled Peking's arma-
ment industry. Even so, PLA commanders could be expected to position
their best equipment in most crucial locales.
Unlike the Chinese-U.S. pattern of military engagement during
1964-1967, when latest model U.S. equipment was not often placed in
direct opposition to Chinese forces, it is highly probable that latest
production line weapons systems, such as the Mach-3 MiG-23 interceptor
and Sagger anti-tank missiles, were immediately deployed to frontier
defense units. Available information does not reveal whether any of
these new weapon systems were used in combat during the crisis of 1969.
49
I.S.S., The Military Balance , annual issues through 1970-1971.
50
See The Military Balance, 1970-1971 , pp. 99-101, for the
I.S.S. estimate on current deployments on the Sino-Soviet border. China's
most modern tank is a version of the Soviet T-54. Red Army armored units
now have the T-62.
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The Nuclear Warfare Option
Turning to the possibility of the introduction of nuclear
weapons into the military engagement, we find, initially, an existing
situation remarkably similar to that between Chinese and U.S. forces
in 1967. Soviet forces included organic tactical nuclear-armed com-
ponents that completely overshadowed the small Chinese nuclear capa-
bility. In addition, there were Soviet IRBMs in the Far East. The
existence of these missiles was revealed late in 1970, when some of
52
them reportedly were taken out of service. Their targets presumably
included U.S. installations in Alaska, but if the missiles were designed
with a 360 -azimuth launching capability, they also could be targeted
on Chinese installations. At the apex of the Soviet nuclear capability
were the Strategic Rocket Forces, which, it must b£ presumed, also
could target Chinese as well as U.S. sites.
According to travelers on the Trans-Sibeiian railway, who
observed major construction in progress in several Soviet areas, there
is little doubt that missiles targeted on China were being installed.
Other construction, in Mongolia near Choibalsan, im a limited-access
area, also may contain launching sites.
51
The Military Balance , 1970-1971, p. 8.
52
U.S. Department of Defense spokesman J.W. Friedheim, reported
in The New York Times, December 17, 1970.
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It is difficult to believe that the
Soviet and Mongolian missile installa-
tions which have been rushed into com-
pletion along the Chinese frontiers have
not been armed with nuclear warheads...
Concurrently, however, it was unknown whether there were
Chinese nuclear missiles, even of short range, installed and targeted
on Soviet installations. By 1968, China could have deployed such
weapons, although aircraft nuclear delivery systems presumably remained
more important to Peking.
...It is an intelligent guess that
nuclear missiles are in place on the
Chinese as well as the Russian side...
The presumption on which Soviet plans
are being made is that China has done _,
just that [installed nuclear missiles].
By the end of the 1968-1970 period, verification of a small but ready
medium-range ballistic missile deployment by the Chinese came from
"senior government analysts" in Washington.
A small number of 600-1000 mile
range missiles have been installed at
long-active Chinese test-launch sites
Except for the recent discovery of
a few such missiles kept in readiness at
test-launch pads, however, no broad deploy-
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Therefore, there can be little question but that the pattern
of Soviet-Chinese military engagement during 1968-1970 was distinguished
by prominent nuclear overtones. The crucial questions, however, are
"How willing was either side to use these weapons?" and "How near did
the opposing forces come to firing them?" Obviously there was not a
nuclear exchange. But did Peking offer Moscow a special "no-first-
use" pledge, as it had done earlier to Washington? What about Moscow's
posture? Were the Soviets leaning toward a premptive strike?
Military secrecy surrounds the answers to these questions.
However, indications of the intentions of each party may be garnered
from their political dialogue and the tacit exchange between them.
We turn next to the Sino-Soviet political dialogue.
II. The Political Dialogue
Following the analog utilized in the previous chapter, our
examination of the Sino-Soviet political dialogue during the 1968-1970
period will be conducted in three parts: the irregular dialogue; the
public dialogue; and the diplomatic dialogue. Once again, it is empha-
sized that there is considerable inductance, or "cross-talk," not only
between these three categories, but between them and the patterns of




The irregular dialogue between Peking and Moscow has to be
seen in much more complex terms than the irregular dialogue between
Peking and Washington. This is not because our knowledge of what
occurred is greater. Once again, only the tip of a great submerged
iceberg of events probably is viewable. But the irregular Sino-Soviet
dialogue has certain aspects absent from the Chinese-U.S. irregular
dialogue. Among these are: (1) "mutual subversion," which, in its
military aspects (occasional guerrilla activity) might be applicable
in the preceeding section; (2) two favorite means of esoteric com-
munication between communist states, historic analogy and the use of
surrogates to conduct an argument, both of which came into play during
the 1968-1970 period; (3) actions by governing Communist hierarchies
on party as well as state levels, a convenient facility in times of
interstate crisis; and (A) Communist governmental expressions routed
through easily disavowable "agents," which can include Western visitors
to the Soviet Union, correspondents from socialist countries, or other
once-or-twice removed personages.
Instances of the usage of each of these channels of the
irregular dialogue by both sides will be brought out in the following
presentation.
It will be recalled that certain U.S. -Chinese Nationalist
covert military activities against China were mentioned in the military
engagement section of Chapter 4.
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Reports in 1968 indicated that both Peking and Moscow were
backing clandestine political organizations in the other's territory.
Peking supported a so-called "Stalinist Group" in the Soviet Union.
This group circulated an article calling for a Cultural Revolution in
all Communist countries. A Moscow-sponsored "Marxist-Leninist League"
debuted in China at about the same time, circulating a ten-point anti-
Maoist platform. A "Ghengis Khan Combat Corps," which may have been
in collusion with Moscow, was operating in Inner Mongolia (in China),
allegedly caching weapons and asserting Mongolian nationalism. Its
leader may have been (or is) Ulanfu, a previously pro-Mao Mongolian
prince who had been deposed by Maoists in 1967. Dissident Chinese
groups also began to operate in Sinkiang Province and Tibet, some of
CO
them from mountain lairs. Whether or not these groups were linked to
the Soviet-based Free Turkestan Movement, led by General Zunun Taipov
59from Alma Ata, is not known. Inasmuch as Taipov' s radio transmitters
were telling listeners in Sinkiang about Chinese atrocities and oppres-
sion, the possibility of a connection is strong.
Between the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the
Ting Chu-yuan, "Organizations for Mutual Subversion in the
Peiping-Moscow Conflict," Issues and Studies , Vol. 10, No. 12 (Septem-
ber, 1968), pp. 1-10; Peking Review , May 17, 1968, pp. 20-24.
CO
See The Washington Post , February 26, 1968.
59
The New York Times , February 2, 1970, carries a lengthy
report on the Free Turkestan Movement; Taipov's article, "Maoist Out-




activities of these Moscow-sponsored clandestine groups, turmoil was
great throughout China during 1968. We do not know of equivalent dis-
60
turbances in the Soviet Union during the same time period. Chinese
subversive efforts among the nationalities on the Soviet side of the
border may not have paid off as well, or, if they did, Moscow success-
fully repressed publicity.
On Peking's part, however, there was comparatively less radio
agitation of groups across the border, a tactic heavily used by Moscow.
In fact, Moscow, besides broadcasting enormous quantities of anti-Maoist,
anti-Chinese polemics in Chinese during 1968 and 1969, made a fetish of
reporting every Chinese domestic disturbance that came to its attention.
Whether Moscow's radioed reports of riots and civil strife were meant
as signals for further anti-Maoist unrest, or were simply Soviet gloating
over Peking's problems, is not ascertainable, ' but the Soviet practice
There was an armed uprising in Uzbekistan in 1962, a workers
demonstration in Kazakhstan in 1967, and reports of worker unrest there
in 1968.
Peking did publish some agitation. E.g., "Soviet Revision-
ist Renegade Clique is Biggest Exploiter and Oppressor of Central Asian
and Kazak Peoples," Peking Review , No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 31-33.
6?
Soviet broadcasts, which easily could be regarded as inflam-
matory by Chinese authorities, originated not only in Moscow but from
Tashkent, Alma Ata, and other transmitters along the border. Instances
of Soviet "news" on Chinese unrest can be found in the reports of the
U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service throughout the 1968-1970 period,
Their peak frequency and intensity was during April-August, 1968, cor-




surely made Peking suspicious--and furious. The fact that unrest
was prominent in Sinkiang Province, the locale of Chinese atomic energy
facilities, surely aroused Peking's concern. However, so far as can
be ascertained, neither Soviet-sponsored subversion nor Soviet agita-
tion of Chinese domestic difficulties significantly altered the Chinese
nuclear weapons program. The Chinese test schedule proceeded normally.
On the other side of the border, Chinese subversive machina-
tions have been studiously ignored in the Soviet press; we do not have
reliable information on their extent or effectiveness, or how Soviet
64
authorities have handled them. Moscow has been seriously concerned,
sometimes publicly, about Peking's attempts to establish "splinters"
of Communist parties throughout the world, and has attempted to thwart
6S
these Peking-sponsored factions by any and all means. Nevertheless
Peking's efforts to subvert various national Communist parties have met
with some success; there are numerous Maoist splinter parties of varying




, Lisann, op. cit
. , pp. 33, 40. Lisann believes that,
at least until February, 1967, the pacing and form of the Cultural
Revolution probably owes more to Moscow than Peking.
64
Radio Moscow once reported that Peking s budget for subver-
sion was about $500 million a year, but on May 19, 1968 said that the








The result of mutual subversion seems to have been some
domestic discomfort and governmental aggravation, more so in China than
in the Soviet Union. As far as its ultimate purpose was concerned, that
is, bringing about change in the opposing regime, subversion has had
little observable effect. Moscow and Peking presumably each know of
residual sympathizers in the higher echelons of the other's goverment
whose cultivation might have gone further toward bringing about govern-
mental policy change than did any form of subversion. In fact, subver-
sion unquestionably detracted from persuasive efforts of Russophile or
Sinophile elements, and thus was counterproductive.
As the subversive aspect of the irregular dialogue was an
element of aggravation, so was the use of disavowable threats against
the opposing state. These threats appeared throughout the 1968-1970
period. They were more flagrantly employed by Moscow than by Peking.
Much of Moscow's pressure on Peking utilized the rationale
behind the Brezhnev Doctrine as a lever of justification. This doctrine,
promulgated as an ex post facto justification for the Warsaw Pact inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, was a decree of limited sover-
eignty in the Socialist world. Brezhnev probably was not its author,
The Brezhnev Doctrine, which, it should be noted, is a Western
appellation, first appeared in an article by S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty
and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries," Pravda , Septem-
ber 26, 1968, translated in CDSP , Vol. 20, No. 39 (October 16, 1968),
pp. 10-12, and reprinted in Robin A. Remington, Winter in Prague , Cambridge:
M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 412-16 (Document 65).
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nor was the premise of subordinating international law to the law of
the class struggle anything new. But the application of the doctrine
was immediately obvious to those capitals who had cause to fear Moscow:
Bucharest, Belgrade, Tirana—and Peking. Thus the Chinese leadership
immediately denounced Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe, and the other
capitals began to look to their defenses.
Moscow had earlier postulated a precursor to the Brezhnev
Doctrine, and indicated its possible applicability in the Far East.
In April, 1968, Kommunist , the CPSU theoretical journal, noted that
Events in China are not exclusively
an internal affair . The policies of Mao
Tse-tung's group are detrimental to the
cause of socialism and revolution in the
whole world because, first of all, they
draw China away from the Socialist System
and convert her into a force hostile to
the Soviet Union and other Socialist
countries ...
Thus Peking quickly countered the possibility of a Soviet grand design
through its surrogate, Tirana. On September 13, 1968, the Albanian
National Assembly passed legislation condemning the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.
Pointed out by Remington, op. cit .
,
p. 411. Dr. Remington's
analysis includes references to several other authoritative commentaries
on the Brezhnev Doctrine.
68
"The Roots of Present Events in China," Kommunist , No. 6
(April, 1968), pp. 102-13. (Italics added.) The quote is on p. 102.
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The outraged Albanians invoked Chinese help: Premier Hoxha
noted that China's atomic weapons, hydrogen bombs, and guided missiles
served to defend not only the sovereignty of the People's Republic of
69
China "but also its allies." Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Mehmet Shehu said
If you touch our borders, you must
know that to defend Albania the aid which
will come to Socialist Albania will not
recognize state boundaries ... 70
The Albanian policy statements may be regarded as Chinese
statements promulgated to Moscow "by indirection." They were echoed,
of course, in the Chinese press.
The Chinese-Albanian alliance involved more than words. A
Chinese trade delegation visited Albania from September 29th to Novem-
ber 20th. The resulting agreement was termed "of extraordinary impor-
tance, not only in terms of volume, but... in terms of its political
> 72
content and its high quality." As a result of the agreement, "a
number of important objects and new branches of industry will be
69
Press Release of the People ^ Republic of Albania Mission to
the United Nations of October 15, 1968, the text of a speech by Enver
Hoxha on September 30, 1968, pp. 3-4.
Ibid .
,
dated October 18, 1968, the text of Shehu's speech of
September 12. 1968, p. 27. In this speech Shehu officially denounced the
Warsaw Treaty.
E.g. , see Peking Review , issues 36-39, 1968.
72




created." There was some conjecture as to the nature of these "ob-
74jects." Speculation that they might be military in nature was en-
hanced by the November 28th visit to Tirana of the PLA Chief of Staff
Huang Jun Shen and top-ranking staff officers. However, the extent of
Chinese military aid to Albania in 1969 and 1970 has not been confirmed.
The irregular dialogue continued in this vein until after
Sino-Soviet hostilities had commenced in March, 1969, when a major
change ensued. After the initial clash, the Red Army newspaper Krasnaya
Zvezda (Red Star) underlined the gravity Moscow saw in the situation by
pointedly alluding to the Soviet nuclear capability in the Far East.
When border clashes increased in intensity toward the end of the
Summer, 1969, Pravda , the party daily, warned "the Chinese people" that
76
Mao was "courting nuclear war."
Concurrently, rumors were rife that Moscow had bluntly queried




E.g., The New York Times , November 29, 1968 and The Boston
Sunday Globe
,
December 8, 1968 speculated on Chinese military assistance




"Peking's Adventurist Course," Pravda , August 28, 1969, also
:arried in CDSP
,
Vol. 21, No. 35, September 24, 1969, pp. 3-5.
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atomic weapons on Chxna.
Strangely enough, Moscow's threats in the irregular channel
continued after China probably had agreed to negotiate the border dis-
pute. In fact, nuclear threats were issued during a period when routine
polemics had been phased down by both sides. On September 16, 1969 an
unusually and significantly entitled article "Will Russian Rockets Czech-
Mate China," datelined Moscow, appeared in the London Evening News
. Its
author was the unorthodox Soviet foreign correspondent who had visited
Taipei for discussions with the Chinese Nationalists about a year earlier,
78
Victor Louis. The article reported a "common assumption" in Moscow
that "Soviet nuclear rockets are pointed at Chinese nuclear installations"
and continued
There is no doubt that the tactic
of scorched earth will be applied to
Chinese territory whenever there is an
attack by a small Chinese group...
To my knowledge, this Moscow query has never been seen in
writing. However, there were numerous reports of the query, for example,
Joseph C. Harsch in The Christian Science Monitor
,
September 2, 1969,
who said that a high official of the intelligence community had mentioned
the query during a "background luncheon"; Harrison Salisbury in The New
York Times , September 18, 1969; Paul Wohl in The Christian Science Monitor
,
September 22, 1969, and Otto Zausmer in the Boston Globe , October 12, 1969.
78
Victor Louis' distinctive mode of operation and life style
indicate a KGB connection to some. For his personal view of this, see
an exchange of letters between Louis and Abraham Brumberg in Problems
of Communism
,
Vol. 18, No. 6 (November-December, 1969), pp. 68-69.
Also see Herbert Gold, "Would You Buy A Manuscript From This Man?," The
New York Times Magazine
,
January 31, 1970, pp. 12 ff.
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The Soviet Union has a whole gamut of




The statement concluded with the dark thought that although "...China
was... many times larger... and might offer active resistance," that was
no reason for not applying the Brezhnev Doctrine in the East!
In a subsequent article in The Washington Post Mr. Louis added,
after repeating his ominous earlier observations, that anti-Maoist forces
were gathering strength in China and that they might "produce a leader
80
who would ask other socialist countries for fraternal help."
Other sources indicated that planning was well underway for a
lightning strike by the Red Army. Among these was the appearance in
October of a historically analogous article concerning the Red Army
81
victory over Chinese forces in 1929. The account of General Blucher's
smashing campaign was an obvious parallel to Soviet intentions forty
years later. The October article elaborated on a theme enunciated in
79
Victor Louis, "Will Russian Rockets Czech-Mate China?,"
London Evening News
,
September 16, 1969, p. 7. Commentary in The New
York Times
,







V. Dushen'kin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, "Defeat
of the Chinese Militarists in the Region of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way in 1929," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military History Journal),
No. 11 (October, 1969), pp. 121-26.
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August by General V.F. Tolubko, who also had written for the anniversary
82
of the 1929 victory. However, Tolubko' s August article was considered
more important at that time because it revealed his appointment as Com-
mander of the Far Eastern Military District.
By the Fall of 1969, there was serious world-wide concern over
the seemingly imminent prospect of a Sino-Soviet war. This was accen-
tuated by the appearance of a book by Harrison E. Salisbury, plainly
entitled War Between Russia and China . Salisbury was positive that this
84
war would be nuclear. His recent travel in Outer Mongolia and Siberia
lent authority to the prediction. Peking surely noted that Salisbury
had been one of few correspondents allowed to visit these critical areas,
and must have suspected Soviet sponsorship for his conclusions. Interest-
ingly, when tension between the two nations lessened somewhat, Soviet
o c
reviewers deplored Salisbury's book.
82
Gen. V.F. Tolubko, "The Glory of Heroes Lives," Krasnaya
Zvezda
,
August 6, 1969. For an excellent analysis of the significance
of the Tolubko article, and the Dushen'kin article (fn 81), see R. Waring
Herrick, "USSR Resumes Rocket Rattling With Scenario for 'Shattering
Strike' at China," Radio Liberty Research , CRD 407/69, December 2, 1969.
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S. Tikhvinsky, "Geopolitical Fortune-telling," Pravda ,






If Moscow had manipulated foreign newsmen for Soviet ends,
so Peking manipulated them for Chinese ends. Thus, during the height
of the tense summer, Peking invited the Australian Anglican Francis
James to visit Chinese atomic production and testing installations.
James' report, widely circulated outside China, emphasized to all
China's growing nuclear capability— and, perhaps, Chinese intentions.
But Chinese signals lacked the pointed quality of the Soviet
method. In December, 1969, when it seemed that the Peking Talks were
about to break down, General Tolubko again took pen in hand. On this
occasion he claimed that Red Army troops were training actively with
tactical nuclear weapons, whose use was inevitable in any major conflict.
After their "intense" exercises with "modern" weapons, his men were
87
given medical examinations and found to have suffered no adverse effects.
On December 9, 1969 Krasnaya Zvezda published a picture of
rockets being used in training in the Siberian military district. Ten
days later the paper carried a photograph of a nuclear weapon exploding
)ver a terrain model.
In response to this terrifying Soviet innuendo, Peking did not,
;o far as is ascertainable, resort to further statements about Chinese
mclear systems. Instead, the Chinese sought to justify their great
86
James , op. cit .
87
Gen. V.F. Tolubko, "The Will To Victory," Krasnaya Zvezda ,
Jecember 7, 1969. For analysis, see R. Waring Herrick, "USSR Signals
'eking of Readiness to Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Radio Liberty
Research
, CRD 434/69, December 23, 1969.
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defensive program. In response to Soviet criticism of their emphasis
on defense, the Chinese said that the
...consolidation of the defense of
the homeland, the preparation of the
population to cope successfully with
any kind of aggression which the enemies




Once again, Peking's surrogate Albania was used to announce the position.
Neither mutual subversion nor the threatening posture of the
irregular dialogue were consistently reflected in the public political
dialogue between Peking and Moscow. The divergence among Moscow's policy
positions, however, was far greater than Peking's. On neither side was
there much evidence of the threatening of major violence, with nuclear
overtones, that characterized the irregular dialogue, although Soviet
broadcasts to China sometimes accented the Red Army's nuclear capability.
In the following analysis of the public Sino-Soviet political
dialogue, official statements of the national leaderships will be exam-
ined first, followed by a sample of the great Sino-Soviet polemics.
Variance between content of the irregular dialogue and that of official
statements, particularly on the Soviet side, is startling.
88
"The Policy of the People's Republic of China for the Defense
of the Homeland and for Preparations Against War—A Correct Revolutionary
Policy," Zeri i Popullit , January 31, 1970. An analysis of this editorial
is contained in (lz), "Albanian Editorial Defends Chinese Military Prep-
arations," Radio Free Europe Research , February A, 1970.
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The Public Political Dialogue
Official Statements
Throughout the 1968-1970 period the top leadership in the
Kremlin maintained the posture of judicious and resolute world-states-
men. Their theme was unity in the Communist world. If unity was
achieved, other problems would be much less difficult. As Czechoslovakia
demonstrated, they would go far to maintain, or restore, unity. After
August 21, 1968, they probably did not need to reiterate the theme.
Obviously apprehensive over the downturn in relations with
China, especially after Chinese verbal blasts concerning Czechoslovakia,
and more so after the border dispute had broken into bloody fighting,
Messrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny continued to maintain a reasonable
public approach to the Chinese problem. Their public posture was im-
peccable. They walked the "high road" while nearly all other machinery
of the Soviet Union proceeded on the "low road" of subversion, hyper-
critical polemicizing, strong diplomatic protests, and extensive and
rapid preparation for war.
Thus at the long-deferred International Conference of Communist
and Workers Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969, in the midst of the
Sino-Soviet military engagement, General Secretary Brezhnev's speech




of communists. It should be noted that Brezhnev's posture on the
Chinese question must have been in part determined by pressures brought
from many Communist parties, ruling and non-ruling, to not excommuni-
cate the Chinese party from the movement. The 1969 Conference procedures
were much more relaxed than any of the earlier conferences (e.g., a less
officious atmosphere, with delegates given the opportunity to mingle
and issue daily reports on speeches, etc.), largely as a result of sug-
gestions and p ersuasions of the non-Soviet parties. The influence of
90
these parties on substantive issues was very notable. Nevertheless,
Peking quickly noted a long-range Soviet goal in the speech that could




In October, 1969, in a speech given at ,a meeting with the
Czech leadership in Moscow, Brezhnev was much more explicit. By this
time border talks in Peking were underway. Brezhnev's comments were the
epitome of reasonableness as he defined the goals of Moscow's policy
toward China:
... to normalize relations with the
People's Republic of China, to open the road
to restoration of Soviet-Chinese friendship...
89
L.I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists,
For a New Uprwiing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda and Izvestia,
June 8, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 23, July 2, 1969, pp. 1-17.
Devlin, op. cit.
,







...that the positive realistic
approach will be reigning at the
talks. We are for solving border-
line and other questions between
the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. on the
first and just basis Solution
will be possible if the Chinese
side shows good will, too.
Once again, unity and solidarity were stressed. Moscow was
...consistently upholding the
Marxist-Leninist line in questions
of ideology, strategy, and tactics
of the world communist movement and
rallying for its cohesion, ... always
striving to settle differences and
resume cooperation. .. 7A
Brezhnev's policy statement was re-echoed for widest consumption by
93
President Podgorny on the 52nd Anniversary of the Russian Revolution.
In the Chinese view, Moscow's formal policy line probably was
entirely outweighed by other less reasonable signals from the Soviet
Union. Therefore, as we have noted, and will mention subsequently,
Chinese war preparations assumed tremendous proportions. Countering
this move, Soviet official spokesmen denied that China needed to accent
defensive measures. An important statement came from Marshal Yakubovsky
Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact
92
Moscow, Tass International Service in English, October 27, 1969,
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"Under the Banner of Lenin to New Victories in Communist
Construction, Report by Comrade N.V. Podgorny at the Fifty-Second Anniver-
sary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," Pravda and Izvestia ,
November 7, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 45, December 3, 1969, pp. 8-9.
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forces. It was the first such statement by a Soviet Marshal in most
memories. Yakubovsky was apprehensive over
The military psychosis fanned up
by the Peking leaders ... .Heating up
chauvinistic moods, they pile up anti-
Soviet slanders and impress on the
Chinese people that it must prefer
war and hunger.
. . .To the agressive
plans of international imperialism,
the countries of the socialist community
counterpose the principled policy of




Shortly thereafter Moscow officially denied any plans for war against
China. The official news agency Tass said
Insinuations have been made recently
in the bourgeois press and by ruling
circles of certain imperialist States
about the situation on the Sino-Soviet
border. .. .Rumors are being spread that
the Soviet Union is preparing an alleged
"attack..." Anti-Communist propaganda
is attempting by this means to impede the
Soviet-Chinese negotiations Soviet
Armed Forces are carrying out normal
duties .. .within the framework of regu-
lar plans and programs for strengthening
the defense of the Soviet state in all
its territory. The unchanged policy of
the U.S.S.R. and its government is a
striving for the normalization of Soviet-




February 22, 1970, excerpted by Tass
International Service in English, February 22, 1970.
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Moscow, Tass International Service in English, March 14, 1970,
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On April 15, 1970, one week prior to the Lenin Centenary celebration,
Brezhnev presented a definitive statement on Soviet policy toward
China:
A few words about our relations with
China. The unvarying policy of the C.P.S.U.
and the Soviet government is a policy of
the restoration and development of friendly
relations with the Chinese People's Republic.
It is not our fault that these relations have
been damaged and brought to the point of
extreme exacerbation. While waging a prin-
cipled, struggle against splitting activity
in the international Communist movement and
the propaganda of anti-Leninist views, we
at the same time have constantly striven
and continue to strive against the transfer
of ideological disagreements to inter-state
relations. The Communist and Workers'
Parties, at their international conference
in Moscow, again expressed their support
for this course.
As you know, the question of the nor-
malization of the situation on the Soviet-
Chinese border has become the subject of
talks with the C.P.R. government. The
- Soviet Union holds a clear and unambiguous
position in these talks. We deem it neces-
sary to reach an agreement that would make
the Soviet-Chinese border a line of good-
neighbor relations, not of hostility. Not
retreating from our legitimate and principled
positions, and upholding the interests of
the Soviet homeland and the inviolability
of its frontiers, we shall do everything in
our power to normalize inter-state relations
with the Chinese People's Republic. Of
course, as everyone realizes full well, this
does not depend on us alone.
He base our actions firmly on the prem-
ise that the longterm interests of the Soviet
and Chinese peoples not only do not contradict
one another but in fact coincide. At the
same time, we do not close our eyes to the
fact that an atmosphere is being artificially
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created around the talks now taking place
in China that can in no way contribute to
their success. Indeed, who can seriously
maintain that the whipping up of an anti-
Soviet war psychosis and calls to the popu-
lation of China to make preparations for
"war and famine" promote the success of
the talks? If this is being done to exert
pressure on the Soviet Union, then it can
be said in advance that these efforts will
be in vain. The nerves of our people are
strong, and it would not hurt the organizers
of war hysteria in China to learn this.
(Prolonged applause .) In the final analy-
sis, the C.P.R. has as great an interest
in a clear-cut settlement of the border
question as does the Soviet Union, which
has at its disposal everything necessary
to stand up for the interests of the Soviet,
people—builders of communism. (Applause .
j
Much of this statement was repeated by Brezhnev in the Lenin Centenary
speech. However, on April 22nd, Brezhnev suddenly included inflam-
matory remarks about the Chinese leadership. The Sino-Soviet situation
...is obviously the fruit of the
nationalistic policy of the Chinese leader-
ship and the result of its rupture with the
principles laid down by Lenin. .. .Only the
enemies of socialism are served by the
violent anti-Soviet campaign that has been
under way in China for several years now.
Recently it has been carried on under the
cover of assertions about an imaginary
threat posed by the Soviet Union. By
their actions against the country of Lenin
and against the world Communist movement,
96
L.I. Brezhnev, "Live and Work as Lenin Did," Izvestia , April
15, 1970, also in CDSP , Vol. 22, No. 15, May 12, 1970, p. 4; excerpts
in The New York Times , April 15, 1970.
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the initiators of this campaign unmask
themselves before the broad masses as
apostates from the revolutionary Lenin-
ist cause. 97
Whether Brezhnev's public rancor was due to foreknowledge of
the Chinese diatribe against Moscow on Lenin's Centenary, or was evi-
dence of long-suppressed anger at Chinese intransigence is not known.
Rancor did not perservere in the statements of the top Soviet leader-
ship. In May, Kosygin emphasized the "constructive attitude" of Moscow,
its "determination to settle the dispute," and its aspiration "to main-
tain and strengthen the friendly and good-neighbor undertakings with
the Chinese people." Kosygin "regretted" that the Chinese leaders were
98
refusing "to take this only correct road." Regret, rather than rancor,
may have reflected Kosygin's hope that as a result of Cambodia, Sino-
Soviet relations would improve. If this was so, however, his position
was not confirmed by the violent Soviet May 18th polemic reply to Peking's
99
Lenin Centenary statement. However, despite the May 18th polemic,
Kosygin maintained the "reasonable" Soviet attitude. On June 10th he
said that despite the complexity of the Peking talks, "which are hampered
97
L.I. Brezhnev, "The Living and Triumphant Cause of Lenin,
Pravda and Izvestia
,
April 22, 1970, also in CDSP , Vol. 22, No. 16,
May 19, 1970, p. 14, and The New York Times , April 22, 1970.
(Italics added.)
98
Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, May 6, 1970, a report of






by the Chinese side," the Soviet Union intended to continue them.
Kosygin's remarks on Chinese-inserted stumbling-blocks may have been
somewhat tempered by the anticipation that Peking and Moscow were pre-
paring to exchange agrement on new ambassadors, a development which he
confirmed on August 10, 1970.
Premier Kosygin, representing the Soviet state, traditionally
had been on better terms with the Chinese than General Secretary Brezh-
nev, who spoke for the party. This may explain Brezhnev's personal
public condemnation of Peking. Since the Peking diatribe on April 22nd
was directed against Brezhnev, he also may have insisted on Moscow's
violent counterattack. Yet, in the final analysis, Brezhnev, with the
one exception, hewed close to the line of reasonableness, good neigh-
102
borliness, friendship, and a constructive, and patient approach to China.
By the end of the 1968-1970 period, the top Kremlin leader-
ship truthfully could say that they personally had adhered closely to
a statesmanlike policy; a few minor exceptions in their posture had
not seemed important; and the policy had paid dividends: the trend in
Sino-Soviet relations was upward. The fact that official Soviet policy
was poles apart from Soviet signals in the irregular dialogue, from the
Premier Kosygin's speech was nationally televised in the
Soviet Union, and reported in The New York Times , June 11, 1970.
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Patriot (New Delhi), August 10, 1970, p. 2.
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See his speech at Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, Moscow Domestic
Service in Russian, August 28, 1970, also referred to in CDSP , Vol. 22,
No. 39, October 27, 1970, p. 6.
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tone of Soviet polemics (Soviet broadcasting to China was hardly "states-
manlike"), and from the tacit moves, many of which were still in progress,
presents a startling paradox. It also raises an important question:
Simply put, "Was improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the latter
half of 1970 due to a Soviet carrot or a Soviet stick?" More broadly,
"Was the tentative rapprochement a result of Soviet policies or a reaction
to external factors?"
Clues for the solution to these questions can be gathered from
the policy statements of the Chinese hierarchy during the same time frame.
It will become quickly evident that the positions of the Chinese leader-
ship more closely corresponded to their military moves, polemics, and
tacit maneuvers. Further, many Chinese positions vis a vis the U.S.S.R.
were quite similar to those taken vis a vis the United States in the
earlier period.
Shortly after Warsaw Pact divisions invaded Czechoslovakia,
Premier Chou En-lai voiced Chinese alarm. "Social-imperialism," he
said, "was matching its aggression in Eastern Europe and stepping up
armed provocations against China." Chou further remarked that the
Czech invasion was part of a "spheres of influence deal" between Moscow
and Washington. He opined that as a repayment for not opposing the
103
Warsaw Pact move, Washington would demand a "higher price" on Vietnam.
103
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, September 2,
1968, rebroadcast by Radio Peking in Russian on September A, 1968. The
occasion for Chou's speech was a Vietnamese National Day reception.
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Chou's position subsequently was supported by a telegram to Tirana in
which China approved Albanian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and said
Should American imperialists, Soviet
modern revisionists and their servants
dare to touch even a hair of Albania,
they will meet with none other than
total, disgraceful and inevitable defeat.
104
The telegram was signed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai.
The outbreak of bloody incidents on the border in March,
however, indicated to Peking that Moscow was intent on applying the
Brezhnev Doctrine to China. If we accept the rather persuasive but
still incomplete evidence to the effect that Peking initiated the
first border battle on March 2, 1969, one logical reason for the
decision would be that Peking wanted to be sure Moscow understood that
China would fight any attempt to impose the Brezhnev Doctrine, whatever
the cost. When border incidents continued on a larger scale, Chinese
suspicions that war was imminent seemed to be verified.
Lin Piao alerted the CCP membership to the threat of major
war at the Ninth Party Congress in April, 1969. His "Political Report"
to the Congress included a firm statement of Chinese policy toward
Mos cow
:
Since Brezhnev came to power,... the
Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been
Zeri i Popullit , September 19, 1968. It is possible to read
"China" for "Albania" in this telegram.
Cf., Robinson, op. cit . , pp. 33-38.

213
practicing social-imperialism and social
fascism more frantically than ever
It has ...intensified its threat of ag-
gression against China. Its dispatch of
hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy
Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations
against China on our territory Chenpao
Island are two foul performances staged
recently by Soviet revisionism.
In order to justify its aggression
and plunder, the Soviet revisionist ren-
egade clique trumpets the so-called theory
of "limited sovereignty," the theory of
"international dictatorship" and the
theory of "socialist community." What
does all this stuff mean? It means
that your sovereignty is "limited," while
his is unlimited. You won't obey him?
He will exercise "international dictator-
ship" over you... in order to form the




.We firmly believe that the pro-
letariat and the broad masses of the
people in the Soviet Union... will cer-
tainly rise and overthrow this clique
consisting of a handful of renegades . .
.
We must on no account relax our
revolutionary vigilance. . . and. . .ignore
the danger of U.S. imperialism and
Soviet revisionism launching a large
scale war of aggression. We must make
full preparations. . .agniu-t. .. a big
war... at an early date,...j. conven-
tional war and... a large scale nuclear
war. In short, we must be prepared .
We will certainly counter-attack .
If they insist on fighting, we will
keep them company and fight to the
finish... 106
Lin Piao, "Fearing Neither Hardship Nor Death," Political
Report to the Ninth CCP Congress, April 27, 1969, Peking Review , No. 23,
June 6, 1969, p. 12. Italicized sentences denote Mao sayings.
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.in's report was not widely publicized in China until June, by which
;ime, of course, the border situation was even more threatening, and
;he party deemed that the populace should be fully appraised. Thus the
remarks in the speech became the basis for Chinese polemicizing that
continued through the summer, as well as for official internal briefings
For example, at a briefing of Communist Chinese senior officials in
Canton, the briefer, who reportedly announced that he was speaking on
behalf of "higher authority," said war with the Soviet Union was immi-
nent—"World War III" would break out by October.
Even in its vehemence and pugnatiousness , however, Chinese
policy toward the Soviet Union was not completely intransigent. Lin
noted that
...the Sino-Soviet boundary question is
also one left over by history. As regards
these questions, our party and government
have consistently stood for negotiations
through diplomatic channels to reach a fair
- and reasonable settlement. Pending a settle-
ment, the status quo of the boundary should
be maintained in order to avoid conflicts.
and went on to say that China had concluded successful boundary nego-
tiations with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of Mongolia,
A A* U - 108and Afghanistan.
Ian Stuart from Hong Kong in The New York Times , July 6, 1969.
The information presumably comes from defector interviews.
I AO
Ibid . It will be noted that border disputes with major
neighbors India and the Soviet Union have not been settled.
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Thus, as the dispute moved toward a negotiating phase in the
Fall of 1969, and while the Soviet irregular dialogue was becoming more
threatening, Peking could either adopt a pugnatious or a more concilia-
tory line. The latter position was selected. In a statement of October
7, 1969, the Chinese government said that
there exist irreconcilable differences
of principle. . .But this should not prevent
China and the Soviet Union from maintain-
ing normal state relations,.. China never
has demanded the return of the territories
czarist Russia has annexed by means of un-
equal treaties.
On the contrary, Peking wanted "restitution of some territories" the
109
Soviets occupied "in violation of these treaties." Concurrently,
a Document of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, while condemning previous
Soviet "nonsensical and preposterous arguments" and "absurdities," held
that the essential thing was
...to maintain the status quo of the
* border, avert armed conflicts, and disengage
armed forces from the disputed areas along
the border. .
.
After making a strong case for the Thalweg principle for international
riverine boundaries, which the Chinese most assuredly wanted in the
Amur Basin, the Document compromised itself:
Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of




...There are exceptions to any prin-
ciple of international law.
. .adjustments. .
.
may be made... in consideration of the
interests of the inhabitants.
In the same time frame, Fall, 1969, China had "vigorously"
conducted an H-bomb test and its first underground nuclear test.
Following the conciliatory line, however, Peking took the opportunity
to assure the world, and Moscow, that China's development of nuclear
weapons was "for defensive purposes" and that "under no circumstances
would China be the first to employ them."
After talks commenced in Peking, however, the Chinese atti-
tude hardened once more. The first indication that the discussions
might be in difficulty came on November 29, 1969, when Chou En-lai,
at a reception in the Albanian Embassy in Peking, spoke of "social-
112imperialism s ...aggressive ambitions and war threats." Chou's
statement was seconded on November 29th by Hsieh Fu-chih, the politi-
cal commissar of the Peking military district, who accused the Soviets
"Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China (October 8, 1969), ibid .
,
pp. 8-15. Analysis of this
document and the previously cited Chinese statement may be found in R.
Waring Herrick, "Sino-Soviet Border Negotiations Made Possible By Key
Chinese Concession," Radio Liberty Research , CRD 362/69, October 31, 1969,
"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of
China, op. cit .
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Chou En-lai speech of November 29, 1969; Zeri i Popullit
,
December 2, 1969; Peking Review , No. 49, December 5, 1969, p. 11;




of getting ready for "a new military adventure."
Thus, as the Sino-Soviet dispute entered the new decade,
Peking's official statements, and also Chinese polemics, concentrated
on the threat of imminent Soviet attack. Their basis was "Chairman
Mao's great strategic thinking:"
Heighten our vigilance, defend the
motherland. Be prepared against war, be
prepared against natural disasters, and
do everything for the people. 1-^
As Lenin's Centenary approached, even though border talks were
still in session, Peking continued to fear a Soviet attack. However, the
Chinese attitude was expressed semi-officially in editorial statements.
rhe Chinese top leadership did not personally issue official statements.
rhus the startling Chinese diatribe on the Lenin Centenary, April 22,





not to Mao, Lin, or Chou. This editorial was a
polemical masterpiece. It embellished each of the critical and vehement
parts of Lin Piao's "Political Report" of a year earlier. (Some of the
editorial's more picturesque and meaningful sections will be quoted in
the following section on polemics.) The Chinese government, however,
could disavow, discard, or forget the editorial at its pleasure.
113T,.,Ibid .
Mao Tse-tung, quoted in "Usher in the Great 1970's," the
tew Year's Day editorial of Renmin Ribao , Hongqi , and Jiefangjun Bao ,
3eking Review , No. 1, January 2, 1970, p. 6.
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Much of the bitter edge of Peking's polemical statement seem-
ed to have been forgotten within six months, as Chinese-Soviet relations
began to improve. By June 1, 1970, official warnings of imminent war
were no longer prominent in China. Instead, official statements were
devoted to announcing diplomatic developments between the two nations.
By November, the situation had warmed to the point that Peking's mes-
sage to Moscow on the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of the October
Revolution spoke of China's desire to maintain and develop "normal
state relations" with the Soviet Union "on the basis of the five prin-
ciples of coexistence." Peking wanted to
...take effective measures to
settle important outstanding ques-
tions in state relations... so that
...relations between our two countries
will become friendly and good-neigh-
borly. 115
On November 2, 1970, on the occasion of the eleventh Chinese
nuclear test, the attitudes of officials in Peking apparently had re-
laxed to the point that they felt free to reiterate their earlier call
for an international conference on the subject of general and complete
1 1 fi
'
disarmament. Their crisis years were slipping into the background.
rhey were able to give attention to less urgent, long-range problems
"53rd Anniversary of Great October Revolution Greeted,"
>eking Review
,
No. 46, November 13, 1970, p. A+; The New York Times ,
November 8, 1970.
The New York Times, November 2, 1970.
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faced by China in the modern world.
Compared to Soviet official statements, which had hewed
closely to a line of reasonableness throughout the 1968-1970 period,
Chinese official statements much more closely reflected the deepening
and lessening of the crisis. When the situation was tense, so were
Chinese official attitudes. As the situation eased in 1970, so did
Chinese attitudes.
Most importantly, the official statements of the top leader-
ship of neither participant invoked the threat of nuclear weapons in
the dispute. The official dialogue did not even invoke strong hints
117
of nuclear war. On the Chinese side, a major official statement
specifically denied the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons ex-
cept in retaliation.
However, as we have seen, this nuclear absention was not the
case in the irregular Sino-Soviet dialogue. As we will see, it was not
reflected in the exchange of polemics in the public dialogue, to which
we now turn.
117
Mao's statement that if attacked, we will surely counter-




The public exchange of polemics between Peking and Moscow
during the period 1968 to 1970 has a number of distinguishing charac-
teristics. First, and most important, in volume and intensity polemics
accurately reflected the fortunes of Sino-Soviet interstate relations.
[Then the situation looked dark, polemics were strident and overwhelming.
When moves toward rapprochement occurred, as after the Kosygin-Chou
airport meeting in September, 1969, and after the U.S. Cambodian incur-
118
sion in May, 1970, polemics became muffled and infrequent.
Second, it will be noted that Soviet polemics differed re-
markably from Soviet official statements while Chinese polemics, with
a more varied official line to follow, can be said to have paralleled
Peking's official statements.
Third, both Peking and Moscow utilized an almost unlimited
polemical repertoire. It is difficult to say who surpassed whom in
venom or sarcasm.
Fourth, each government polemicized in the printed media in
approximately equal measure, but Moscow much more heavily emphasized
118
A major shortcoming in presenting Sino-Soviet politico-mili-
tary interaction in the categories used herein is that it becomes diffi-
cult to relate the crescendos and diminishments of the polemic exchange
to the progress of the diplomatic dialogue. If the reader will be pa-
tient, the diplomatic dialogue immediately follows this section. The




radio broadcasting. Moscow operates a more potent radio propaganda es-
119tablishment than Peking, and took advantage of it.
In this presentation, polemics from both sides will be con-
secutively intermeshed in order to bring out the intensifying challenge-
response interaction. Almost any subject was "fair game."
During 1968, as tension on the border increased month by month,
a favorite theme of both governments was the denigration of the opposing
leadership. Peking repeatedly charged that the Kremlin had betrayed the
120
Soviet people while Moscow detailed the shortcomings of Mao's back-
A A 1- • 121ground and polxcies.
119
In addition to Radio Moscow, the government service, the
Kremlin has operated Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, which, as "the
voice of Soviet public opinion," is sponsored by "Soviet public organ-
izations." Radio Peace and Progress began broadcasting in Mandarin on
March 1, 1967, and in Mongolian on October 17, 1967. Radio Moscow also
broadcasts in Mandarin and Mongolian. Radio Tashkent broadcasts in
Uighur and Kazakh.
120
E.g., Peking, NCNA International Service in English, Janu-
ary 2, 1968; "Soviet Revisionists' Treachery Cannot Hold Back the Surg-
ing Tide of Revolution," Peking Review , No. 5, February 2, 1968, p. 29;
"Revolutionary Soviet People Will Rise Up to Overthrow the Reactionary
Rule of the Kremlin's New Tsars," ibid
.
, No. 6, February 9, 1968, pp. 21-
23; "The Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique is a New Pack of Vampires,"
ibid
.
, No. 19, May 10, 1968, p. 25; "Flunkeys of Western Bourgeoisie,"
Renmin Ribao
,
June 17, 1968; "Observer," "Brezhnev's Renegade Features
Revealed More Clearly," Peking Review , No. 30, July 21, 1968, p. 9;
'Diabolical Social-Imperialist Face of the Soviet Revisionist Renegade
:iique," ibid .
,
No. 43, October 25, 1968, pp. 8-10.
121
E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China,
January 10, 1968, describing Mao's "rich peasant background"; ibid . ,
^pril 30, 1968, indicating that Mao had deprived China of everything
>ut Mao thought; B. Zanegin, "The Failure of Peking's Foreign Policy
bourse," Izvestia
,
May 23, 1968; V. Pasenchuk and V. Viktorov, "The
tatipopular Policy of the Peking Rulers," Pravda , June 22, 1968;
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Another mutually pursued theme was "sell-out" to the United
States or its allies. On Peking's part, this often meant Soviet par-
122ticipation in arms control measures. On Moscow's part, it often meant
Chinese "inactivity" regarding Vietnam. " Peking also regularly de-
plored Moscow's dalliance with New Delhi and Tokyo and "exposed" the
"Soviet sell-out" of Vietnam, the U.S. -Soviet consular treaty, and agree-
ment on direct airline service.
The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia triggered a barrage
of polemics in August and September. Peking asserted that Soviet troops
124
were "blatantly occupying" Czechoslovakia. At a reception honoring
Rumanian National Day in Peking, Chou En-lai virtually called for guer-
rilla resistance in Czechoslovakia—and preparations for one in Rumania.
Moscow in Mandarin to China, July 16, 1968; I. Andronov, "Mao and the
Celestial Empire," New Times
,
No. 27, July 10, 1968, pp. 13-17.
122
E.g., Peking, NCNA International Service in English, Janu-
ary 24, 1968, an anti-NPT polemic; "Commentator," "U.S .-U.S . S .R. Military-
Nuclear Alliance Nears," Peking Review , No. 12, March 22, 1968, pp. 31-
32; "Soviets Have Long Been Following a U.S. Plot," ibid . , No. 13, March
29, 1968, p. 31; "Commentator," "Another Big Exposure of U.S. -Soviet
Counter-Revolutionary Collaboration," ibid
.
, No. 28, July 12, 1968, pp.
56, ff. re NPT and SALT; Peking, NCNA International Service in English,
June 11 and 13, 1968, re the NPT.
123
E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia,
January 20, 1968, an essay on collusion in Hong Kong; same source in
Cantonese to China, April 3, 1968; Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China,
April 20, 1968; "The Political Course of Mao Tse-tung on the International
Scene," Kommunist
,
No. 8, May 31, 1968, pp. 95-108; V. Georgiyev, "Bridge
Across the Ocean," Krasnaya Zvezda , July 28, 1968, p. 5, re U.S. -Chinese
coordination.
1 9 A
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 23, 1968,
carried in Peking Review
,
No. 34, August 23, 1968, supplement, pp. III-IV.
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A Renmln Ribao editorial broadened these remarks to include all East
125
European states. Peking asserted that Moscow and Washington were
in/
collaborating as well as contending over . Czechoslovakia, a remark
based on Moscow's crisis control steps mentioned in Chapter 1. Moscow,
127
taken aback by Peking's vehemence, responded rather weakly. Peking
1 2 R
continued the pressure.
The Czechoslovakian invasion resulted in postponement of the
scheduled November International Communist Conference at which Moscow
had intended, once again, to secure international communist condemnation
of Chinese deviationism. Moscow seemed to have been laying the ground-
work for this in a series of articles in Kommunist which explored the
129
roots of developments in China from a very critical perspective.
The effort was not wasted, only postponed for ten months.
A major polemical barrage in late 1968 emanated from the Soviet
side. The instant cause was the rescheduled 135th session of the Warsaw
125












Peking Review , No. 36, September 6, 1968, p. 9.
129
See Kommunist , Nos. 6-8, 1968. Cf_. , discussion in China
Topics
,




Talks. Moscow's subject: Chinese-U.S. strategic collusion. This
theme continued prominently until February, 1969, when China again post-
poned the Warsaw session. It reappeared a year later when Washington
and Peking again decided to resume talks. In the interim, polemics of
1969 reiterated 1968 themes, added some new ones, and incorporated the
language of violence.
As late as February 26, 1969, Moscow's polemicists were lam-
131
pooning Mao, but after the March 2nd clash on the Ussuri River, they
proceeded in dead seriousness. Moscow accused the Mao Tse-tung "chau-
132
vinistic adventurist clique" of "expansionist ambitions," while Pe-




Moscow presented China as the principal enemy of the Soviet
Union at home and abroad. Gory details of the March clashes were high-
lighted. Yevgeny Yevtushenko' s anti-Chinese poem, "On The Red Ussuri
130
V. Bolshakov, "Sacrifice to the Paper Tiger," Komsomolskaya
Pravda, December 1, 1968, p. 3; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin
to China, December 4, in French to Southeast Asia, December 9, in English
to Asia, December 19, 1968; B. Bulatov, "Peking and Washington—A New
Round," Literaturnaya Gazeta , December 11, 1968, p. 9.
1 31
"Mao The Medicine Man," New Times , No. 8, February 26,
1969, p. 22.
132
Pravda , March 17, 1969.




Snow," was released on March 19th, further stirring passions. The
text was militant, if not blood-thirsty:
. . .you see in the smoking twilight
The new Batu Khans,
bombs rattling in their quiwers
.
But if they fire,
the warning bells will sound
And there'll be heroic warriors aplenty
for new battlefields of Kulikovo!
Pravda on May 5 quoted one of the Soviet Union's foremost China experts as
accusing the Chinese of using population pressures as an excuse for expan-
sion.
Peking began to bear down on the U.S. -Soviet "collusion" and
"imperialist and social-imperialist encirclement" themes. Thus the visit
of Victor Louis to Taiwan the preceeding October became part of a "U.S.-
135
U.S.S.R. plot." Further evidence of the plot was seen when President
Nixon entertained Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at a concert in the Rose
Garden
:
...now through the note of harmony
between the United States and the Soviet
Union struck at the White House concert,
that U.S. imperialism and Soviet revision-
ism, the two biggest tyrants in the world, „,
are "natural friends" in opposing China...
-I «^ /
Yevgeny Yevtushenko, "On The Red Ussuri Snow," Literaturnaya
Gazeta , No. 12, March 19, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 15, April 30,
1969, pp. 12-13.
13 5
Peking Review , No. 11, March 14, 1969, p. 13 and No. 13,




Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 30, 1969.
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Peking denounced Moscow for aiding in the search for a Stra-
tegic Air Command tanker aircraft which disappeared over the Bering Sea
137
on June 3, 1969. (One Soviet fishing vessel took part in the search.)
A Soviet shipment of titanium to the United States constituted further
evidence of collusion. When the freighter Orsha docked in Seattle with
the strategically valuable metal on June 26, China said "...while the
Soviet revisionist renegade clique feigns anti-imperialism it is ganging
1 OQ
up with U.S. imperialism..." Even a Soviet reception for Apollo Eleven
astronaut Colonel Frank Borman was denounced as symbolic of sinister U.S.-
139
Soviet machinations. Moscow was accused of hatching a "Middle East
Munich" in collaboration with the United States at the expense of the
140
Palestine guerrillas, of sham support and real betrayal of the Viet-
namese people ("The Soviet revisionist renegade clique and U.S. imperi-
141
alism are jackals of the same lair,") " and of building up naval strength
137
Peking \ NCNA International Service in English, June 8, 1969.
138
"Anti-Imperialist Warrior Reduced to Size: Puny Clown
Toadying to Imperialism," Peking Review , No. 27, July 4, 1969, p. 33.
139
"Soviet Revisionist Chieftain Advocates Soviet-U.S. Friend-
ship," Peking Review , No. 30, July 25, 1969, p. 28.
"U.S. -Soviet Collaboration in Speeding Up Creation of 'Mid-
dle East Munich,"' Peking Review , No. 30, July 25, 1969, pp. 23-24.
"Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin, Premier Chou Warmly Greet
24th Anniversary of D. R.V.N. Independence," Peking Review , No. 36, Septem-




in the Indian Ocean to fill the vacuum created by departing Britain.
In late August Peking denounced Soviet aid to the Congo, collaboration
with West Germany, aid to Suharto's Indonesia, aid and naval visits to
India, naval visits to Japan, and, most vehemently of all, the Soviet
143
plan for a system of collective security in Asia.
Moscow's sponsorship of an Asian collective security system,
coming at the time of violence on the border, assuredly triggered appre-
hension in Peking. The Chinese responded with great vituperation. The
Moscow leadership was referred to as the expansionist "New Tsars," com-
pared to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in the 1950s,
144
accused of "gangster logic," and of reaching the "height of absurdity."
Moscow initially was restrained in responding to these diatribes.
145
But personal denigration of Mao continued unabated, and Peking was
accused of "cultivating the Cold War spirit." Kommunist noted that Renmin
Ribao alone had published more than 600 anti-Soviet attacks in 1968. Mao
1/9
The New York Times , May 19, 1969.
143
"Soviet Revisionists Step-Up Collusion With Reactionaries in
Counter-revolutionary Activities," SCMP , No. 4481, August 22, 1969, p. 29;
SCMP , No. 4486, September 2, 1969.
"Another Step in New Tsars' Expansion in Asia," Peking Review
,
No. 37, September 7, 1969, pp. 18-20 (also in SCMM No. 665, September 22,
1969, pp. 14-17); "Tear Off the Wrappings From Soviet Revisionists' Theory
of 'Responsibility for Security'," Peking Review , No. 36, September 3,
1969, pp. 20-22.
A. Kurov, "Big-Scale Maoism," Literary Russia , No. 32, 1969.
The translation of this article available to me does not note page num-
bers. I have been unable to locate the Russian text.
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was accused of working at party-splitting, and Chinese adventures in the
Third World, trade with West Germany and Japan, and border provocations
146
were denounced. Moscow noted that China had nearly admitted being
isolated from international communism and declared the de facto achieve-
147
ment of a Khrushchevian aim of 1963-1964.
As their relationship became more strained by recurring border
clashes, Peking denounced Moscow in ever more provocative terms:
The Kremlin renegades are like
prostitutes who want to have an arch
of chastity erected for them
They are flirting and stepping up the
collusion with U.S. imperialism.-'-^"
The Brezhnev concept of collective security for Asia was roundly
149
derided. The Soviet leadership was called "the new disciples of Ache-
son" and "New Tsars," the "mortal enemies" of people.
146
"The Policy of Mao Tse-tung's Group in the International
Arena," Kommunist , No. 5, March, 1969, pp. 104-16, also in CDSP , Vol. 21,
No. 15, April 30, 1969, pp. 7-8.
147
A. Ter-Grigoryan, "Parting the Curtain," Izvestia , April 30,
1969, p. 2, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 18, May 21, 1969, p. 21.
148
"U.S. Imperialism, Soviet Revisionism Step Up Collusion
Against Chinese and World's People," SCMP No. 4481, August 22, 1969, p. 30.
149
For example, in commentary by Chien Shao-wen, Soviet Revi-
sionist's Gangster Theory for Expansion Abroad," Peking, NCNA International
Service in English, September 3, 1969, and, from the same service, un-
titled commentary of August 15, 1969.
Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 19, 1969
151
Ibid. , August 20, 1969.
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Moscow countered by declaring that the August 13 clash in
Sinkiang was instigated by Peking as a signal to Washington of interest
152
in "direct collusion." When the U.S. relaxed restrictions on trade
and travel of Americans to China, Moscow said that while howling against
imperialism, Peking in fact was giving a favorable reception to U.S.
.... 153initiatives
.
Shifting ostensibly to arms control, on August 28, 1969 Moscow
said that "constructive proposals" aimed at "the reduction of arms, con-
trolling the race for ever more destructive means of attack and counter-
attack, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons" had been positively
received throughout the world, but that Peking had replied "in its own
way." Chinese arsenals were filling with "all the latest weapons," and
the Chinese army had "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery."
Since Peking had derided Soviet arms control efforts and was arming it-
self rapidly, the Chinese people were warned that Mao was courting nuclear
,154
war!
At this critical stage, however, a diplomatic breakthrough
occurred. Premier Kosygin paid a flying visit to Peking. An airport
15 2
Pravda , August 17, 1969.
153
Moscow in English to South Asia, August 23, 1969. Also
see D. Volsky, "Bridge-Building, Peking Style," New Times , No. 36, Septem-
ber 10, 1969, p. 23.
"Peking's Adventurist Course," Pravda, August 28, 1969,
also in CDSP
,
Vol. 21, No. 35, September 24, 1969, pp. 3-5.
Infra
. , pp. 246-52.
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conference with Premier Chou on September 11, 1969 evidently resulted
in decisions of major import, for Sino-Soviet polemics were largely dis-
continued almost immediately. The day following the meeting observers
in Moscow noted that the Soviet press did not publish articles about the
1 c/r
dispute with China. Moscow's weekly journals took somewhat longer
to taper off. Peking papers, which had been publishing diatribes
against Soviet revisionist renegades trampling the Mongolian people on
the day of the meeting, required several days to cool down. After a
series of comments on the chaotic state of the Soviet food industry,
a depression in Soviet oil and gas industry, and chaos in Russian trans-
port and communications areas, Peking ceased commenting altogether on
] • 158Soviet matters.
From then on, Sino-Soviet polemics were closely tied to the
commencement and progress of the Peking Talks. The hiatus brought on
by the Peking Airport meeting was never complete. Rather, both sides
greatly reduced polemic efforts. Thus, between September 11 and Octo-
ber 20, polemical statements may have been more noticeable. We have
noted previously in the irregular dialogue that Soviet threats continued
Belgrade, TANJUG International Service in English, Septem-
ber 12, 1969
157
Reuters from Moscow, September 17, 1969.
158
SCMPs 4498-4502 of September 18-24, 1969.
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:hrough this period. Some routine polemicizing also occurred.
On September 23rd Peking commented that the "Soviet Revision-
ist Theory of 'International Worker-Peasant Alliance' Is Out and Out
Jangster Logic," and a fig-leaf for a counter-revolutionary "Holy Alli-
159
mce" of imperialism, revisionism, and reaction. Several days later
lao posthumously honored ten soldiers of the People's Liberation Army
rtio died battling Soviet "armed revisionism" during "frenzied enemy at-
:acks" at Chenpao Island in March. Peking periodically spoke of the
'New Tsars," mentioned the "ring of encirclement," and, more often,
referred to "social-imperialism," the popular phrase for Soviet posture,
[he popular song "Smash A New Tsar" remained on Peking's "Hit Parade."
For its part, Moscow was "convinced" that what was "going on
Ln China" was "merely a tragic episode." The policy of the Chinese
Leaders was "totally contrary to the objective requirements of the coun-
ty's development."
...It is perfectly obvious that the
Chinese people will sooner or later grasp
the situation and will sweep away the .
-
obstacles raised on their path of advance...
he sharpest Soviet personal attack on Chairman Mao, a book entitled
'ages from the Political Biography of Mao Tse-tung , appeared in Moscow
159
Peking, NCNA in English, September 23, 1969; SCMP , No. 4506,
eptember 30, 1969, p. 29
160
Peking Review , No. 39, September 26, 1969, pp. 12-13.
161





bookstores in late September, but was later withdrawn. Moscow blamed
the continuing Vietnam War, Laotian troubles, and "the tragedy in Indo-
nesia" on Peking. Two days before the Peking Talks commenced, Kremlin
theoretician Suslov denounced the "adventurist and chauvinistic policy
of the present CCP leaders." The Red Army newspaper quoted Lenin:
Everyone will agree that the Army
that does not train itself to master all
types of weapons, all means and methods
of struggle that the enemy has or may lfic.
have is behaving unwisely or even criminally.
Polemicizing reached a low point as the Peking Talks got under-
way. Either the talks were not promising or Peking was disturbed over
the Soviet decision to conduct SALT discussions with Washington simul-
taneously. The fact of the matter is that when SALT commenced in Helsinki
in November, polemics increased. Peking laid down two polemic barrages,
-1 tc
one against the U.S. -Soviet agreement on a draft Sea Bed Treaty, a
1 f>?
The Christian Science Monitor , October 18, 1969.
Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa, Sep-
tember 30, 1969.
Moscow, Tass in Russian, October 18, 1969. Note that Suslov's
denunciation was not beamed to China.
A. Lagovsky, "Lenin and the Defense of the Gains of Social-
ism: The State's Economy and its Military Might," Krasnaya Zvezda , Sep-
tember 25, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 42, November 12, 1969, p. 5.
I c c
"Intensified U.S. -Soviet Collaboration," Peking Review ,




second specifically against SALT.
Shortly thereafter, polemics increased in vindictiveness
.
Remembering the H-bomb test of September 29th and the first underground
nuclear test of September 23rd, Peking decided the time had come to pub-
lish congratulatory messages. Tirana's congratulatory message declared
that the evidence of Peking's nuclear prowess was
...another crushing blow to the
nuclear blackmail and monopoly of the
U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revi-
sionist renegade clique...-'-""
rhis was the first instance since September 11th that the Chinese had
permitted the Soviet leadership to be called a "revisionist renegade
clique." Although Peking was quoting Tirana, Moscow undoubtedly under-
stood.
In response, Soviet voices began to speak of "some people,"
"this kind of politician," "certain foreign propaganda organs," "for-
eign anti-Soviet elements," and "certain foreign circles."
...some are obsessed by their own
ideas on the question of war and peace and
are drawing the most absurd and irrespon-
sible conclusions on the nature of the
means of modern warfare. They childishly
compare nuclear weapons to a paper tiger. .
.
1 67
"Intensified U.S. -Soviet Collaboration Against China, Es-
sence of So-Called Preliminary Talks on 'Strategic Arms Limitation,'"
ibid., No. 46, November 14, 1969, p. 14.
1 CO
"Heavy Blow to Nuclear Monopoly of U.S. Imperialism and
Social Imperialism; Warm Congratulations on China's Successful New
i-Bomb Explosion and First Underground Nuclear Test," Peking Review
,
to. 47, November 21, 1969, pp. 18 ff.
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To this kind of politician
,
the out-
break of thermonuclear war in our epoch
is not the greatest calamity for mankind,
but rather a small squabble with imperi-
alism.
. .
The governments of the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries, with their
constructive proposals and measures to
ease international tension and prevent
a new global war, have incurred the
wrath of the adventurist elements of
all shades . . .TS9
~~~
The atmosphere surrounding the border talks nardly could improve once
polemics, however disguised, had resumed, and the reverse also held
true. It seems probable that Soviet and Chinese negotiating teams were
stalemated by late November. On December 12th Novoye Vremya (New Times)
condemned the Chinese leadership by name as subjectivistic and adven-
170
turistic. Radio Moscow told Chinese listerners of the errors and
171
faults of Leftist opportunism.
China countered by again condemning Soviet policies on dis-
armament. The draft treaty on the seabed was "a new hoax," SALT was
"a vain attempt to maintain their bankrupt nuclear monopoly and conduct
169
"Imperialist Collusion Denied," Moscow in Mandarin to China,
November 29, 1969; "Destruction of Modern War," Moscow in Mandarin to
China, December 2, 1969. (Italics added.)
170
"New Times Article Condemns CPR Leadership," Belgrade,
TANJUG International Service, December 12, 1969. This article did not
appear in the English version of New Times .
"Errors, Faults of Leftist Opportunism Detailed," Moscow




nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats." The very low ceiling which
Kosygin and Chou En-lai may have tried to establish for permissible
polemicizing had been violated.
The Peking Talks adjourned in December under circumstances
which raised the possibility of a breakdown. Polemics intensified.
When the talks did reconvene in January, 1970, polemics did not diminish,
Peking accused Moscow of colluding with West German militar-
173
ism, of enforcing a fascist dictatorship at home, and of attempting
174
nuclear blackmail on China. China's New Year's Day editorial railed
against the Soviet revisionist renegade clique and all its machina-
175
tions.
Moscow resumed character assassination of Mao and denounced
Chinese war preparations, which, it said, were designed to disrupt the
border negotiations. Peking's "militarist fumings" and "war psychosis"
172
Peking City Service in Mandarin, December 7, 1969.
173
"Commentator," "A Dirty Deal," Peking Review , No. 52,
December 26, 1969, pp. 42-43. Also see pp. 44-45.
"Victorious Years and Bright Prospects," ibid . , No. 2,
January 9, 1970, pp. 18-22, at p. 21.
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"Usher in the Great 1970's," op. cit .
E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China,
December 28, 1969. Also see The Washington Post , January 4, 1970.
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were repeatedly deplored. "Total mobilization" and "preparation for
178
aggression" in the Chinese frontier provinces were deplored. There
were increased references to the Brezhnev Doctrine, with ominous impli-
179
cations for Peking. I. Aleksandrov, (pseudonym for a high official),
one of Pravda 's most anti-Dubcek polemicists in 1968, joined those de-
1 80
ploring Peking's dangerous "sabre-rattling." This line seemed in
consonance with Soviet governmental reassurances to Peking that an in-
vasion of China was not contemplated (Supra . , the record of official
statements.) But Peking was unable to reconcile this position with
Soviet insistence that if a war erupted, the Red Army could unleash
very powerful nuclear strikes.
Moscow also commented adversely on the Chinese-U.S. Warsaw
177
E.g., Yu. Andreyev, "Militarist Fumings in Peking," Kras-
naya Zvezda
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1970, p. 13; V. Korionov editorial in Pravda, January 6, 1970; "War
Psychosis in China," Pravda
,
January 10, 1970, also in CDSP , Vol. 22, No.
2, February 11, 1970, p. 20. Of these articles, Korionov's January 6th
Pravda editorial was subjected to close analysis. See Christian Dueval
,
"'Pravda' Denounces China's 'Military Preparations,'" Radio Liberty
Research
,
CRD 4/70, January 9, 1970.
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Literaturnaya Gazeta , January 14, 1970; Krasnaya Zvezda
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E.g., E.P. Sitkovsky, "Marksizm-Leninism—edinoe internat-
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February) 1970; Col. S. Lukonin in Pravda , March 7, 1970. I am indebted
to Dr. Robin A. Remington for these citations.
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March 20, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1970.
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Talks of January 20 and February 20, 1970. The Kremlin again invoked a
spectre of Sino-U.S. collusion. A typical commentary was as follows:
...in fact, Washington seems to be
flirting, so to speak, with Peking. It
abounds in peaceful statements and, what
is even better, they are almost friendly
ones
It would seem that Peking would not
take this bait... but it did.
. .Nearly all
heavy artillery, more than 500 pieces,
has been withdrawn from the Fukien front
facing the coastal islands of Quemoy and
Matsu occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's troops.
The best-trained units were also withdrawn
from this front and transferred to the USSR
border.
This kind of policy of the Mao team
conceals a mortal danger for the PRC...
War is not threatening China from the
north, from the USSR; however, the threat
of war from U.S. imperialism is becoming
increasingly serious . 1°1
As the Lenin Centenary, April 22, 1970, neared, Sino-Soviet
relations seemed bleak indeed. Polemics were rabid; Moscow was the
more bitter of the two. Moscow seemed perturbed over the lack of pro-
gress of the negotiations in Peking. On April 22, as we have seen,
Brezhnev personally lashed out at Peking.
The Chinese, however, may have been husbanding polemic ammuni-
tion. They fired it, in a great salvo, on Lenin's anniversary. "Leninism
or Social-Imperialism," a joint editorial by Renmin Ribao , Hongqi , and
181






will rank among classic polemics. After ignoring Lenin's
birthday for two years, Peking said that the significance of the cente-
nary celebration lay in exposing "the betrayal of Leninism by the Soviet
revisionist renegades" and promoting "the great struggle of the people
of the world against U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and all reac-
182
tion." This the editorial proceeded to do, with vigor.
According to true Leninism, as interpreted by Mao, the
Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique had carried out a counter-revolu-
tionary coup d'etat. Revisionism in power meant the rise of the bour-
geoisie, and the Soviet Union was now a bourgeois dictatorship of the
German fascist type. The revisionists had turned the Soviet Union back
into the prison of nations. They spoke of socialism but acted imperial-
istically. The Brezhnev Doctrine was an outright doctrine of hegemony,
and the Soviet leaders, the new tsars, dreamt of a vast empire. They
were as treacherous as talented. They indulged in nuclear blackmail
and were plotting to unleash a blitzkrieg on China. However, the
Chinese professed faith in their demise. Mao said
...the masses of the Soviet people
I
are good,... they desire revolution, and -
...revisionist rule will not last long.
182
"Leninism or Social-Imperialism," Peking Review , No. 17,
April 24, 1970, pp. 5-15. For U.S. commentary, see The New York Times ,







Nearly a month passed before Moscow had prepared a suitable
reply to the Chinese blast. It, too, proved to be a masterpiece, a
virtuoso recounting of all Peking's sins and Mao's personal shortcom-
184 „ ..
mgs. By this txme, however, the dispute in polemics had to take
into account major events in Indochina. Moscow's polemic, therefore,
implied that Peking was responsible for the U.S. -South Vietnamese
strike into Cambodia:
By acting this way [slandering
the U.S.S.R. 's internationalist
policy] Peking demonstrates to the
imperialists that it does not intend
to enter into joint actions with the
U.S.S.R. and the other socialist coun-
tries against imperialist aggression.
This position undoubtedly encourages
the imperialist circles in the imple-
mentation of their antipopular schemes
and plans, the recent events in Indo-
china are fresh evidence of this. 185
In other words, Peking's Lenin Day blast was the go-ahead signal to
Washington for the Cambodian incursion. Moscow put it quite baldly in
I 0£
propaganda broadcasts and, on June 5, in an article which warned all
184
"Pseudorevolutionaries Unmasked," Pravda, May 18, 1970,
also in CDSP
,
Vol. 22, No. 20, June 16, 1970, pp. 1-7. For U.S. commen-
tary, see The New York Times , May 19, 1970; The Washington Post , May 19,
1970; The Christian Science Monitor , May 27, 1970.
185
Ibid . In the CDSP translation, at p. 6.
1 86
E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China,
May 2, 1970; Moscow in Mandarin to China, May 9, 1970. The latter broad-
cast was very explicit:
...Mao Tse-tung, at the time of the




communists in Indochina against Peking.
However, events in the diplomatic dialogue suddenly outran
polemicizing. Mao moved personally to keep the Peking Talks in session,
and in succeeding months they began to show results. Polemics then
faded in color but all the main themes could still be heard.
Peking continued to express alarm over Soviet troops massing
on the border. Moscow continued to remind Peking of its naval power
and tank might:
Even if the enemy employs massive
nuclear weapons, Soviet tank corps can
retaliate against the enemy's fierce
attack and strongly safeguard its base.
In September polemics began to catch-up with events on the
diplomatic front. Moscow began to comment on the need for better Sino-
this year, stepped up anti-Soviet hysteria
and thus in this explicit and simple fashion
told the Washington politicians that Peking's
hands were tied in the north...
187
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and Jiefangjun Bao in commemoration of the
43rd Anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Peking Review
,
No. 32, August 7, 1970, pp. 6-7.
1 8Q
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Soviet ties. Commentators were unsure of Peking's response to Soviet
good-will, but they seemed determined to further improved relations.
192
China reciprocated. During the closing months of the year, after
newly designated ambassadors had presented their credentials in Moscow
and Peking, polemics indicated that while past sins were neither for-
gotten nor forgiven, the disputants were concentrating on putting
193
state relations on an even keel. Party disagreements were relegated
to second priority. For practical purposes
,
the days of polemical bombast
194
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To check on diplomatic developments which, as has been noted,
seemed to be behind the polemic fluctuations, we turn now to examine the
diplomatic dialogue.
The Diplomatic Dialogue
The analysis of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue must be
conducted on the basis of severely limited data. Unlike the Sino-Soviet
public political dialogue, in which analysis was complicated by super-
abundant data, the diplomatic dialogue is shrouded in secrecy. Neither
Moscow nor Peking has revealed any great degree of explicit information
about the detailed substantive content of its diplomatic activity vis a
vis the other. We are forced to proceed by inference from the meagre
public information available.
The circumstances in which the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue
has been conducted differ widely from those of the Chinese-U.S. diplo-
matic dialogue. Neither Peking nor Moscow has withdrawn recognition
from the other. When each government ordered its ambassador home to
emphasize its displeasure over rude and provocative activities staged
against the respective embassies in 1966 and 1967, substantial embassy
staffs nevertheless remained in place. The Soviet staff in Peking re-




expediting— Soviet military assistance shipments to North Vietnam.
Therefore, while the Chinese-U. S. diplomatic dialogue was
conducted in comparatively unconventional fashion, the Chinese-Soviet
diplomatic dialogue benefitted from regular diplomatic instrumentalities.
A substantial amount of normal interstate business was conduct-
ed in these regular Chinese-Soviet diplomatic channels throughout the
crisis period. During the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations in the summer
of 1969, trade talks between the two nations commenced in Moscow. From
a June beginning, these talks continued until December. The resulting
trade agreement was not outstanding—it duplicated the minimal Sino-Sov-
iet trade of 1968. Nevertheless, it exemplified the fact that all
things were not abnormal between the two capitals.
Another instance of continuing normal diplomacy during the
border crisis is found in the incongruous session of the Commission on
Shipping on the Border Rivers of the Amur River Basin that had been
meeting annually since 1951. Commission members convened in June, in what
initially seemed to be a normal session, although they subsequently were
caught up in border crisis developments, as will be noted below.
Last, diplomatic communications were used by both sides through-
out the border crisis. Each major military engagement of the hot 1969
195
As of September 1, 1966, before ambassadorial recall, the
Soviet embassy in Peking had a "considerable staff... of diplomats, mili-
tary attaches, commercial and technical experts, transportation special-
ists, and air liason officers." Radio Free Europe Research , Communist
Area, September 1, 1966.
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summer was followed by an exchange of formal diplomatic protests, which
often were polemical in tone. As we have seen, the protest notes were





Our primary focus, however, is on the Chinese and Soviet dip-
lomatic sequence toward crisis control, and not on their often overstated
self-justifications. To this we now turn. It quickly will become appar-
ent that the Soviet diplomatic position closely coincided with, and even
forecast, the "reasonable" official statements of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and
Podgorny. On the opposite side of the border, Peking initially played
the part of a "reluctant dragon."
After the border clash on March 2, 1969, Moscow made no dip-
lomatic initiatives pointing toward crisis control. Following the much
larger battle of mid-March, however, the decision apparently was taken
to try to open a top-level dialogue with Peking. Accordingly, on March
21, Premier Kosygin contacted Peking, presumably by telegraph or radio,
saying that he wanted to discuss the border dispute personally on the
telephone. The next day the Chinese replied that under the circumstances
telephone discussions were not suitable. If Moscow had anything to say,
197
it could be said through diplomatic channels.
196
It is important to realize that there probably were numerous
diplomatic messages between Moscow and Peking during the period that were








Somewhat taken aback, Moscow nevertheless accepted Peking's
suggestion and proposed through diplomatic channels on March 29th that
the two nations negotiate their territorial differences. Peking did
198
not respond immediately to this initiative. Moscow reiterated its
199
offer on April 11th, suggesting that negotiations commence on the 15th.
By this time, additional border clashes had occurred. Six weeks later,
on May 24th, Peking accepted Moscow's March 29th offer in principle, but
appended a familiar precondition that the Soviet Union must recognize
the Treaties of Aigun and Peking as "unequal." The Soviets did not re-
spond directly to this Chinese counteroffer.
However, on a local level, the Soviet member of the Amur River
Basin Commission had invited his Chinese counterpart to an annual meeting.
His invitation of April 26th suggested convening sometime in May. There
is some possibility that the Kremlin had directed this move when Peking
failed to reply to its March 29th and April 11th negotiation offers.
However, the Commission meeting invitation was ignored by the Chinese
member.
On May 23, 1969, the Soviet Commission member suggested a
June 18th meeting. This time the invitation was accepted, and the
198
Ibid. Lin said the Chinese leadership was "studying" the
Soviet proposal
199
The New York Times, April 12, 1969.
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commission convened.
The frequency and content of the Commission meetings in
Khabarovsk is not known. The sessions were interrupted on July 8th,
when a battle at Pacha (Goldinsky) Island adjacent to the city of
Khabarovsk ostensibly caused the Chinese member of the Commission to
break off discussions. Walking out on July 12th, he unexpectedly re-
201
turned the next day, and the Commission continued its deliberations.
The members signed a protocol on August 8th that called for
carrying out measures to improve the shipping situation during the 1969
navigation season —which was nearly half over!
The Amur Basin protocol of 1969 was regarded as a harbinger
203
of improved Sino-Soviet relations by Western observers. This opti-
mism was rudely shattered by the major Soviet-Chinese battle in Sinkiang
on August 13th. The situation seemed darker than before. Moscow's
diplomatic initiatives were not yielding favorable results.
In these ominous circumstances, an unexpected event resulted
in an opportunity for Sino-Soviet summit diplomacy. Ho Chi Minh's death
required that both Peking and Moscow send high-level delegations to the
Chronology from New Times (Moscow), Volume 12. There are
some indications that the Chinese intended to use the Amur Basin Commis-
sion as a base for broader territorial discussions, as they had attempted
to do in 1967.
201
The New York Times , July 14, 1969.
Ibid .
,





funeral. The delegates might indeed consult in Hanoi. The last testa-
ment of Ho, who in life had tried to reconcile the Sino-Soviet dispute
on two earlier occasions, again urged that Peking and Moscow pursue
204
unity. However, it seemed that the funeral delegations of the two
parties would avoid each other at the North Vietnamese memorial services.
The Chinese delegation to Hanoi, led by Chou En-lai, made a one-day
visit on September 4th, probably so as to have departed before the Mos-
cow delegation, led by Kosygin, had arrived. But the Soviet delegation
unexpectedly landed at Peking when it should have been returning to
Moscow. Kosygin spoke to Chou at the Peking Airport on September 11,
1969, and Moscow Radio reported the next day that "Both sides stated
,205
their positions and had a useful talk.' It began to look as though
Ho Chi Minh indeed had been effective in death.
However, a closer examination of events reveals other forces
at work. The activities of the Rumanian delegation to Hanoi are of
special interest. This delegation, led by I.G. Maurer, stopped in Pe-
king en route to Hanoi on September 7th, while the Soviet delegation
had arrived in Hanoi on the 6th after a refueling stop in New Delhi.
On the 10th the Soviet delegation departed Hanoi for Moscow via Calcutta
and Dushanbe in Soviet Tadjikistan, where their aircraft was located when
o n/
The text of Ho's testament may be found in The New York
Times, September 10, 1969.
205
Moscow domestic service in Russian, September 12, 1969;
Pravda and Izvestia , September 12, 1969, also carried in CDSP , Vol 21,
No. 37, October 8, 1969, p. 13.
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information was received that Mr. Kosygin could, or should, proceed to
Peking. When the Soviet aircraft reached Peking on the 11th, the Ru-
manian delegation was there. The timing implies that the Rumanians
may have arranged the Peking airport conference, either on their own
, . .
206
volition or at the request of another party, which could well have
been Moscow. In any case, by the time Premier Kosygin finally returned
to Moscow, he had flown considerably further than probably had been
planned initially. The flight from Dushanbe to Peking was about the
same distance as from Hanoi to Dushanbe, but away from Moscow. The
itinerary revision nearly doubled the mileage of the total trip.
Some weeks later, Brezhnev indicated that the Peking meeting
207had been arranged "at our initiative." Soviet pride in this achieve-
90f)
Bucharest obviously had been benefitting from playing the
role of an honest broker between Moscow and Peking since the early days
of the Sino-Soviet dispute. First Georghiu-Dej and then Ceaucescu had
been able to maneuver Rumania into a markedly improved position vis a
vis Moscow, achieving a great degree of international independence and
thorough internal autonomy, in part because of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
It was not so much that Bucharest was able to play Peking off against
Moscow and vice versa as that both Peking and Moscow were willing to
"pay" for Rumania's support. Moscow's "payment" was acquiescence in
Rumanian demands for autonomy.
Were the Sino-Soviet dispute to break into open war, how-
ever, Rumania would be required to take sides with Moscow. The latter
would not tolerate a neutral in the rear. This of course would end
Bucharest's independence. Therefore, it indeed would be in Rumania's
interest to arrange a Sino-Soviet meeting. For a detailed analysis
of earlier Rumanian maneuvering between Moscow and Peking, see Devlin,
op. cit
.
, Part VI, pp. 33-40, 43.
207
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October 28, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 44, November 26, 1969, p. 5,
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ment led to repeated usage of the statement in Soviet polemics.
The first important question about the Peking Airport meeting
is "Why was the meeting held?" If the meeting had been sought by Moscow,
was its purpose to try to ameliorate the border dispute through reason-
able persuasion? Or was Kosygin's real purpose to deliver an ultimatum
to the recalcitrant Chinese? In the first case Moscow's "statesman"
image would be enhanced. After a meeting, if the border situation did
further deterioriate , the Kremlin could not be accused of not trying hard-
er to settle the dispute than did Peking. In the second case, much the
same logic would apply providing the ultimatum aspect of the meeting
were kept secret—and Peking, even if bowing to an ultimatum, would be
unlikely to publicize it.
Since it takes two sides to hold a meeting, we should inquire
why Peking, if it did not seek the meeting, agreed to attend it. Indi-
cations are that the Chinese in fact were as reluctant to have a meeting
as the Soviets were eager to have one. (Protocol would have required
that Chou En-lai visit Moscow to confer with Kosygin rather than vice
versa, since they had last met in Peking in 1965, yet this, too was
changed.) Thus the Chinese might have withheld their agreement to host
a meeting until Kosygin was over half-way home from Hanoi, thinking he
would not be ordered— or agree— to reverse course for Peking. Further,
their traditional Chinese hospitality was sadly absent. Chou did not
invite Kosygin into the city for a few hour's relaxation; the two paid
close attention to business.

250
Peking's actions point almost inescapably to the conclusion
that the Chinese, much as they disliked holding discussions with the
Soviets, had concluded that unless they did agree to talk they were
about to bring a catastrophe down on themselves. Perhaps one reason
behind the inhospitable nature of the meeting was that part of the
Chinese hierarchy continued to oppose it, and Chou had been sent to the
airport to try to ascertain the severity or leniency of the Kremlin's
intentions before making any final decisions on China's next moves. Thus
it would be over a month before any of Peking's responses to Moscow's
208initiative were officially revealed.
Therefore, the second, perhaps equally important question was
to what had Kosygin and Chou agreed in their brief conversation? On
September 18th, sources in Moscow reported that they had agreed to border
talks, but official verification was not available. Finally, on Sep-
tember 30th, through a visiting Japanese labor leader, it was authorita-
tively revealed in Moscow that the Soviet Union did expect to hold border
talks and that Kosygin 's proposal to Chou had included that (1) border
talks should be resumed, (2) trade and economic ties reconsidered,
(3) polemics halted, (4) troops withdrawn from both sides of the border,
208
For more detailed information on the twists and turns in
Kosygin' s itinerary and some initial speculation on the purpose of the
Kosygin-Chou meeting (some of which proved to be rather weakly based,
e.g., that polemics were continuing unabated ) see Christian Dueval
,
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(5) and a "no firing" order be given.
A retrospective report by an enterprising Hungarian journal-
ist who was allowed to visit the Amur Basin and interview Soviet Chinese
experts in 1970 holds that the Japanese labor leader's account was sub-
stantially correct, but incomplete. According to this report, Kosygin
proposed (1) (4) (5) "normalizing" the situation on the border, (2) "nor-
malization" of commerical ties, (3) serious scientific discussion, at
appropriate forums, of ideological differences, (6) appointment of new
ambassadors, and (7) reestablishment of a "hot line" between Moscow and
Li- 210Peking.
An authoritative Communist newspaper in Hong Kong has held
that a less ambitious agenda was proposed and that Kosygin and Chou
agreed to (1) maintain the boundary status quo, (A) disengage armed forces
in disputed areas, and (5) avoid armed clashes before proceeding to
211
(1) an all-around settlement of the boundary question.
In any case, Kosygin' s proposals constituted a full agenda for
209
London, Reuters dispatch by Robert Evans, September 3, 1969.
210
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bering the proposals in the preceeding paragraph. The Hungarian journal-
ist Istvan Koermendy published his report "Soviet Union-China" in Magyar-
orszag
,
Nos. 31-35, August 2, 9, 16, 23, and 29, 1970. His account of
Kosygin's proposals appeared in the August 2nd issue, pp. 10-11. An
analysis of the Koermendy articles can be found in j.c.k. (Joseph C. Kun) ,
"The Sino-Soviet Conflict—A Hungarian View," Radio Free Europe Research ,
September 4, 1970.
211
Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), January 9, 1970. Once again, the




However, there was no official announcement of the impending
talks for some time. The first official indication supporting the view
that talks might occur came with Peking's much more reasonable document
212
of October 7th and statement of October 8th, which have been discussed.
Finally, on October 19th, both capitals announced that talks would com-
mence on the following day in Peking. Deputy Foreign Ministers would
213
be the official representatives.
Agreeing to discuss border issues and actually discussing
them to mutual benefit proved to be only distantly related. Little is
known of the substance of the talks. Before discussions began, Peking
disclosed only that the matter of "20,000 square kilometers (7,722 square
miles) in the Pamir area" and "over 600 islands" in boundary rivers,
214
comprising another 100 square kilometers, were at issue. There is a
minor possibility that the 66,000 square mile Tuvinian Autonomous Pro-
vince of the Soviet Union also might be at issue. Before 1911, this
Soviet province had been the "independent republic of Tannu-Tuva," owing
allegiance to the Manchu emperor. However, this mineral-rich area has
no common boundary with contemporary China, and Peking could not assert





For Moscow, V.V. Kuznetsov and 29 experts; for Peking, Chiao
Kuan-hua and a large staff.
01/
"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of
China, May 24, 1969," Peking Review , No. 22, May 30, 1969, pp. 1-9, at p. 5,
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If Peking said little, Moscow was completely silent on Soviet
negotiating positions.
Once the Peking talks had commenced, they were shrouded in
secrecy. It has been reported that the delegations met on alternate
215
Thursdays and that they quickly reached a state of ennui. Increased
polemicizing toward the end of the year indicated that the talks were
going badly. This seemed to be substantiated by the return of the So-
viet delegation to Moscow, on December 14, 1969, for "consultation."
It was reported that the negotiators had not managed to agree on an agen-
217
da, a "must" for Communist negotiators.
However, the Soviet team returned to Peking in January, and the
talks struggled on. Of some significance to the Chinese must have been
the Soviet decision at this time to permit dependent wives and children
of members of the permanent Soviet mission to return to Peking. (They
had been evacuated in February, 1967.) Reportedly some wives of the
negotiating team also moved to Peking to be with their husbands, and
the Soviet mission's school for dependent children reopened.
215Stanley Karnow from Hong Kong, The Washington Post , Feb-
ruary 9, 1970.
The return of the Soviet delegation to Moscow was linked
to the imminent session of the Supreme Soviet, but this may have been
done to limit speculation that the talks were stalemated. As a normal
practice, Moscow rarely discloses when a diplomat has been recalled for
consultation.
217
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It was reported that Peking had made territorial agreement
a prerequisite for the discussion of commercial relations and an ex-
21 8
change of ambassadors. However, Moscow apparently wanted to discuss
"easier" questions of trade and cultural relations before tackling the
219
border issue. Concurrently, it was rumored in Moscow that Mr. Kuz-
netsov had been authorized to offer certain islands in the Far East to
Peking, including Chenpao (Damansky) Island, but that Peking had not
accepted a conditional aspect of the Soviet proposal, which was renun-
220
ciation of any Chinese claims to the Soviet Far East. The Chinese
voiced displeasure over the alleged Soviet failure to withdraw Red Army
troops from disputed areas to a previously agreed distance and said that
221
Moscow in fact had refused to put any restraint on them. The Red
Army apparently could not withdraw 100 kilometers from the border, as
could the PLA, without baring parts of the vital Trans-Siberian rail
222
supply route to Chinese interdiction. Moscow in fact may have reneged
218
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219
The New York Times , March 20, 1970.
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Bombay, PTI in English, January 13, 1970; The Observer
(London), January 18, 1970.
221
Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), January 9, 1970.
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on a Kosygin condition to Chou.
The border talks seemed about to collapse. A report from
Moscow in January held that Kuznetsov would be recalled in February
224
unless some progress was made. In early February Victor Louis spec-
ulated that "some participants will leave and new visitors of less po-
litical importance will take their places" and opined that "The Soviet
deputy foreign minister cannot be expected to attend such a mad hatter
225
meeting much longer." Kuznetsov 1 s presence at the talks continued to
be the subject of speculation in March, for Kuznetsov did not return
to Moscow in February as had been speculated. But public lecturers in
Moscow told audiences that the Peking talks were very disappointing and
that the Chinese were demanding 12,000 square miles of Soviet territory
227
and 440 islands in border rivers.
The possibility of an exchange of ambassadors apparently had
been addressed. On April 1st the Western press noted rumors in Moscow
that the Kremlin had asked for Peking's agrement for V.I. Stepakov
223
Chou's remark, in November, about Russian "treachery" may
be indicative.
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The Observer (London), January 18, 1970.
Victor Louis, "This Mad Hatters' China Tea Party," London
Evening News
,
February 11, 1970, p. 6.
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The Times (London), April 1 and 20, 1970. Dispatches from




as the new Soviet ambassador. The rationale for this nomination is
not clear. On its face the appointment was insulting to Peking. Step-
akov, a Khrushchev protege, was at the time director of Agitprop
,
where
he had been supervising the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet polemic ex-
,229
change,
Mr. Kuznetsov returned to Moscow sometime prior to the Lenin
230Centenary celebration, April 22, 1970. At this juncture, with pub-
lication of the Chinese diatribe, prospects for the Peking talks were
slim indeed. Then U.S. and South Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia.
The Southeast Asian strategic picture changed rapidly. Complex politi-
co-strategic developments in Indochina resulting from the Cambodian in-
cursion need not be detailed here, for they should be fresh in most mem-
ories. However, one development of highest significance to this presen-
tation must be singled out: the Cambodian action seems to have been at
least one motivating factor for Peking to move, at the highest level, to
228
Ibid. , April 1, 1970.
229
See r.r.g. (Richard Rockingham Gill), "The New Soviet Am-
bassador to Peking," Radio Free Europe Research , April 24, 1970, pp. 1-
6, for an analysis of this Soviet move that emphasizes its domestic
(intraparty) as well as foreign ramifications. The author speculates
that Moscow may have hoped for a refusal by Peking prior to the Lenin
Centenary. Also see The New York Times , April 10, 1970.
230
The Times (London), April 21, 1970, reported that Kuznet-




keep the Peking talks in session.
On Hay Day, 1970, Mao Tse-tung sought out the senior Soviet
representative, V.G. Gankovsky, at a reception in Peking and expressed




Mr. Kuznetsov returned to Peking on May 3rd, probably in re-
sponse to Mao's initiative. Thenceforth, interstate relations improved,
slowly at first, but consistently in the last half of the year. In June,
Premier Kosygin said that the Peking talks had failed to make any appre-
232
ciable progress but that Moscow intended to continue them. In July
it was reported that Peking had accepted Mr. Stepakov as the new Soviet
233
ambassador. The Soviet negotiator, Mr. Kuznetsov, returned to Moscow
in July due to illness (which had plagued both the Soviet and Chinese
delegations) but was replaced by L.F. Ilyichev, the next-ranking deputy
234
foreign minister. Ambassador-designate Stepakov reportedly was
2^1
The Observer (London), May 10, 1970. In The New York Times
,
May 10, 1970, Harrison Salisbury reported that Mao had urged that the
Sino-Soviet talks "resume," indicating that they might have been broken
off prior to, or immediately following, Peking's great Lenin Day polemic,
232
The New York Times , June 11, 1970; also see the Patriot
(New Delhi), August 10, 1970 for a parallel Kosygin statement.
J J
The Times (London), July 3, 1970.
Ilyichev, a former editor of Izvestia and Pravda , had been
party secretary for ideological matters under Khrushchev, and had nego-
tiated with the Chinese in Moscow in 1963.
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stricken with a heart attack but agrement was arranged for V.S. Tolsti-
235
kov, the Party Secretary in Leningrad, as his replacement. The Amur
Basin Commission met again in July in Heiho, China, and in August Sino-
Soviet trade talks began in Khabarovsk.
Agreement apparently was reached at the Peking talks during
the summer on the operation of a direct telephone line, similar to the
Moscow-Washington "Hot Line," between Peking and Moscow. It is not
clear whether the "Hot Line" had been established or would be established
236
soon.
By the end of the year a new Chinese ambassador, Liu Hsin-
chuan, was in Moscow, Tolstikov was in Peking, a trade and payments
agreement had been signed in Peking, and the Peking border talks contin-
ued.
It is legitimate to inquire why the U.S. -South Vietnamese in-
cursion into Cambodia seemed to result in pushing Peking and Moscow some-
what closer together when all previous U.S. escalations in Indochina
seemed to have driven them apart. It should first be understood that
the two were not pushed very much closer together by the incursion.
They have not agreed to support the same elements in Indochina. Moscow
continues to recognize the Lon Nol government in Phom Penh while Peking
235
Both Kosygin and Tolstikov rose to prominence in the Lenin-
grad party organization
236
Borba (Belgrade), August 20, 1970. Report by Pedrag Vukovic.
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has adopted the exiled Prince Sihanouk. They both continue to vie for
Hanoi's favor.
It is possible that Mao made his May Day move in 1970 because
the increasing tendency toward unpredictability evident in Washington
decisionmaking indicated that a small measure of added security on the
North might be valuable to China in the long run, especially if the U.S.
began to throw its full weight into the Indochina problem. Second, Mao
probably knew that a slight move on his part toward Moscow as a result
of Cambodia would make Washington think twice before initiating similar
escalations. Third, Mao may have believed that a slight warming toward
the Soviet Union would garner additional support for China among the
neutral or pro-Soviet parties in the international communist movement.
Mao had little to lose and much to gain by his initiative.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were hardly prepared to move far
toward the Soviet position on substantive matters. At year's end pro-
gress on the border issue seemingly still eluded the negotiators. How-
ever, both sides probably were pleased that sixteen months had passed
without resort to gunfire to settle border issues. If Sino-Soviet border
talks were still far from achieving a "big payoff," neither side seemed
ready to discount their crisis control benefit or the small positive
steps that had been taken.
While this comprehensive Sino-Soviet political dialogue was
proceeding in the irregular, public, and diplomatic channels, both sides
were extensively engaged in moves at home and abroad which, while not
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necessarily requiring a direct response from the opponent, were of
significance to him. We turn now to the tacit exchange between Peking
and Moscow.
III. The Tacit Exchange
In the model of the political-military interaction "cable,"
the strand carrying signals or events of the tacit exchange is composed
of filaments that repeat the main strands of the cable itself: the
tacit military and political filaments. In the Chinese-Soviet case,
tacit moves or events are perhaps more difficult to fathom than those
of the Chinese-U.S. case. For instance, there is abundant room for
speculation about whether a certain move by the Soviets was perceived
in Peking as it was in the United States. Since many details of a given
military or political move by either Moscow or Peking are lacking in the
West more so than they may be lacking in the opposing capital, our anal-
ysis must proceed much as a driver does on a foggy night. His vision
must try to pierce one or more veils of fog, or, in this case, penetrate
a compound veil of uncertainty. Nevertheless, certain information does
filter through the veil and we are able to examine a few of the more
obvious tacit moves with fair assurance.
Major tacit military-strategic moves of significance to the





A prerequisite for understanding and evaluating tacit military-
strategic moves is an estimate of how much the other side really knows
about them. In the Sino-Soviet case it may be presumed that both Peking
and Moscow make it their business to keep appraised of what the other
is doing. Moscow, of course, is able to benefit from much more sophi-
sticated reconnaissance equipment including the Cosmos series of earth
satellites and high performance photographic aircraft. Peking also may
operate some sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft—U-2 technology is
available for Chinese engineers from American aircraft wreckage in their
possession. But both governments unquestionably rely on espionage net-
works on the other side of the border. These networks presumably must
be fairly well developed, if for no other reason than that each side has
been working for many years among sympathetic nationality groups across
the frontier. The Chinese, and perhaps the Soviets, have taken steps
to restrict the mobility of these groups across the frontier, and Peking
has attempted to settle large numbers of Han near the Western border,
displacing indigenous peoples to the interior. Whether moves of this
nature effectively narrowed the intelligence capabilities of the oppo-
nent is unknown.
During the 1968-1970 period of high tension, however, Moscow
purposely publicized some of its military moves, in general terms, as
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237part of a calculated war of nerves against Peking. The Chinese did
not publicize their military moves in a reciprocal manner; as we have
seen, Peking emphasized war preparations but did not publicize military
redispositions. Nevertheless, knowledge of some Chinese military moves
became available. Between their intelligence information and this public
knowledge, each side deduced an increasing threat. As far as military
moves were concerned, the tacit exchange therefore became an engine of
reciprocating escalation that may or may not have reached a climax at the
close of the period under examination.
,
The series of moves commenced during 1967 when Moscow moved
major troop units into Mongolia and, according to the Chinese, redeployed
2 38
thirteen divisions from Eastern Europe to the Sino-Soviet border.
The estimated six Soviet divisions in Outer Mongolia were highly visible
239
in late 1967, parading and conducting maneuvers. Not long after the
maneuvers, Hong Kong sources reported a number of PLA divisions shifting
northward to the border. These four to five divisions were accompanied
by significant numbers of artillery moved from Fukien Province, opposite
Taiwan. Peking also began to deploy increasing numbers of Production
237
Highlighting, once again, the great degree of overlap be-
tween our analytical categories.
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and Construction Corps personnel into frontier zones.
Presumably a Soviet response to the Chinese moves was delayed
by a commitment of troops to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
As we have noted, Peking quickly realized that this Soviet action, and
particularly the political doctrine accompanying it, could be pointed
eastward as well. Although Moscow later made the point crystal clear,
241
Peking probably regarded the clarification as superfluous.
Following the bloody clashes on the Ussuri in March, 1969,
border reinforcement moves began in earnest. In May, 1969, the Soviet
press announced Red Army maneuvers on the Sino-Soviet border. It was
reported that between one and two hundred thousand Soviet soldiers, in-
cluding rocket troops, had moved into Siberia and Mongolia. Nine Siberian
airfields were being enlarged, and travel was banned to Khabarovsk on
242
the Amur River and to Irkutsk near Lake Baikal. In June the Trans-
Siberian railroad was closed to passenger travel for a time, and it was
revealed that the Soviet troop redeployment was closer to the 200,000
figure: sixteen divisions with ample support reportedly had been moved
to the border. Red Army strength had been increased to 28 divisions on
See Robinson, op. cit .
,
pp. 30-31, for additional informa-
tion on the 1968 Chinese build-up.




Harrison E. Salisbury, "Soviet Expands Airfields in Far





First reports of Chinese border reinforcement to counteract
the Soviet redeployments appeared in July, although troop movements
unquestionably began months earlier. The PLA reportedly formed many
new units in Inner Mongolia and Heilungkiang Provinces, established ad-
ditional Production and Construction Corps paramilitary units in the
Lanchow Military Region, and moved two armored and three anti-aircraft
244divisions to the vicinity of Lop Nor.
Moscow brought the Red Navy into the tacit escalation, announc-
ing in July that sailors from the Soviet Pacific Fleet were holding
245
exercises on the Amur River. In August Moscow revealed the appoint-
ment of General V.F. Tolubko, longtime Deputy Commander-in-Chief of
Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, as Commander of the Far Eastern Military
246
District. The significance of this appointment was apparent to Peking.
By the end of August a major Chinese summer military build-up had become
obvious to Hong Kong observers, who also reported a suspension of rail






The New York Times , July 6, 1969; Tokyo Shimbun , February
6, 1970, p. 8.
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In September, 1969, despite movement on the diplomatic front
to bring the border dispute to the negotiating table, escalation
in the tacit mode continued. Reports, albeit of modest reliability,
circulated that some air force units of the Warsaw Pact nations (Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany) had been transferred to the Sino-
249
Soviet border, augmenting the already potent strength of the PVO,
the Soviet air defense command. In November the existence of revised
Soviet military command arrangements for the western sector of the China
250
frontier area was disclosed. The new command ostensibly was oriented
toward defense, but heavy reinforcement of Soviet units during the summer
logically could be regarded by Peking as an offensive threat. Intelli-
gence on the build-up, when combined with Soviet statements in the ir-
regular dialogue, could hardly admit another conclusion.
247








Don Cook from West Berlin in the New York Post , September
13, 1969.
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The Central Asian Military District, comprising the republics
of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tadzhikistan, was formed with headquarters




By year's end, 1969, it was estimated that reciprocal rein-
forcements of border military units had resulted in a Soviet troop dis-
position of 558,000, augmented by 100,000 border guards. Facing them
were some 564,000 regulars of the PLA plus 150,000 Chinese frontier troops
251
and an estimated 100,000 militiamen. Sophisticated weapons systems
gave the Red Army a tremendous firepower and mobility advantage over
the PLA and must have indicated to Peking that any Soviet attack, con-
ventional or nuclear, might penetrate deeply into China. Accordingly,
toward year's end, the Chinese accent moved heavily to civil defense.
In late 1969 and well into 1970, the Chinese populace was digging.
252
Reports of new shelters and tunnels were numerous, and, inasmuch as
shelters could greatly enhance the survivability of Chinese defenders,
of significance to Soviet decisionmakers.
As we have seen, Soviet-Chinese negotiations, once activated,
continued in a perfunctory manner at best. Initial optimism was quickly
251




E.g., The New York Times , December 28, 1969; London, Reuters
Service in English, January 16, 1970; various Chinese City, Provincial
and Regional Broadcast Services broadcasting circa 10-15 January, 1970;
Tokyo Shimbun , February 6, 1970, p. 8; Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), Febru-
ary 17, 1970; The Times (London), February 22, 1970. The philosophy
behind the monumental Chinese Civil defense program was contained in two
articles, Hu Hui-pao, "Chairman Mao's Military Thinking is the Magic
Weapon in Defeating the Enemy—Fight No Battle Unprepared," and Wang
Ta-kuo, "Achieving Real Superiority Through Full Preparation," in Peking
Review
,
Vol. 13, No. 2, January 9, 1970, pp. 15-17.
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overtaken by many signs of disagreement and disappointment. Whether
slow progress resulted in further military moves by each side, or vice
versa, is not ascertainable. It is clear, however, that both Moscow
253
and Peking continued to reinforce their frontier well into 1970.
In February, 1970, it was reported that the PLA Navy was on
24-hour alert ' and that the PLA was calling up reservists. Mili-
tary defense exercises were held. Not to be outdone by Moscow, Pe-
257king reshuffled the PLA command establishment along the border.
As late as July, 1970, Western intelligence sources indicated that the
Soviet build-up showed no signs of stopping. The Red Army reportedly
had emplaced "many hundreds" of tactical nuclear missiles along the bor-
der, including the first deployment of a mobile solid-fuel missile called
253
By late summer, 1970, according to one estimate, the Red
Army was up to 35 divisions on the border, with 25 more divisions in
ready reserve, a total of 800,000 men. Harrison E. Salisbury in The
New York Times , August 30, 1970.
254
Djakarta (Indonesian) Domestic Service in Indonesian,
February 3, 1970.
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Taipei, CNA International Service in English, February 12
and 15, 1970.
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Budapest, MTI Domestic Service in Hungarian, February 17,
1970.
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Taipei, CNA International Service, February 23, 1970; Tokyo
Shimbun
,
February 6, 1970, p. 8; The New York Times , July 22, 1970.
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Scaleboard, which is thought to be capable of hurling a one megaton war-
head 500 miles. Additionally, Red Army Frog (30 mile range) nuclear
2 58
rocket battalions were augmented with an extra, fourth, company. In
March, 1970, the Red Army conducted the largest maneuvers it had held
in several years. These "Dvina" maneuvers were held in European Russia,
259
ostensibly not to irritate Peking. However, since some participating
units immediately were sent to the border, the exercises probably were
2 fciO
regarded as a Soviet pressure tactic by the Chinese. The "Dvina"
maneuvers were followed by "Ocean" worldwide exercises by the Red Navy
geared to the Lenin Centenary celebration. The Soviet Pacific Fleet's
amphibious exercises on this occasion implicitly threatened China.
Finally, of less immediate but perhaps ultimately greater significance
to Peking, it was reported that Soviet defense appropriations for border
areas had been increased by twelve percent.
Little is known of the Chinese budget process through which
25 8
The New York Times , July 22, 1970.
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Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, March 12, 1970; The Chris-
tian Science Monitor , March 21, 1970.
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Thus in the first week of April, French correspondent Alain
Bouc reported a steady movement of military convoys eastward on the Trans-
Siberian railroad at a rate of four trains every six hours. Le Monde ,
April 2, 3, and A, 1970.
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The Times (London), June 19, 1970.

269
resources are allocated to defense, but in 1969 and 1970 it was obvious
to Moscow that Peking had embarked on a major program to accumulate
strategic materials. Heavy Chinese buying kept world demand for steel
unusually high. Peking also increased orders for nickel, aluminum, and
copper, while restricting exports of antimony and tungsten. Moscow
knew, of course, that Peking would not be able to convert these raw ma-
terials into weapons systems overnight, but their long term significance
was serious.
These moves in the military side of the tacit exchange seemed
to indicate, at best, that neither side was hopeful over their diplomatic
dialogue or, at worst, that both sides were using the talks to buy time
7 ft ^
until they had prepared for a determinative military engagement.
The Times (London), February 22, 1970; The New York Times
,
December 28, 1969, January 28, 1970, and May 17, 1970, (p. F-12); The
Observer (London), March 1, 1970.
Of.'i
Imperialism, social imperialism,
and all reactionaries often use peace-
ful negotiations as a cover to launch
surprise and large-scale aggressive
wars We must face this with high
vigilance and be ready at all times
to wipe out the invading enemy.—Nanking Radio,
October 21, 1969, quoted in The New York Times , October 22, 1969. In a
policy speech on December 15, 1969, Premier Brezhnev reportedly said it
was not certain "whether the Chinese side really seeks to arrive at a
durable detente between the two countries or merely wants to obtain a
respite." The speech, "On The Practical Activities of the Political
Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee in the Sphere of Foreign and Home
Policy," was given to a plenum of the CPSU C.C., but the full text has
never been released. The quote is in The Christian Science Monitor ,
April 24, 1970. Also see The Washington Post , January 4, 1970.
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Moreover, the Sino-Soviet tacit strategic picture was entire-
ly dissimilar from the Chinese-U. S. tacit strategic picture of a few years
earlier. whereas Chinese-U. S. force dispositions seemed to rule out,
for both sides, the possibility of a coordinated three-pronged attack in
Southeast Asia, the Formosa Strait, and the Northeast, Sino-Soviet force
dispositions seemed mutually to envisage warfare on three sectors of the
border, in Sinkiang, in the Outer Mongolia area, and in the Far East.
The Soviets outnumbered the Chinese in the West but the PLA outnumbered
the Red Army in the East. The possibility of an attack by one side in
one sector being countered by the other side in another sector seemed
prominent.
If this interpretation of Chinese and Soviet perceptions is
correct, the next logical question that both would seek to ask would
be "Do the opponent's diplomatic moves complement his military moves?"
Tacit Diplomatic Moves
As they observed Moscow's diplomatic performance, the Chinese
reasonably could have concluded that the Soviet Union was intent on com-
pleting an encirclement of China and, concurrently, of coming to an
agreement with Washington to act to the detriment of China.
Soviet diplomatic moves pointing toward the encirclement of
China were evident in 1968, although an explicit policy statement was
not forthcoming from Moscow until 1969. Thus Moscow repeatedly tried
to establish diplomatic links with Manila, attempted a commercial agree-
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ment with Bangkok, established a booming trade with Tokyo and Kuala
Lumpur, recognized Suharto's government in Jakarta, continued to recog-
nize Souvanna Phouma's government in Laos, and continued to extend aid
to Delhi. As noted in the irregular dialogue, Moscow's representatives
264
even were in contact with the Chinese Nationalists.
Meaning was added to these Soviet diplomatic moves when Pre-
mier Brezhnev publicly enunciated a "long-range task" for the Soviet
Union of creating "a system of collective security in Asia." How
far Moscow intended to go along this line, and what implementing steps
actually were taken by Soviet diplomats, is not known. The task was
extremely difficult: the king pin of any such security scheme, India,
was not readily available for it. Even if initially unrealizable, how-
ever, Brezhnev's "long-range task" remained an implicit threat to Pe-
1 A 266king, ana was so regarded.
264
The prospect that any nation, especially the Soviet Union,
would promote a "two-China" policy has always been abhorrent to both
Peking and Taipei. For evidence of Peking's sensitivity, see The Chris-
tian Science Monitor
,
January 14, 1970; Peking Review , No. 11, March 14,
1969, p. 13, and No. 13, March 28, 1969, p. 30.
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Leonid I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of
Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda
and Izvestia , June 8, 1969, also in CDSP , Vol. 21, No. 23, July 2, 1969,
pp. 3-17.
An Chun-tao, "Another Step in New Tsars' Expansion in Asia,"
Peking Review , No. 37, September 7, 1969, pp. 18-20; "Tear Off the Wrap-
pings from Soviet Revisionists' Theory of 'Responsibility for Security,'"
Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1969, pp. 20-22.
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Peking's major attention, however, presumably was on Moscow's
relationship with Washington. Chinese concern over Soviet-U.S. "collu-
sion," which had grown constantly since 1963 (after the Test Ban Treaty),
continued well into the 1968-1970 period. Moscow's initial willingness
to accept President Nixon's drive for "an era of negotiations" meant to
Peking an increasingly menacing dialogue between the superpowers.
As noted earlier, Chinese reaction to the Soviet-U.S. decision
to negotiate a Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968 was entirely negative.
Peking maintained this pose as the NPT moved through the dual ratifica-
tion and signature process. U.S. Senate ratification in March, 1969,
Soviet legislative ratification in August, 1969, formal simultaneous
governmental ratification in November, 1969 and final implementation of
the agreement in March, 1970, were each regarded by Peking as a further
big-power move against China. Peking also took Soviet acceptance and
initiation of talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT) as an anti-Chinese
O CO






...disarmament conferences and talks
on limiting nuclear missiles. .. are nothing
but deceptive tricks. Under the signboard
of disarmament, they are actually engaged in
arms expansion to oppose China and the people
of the world. —Peking, NCNA International Service
in English, June 8, 1969.
...Talks with U.S. imperialism on strate-
gic weapons to step up nuclear blackmail against
the world's people Continued sell-out —
"Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique's Ugly Performance of Self Exposure,"
SCMP 4479, August 20, 1969, p. 29. Also see SCMP 4480, pp. 27-29.
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to border discussions with Moscow was immediately followed by a Soviet-
U.S. decision to commence the SALT Talks. As long as Moscow was preoc-
cupied with the border, SALT was deferred.—Once China had seemed will-
ing to stabilize the border situation, however, Moscow immediately re-
269
commenced its collusive schemes with Washington.
But the NPT and SALT were only two among many items which
Peking regarded as evidence of Soviet-U.S. collusion. The new but re-
dundant official diplomatic communication system inaugurated on March
20, 1969; visits by high Soviet defense ministry officials to the Penta-
gon in April, 1969; Soviet shipments of titanium to the United States;
agreement on the text of a draft treaty banning the emplacement of nu-
270
clear weapons on the seabed ; a U.S. -Soviet cultural exchange agree-
271
ment consummated in thirteen days; "crisis control" in the Middle East ;
and even the Soviet-West German friendship treaty; all these diplomatic
events were regarded as evidence of Soviet machinations against China,
272
although China was not directly affected by any of them.
269
See William A. Platte, "Peking, Moscow, and the SALT TAlks,"
Naval War College Review , Vol. 22, No. 9 (May, 1970) pp. 93-111 for a
detailed analysis.
270
"Intensified U.S. -Soviet Collaboration," Peking Review , No.
44, October 31, 1969, p. 30; Peking City Service in Mandarin, December 7,
1969.
271
"U.S. -Soviet Collaboration is Speeding Up Creation of 'Mid-
dle East Munich," 1 Peking Review , No. 30, July 25, 1969, pp. 23-24.
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Not to say that Middle Eastern developments in 1970 did
not severely hinder the Palestinian guerrillas that Peking backed, or that
West Germany might not be pressured by Moscow to curtail trade with Peking,
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Similarly, Chinese diplomatic moves would be regarded by Moscow
as anti-Soviet machinations even though they had no direct effect on the
Soviet Union. Although Chinese moves in the Middle East, East Africa,
vis a vis North Vietnam and Pakistan, and, more recently, as the Cultural
Revolution receded into the background, improved Chinese diplomatic ties
with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Canada were regarded as potentially detri-
mental to Soviet interests, Peking's relations with Washington occupied
Moscow's center of attention. For quite some time during the 1968-1970
period it seemed that Peking and Washington might be giving Moscow some-
thing to worry about.
Early in 1968, and especially after the suspension of bombing
in North Vietnam> Washington began to show serious interest in dampening
Peking's hostility. On April 22, Vice President Humphrey called for
building "peaceful bridges to mainland China." Not once in his speech
was the phrase Communist China used— an unmistakeable signal to Peking.
On May 21, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach assured Peking that Wash-
ington appreciated China's "legitimate security interests," said that
the exchange of journalists and related questions of travel should be
pursued, invited Chinese newsmen to witness the November elections, and
indicated that the U.S. embargo had not achieved anticipated results.
The same evening, Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow repeated the
U.S. welcome for Chinese newsmen, scientists, and scholars. Further,




These initiatives did not provoke a response from Peking.
However, when presidential candidate Nixon also seemed interested in
opening a new dialogue with Peking, the Chinese attitude changed. After
the election, on November 26th, Peking apparently decided the time was
273
opportune to convene the long-delayed 135th session of the Warsaw Talks.
Moscow immediately regarded Peking's move as attempted collu-
~7 /
sion with Washington, a view enhanced by U.S. acceptance of the pro-
posal within four days.
However, the Chinese-U.S . talks were not held in February,
ostensibly because of Peking's furor over Washington's handling of an
27fi
important Chinese defector at The Hague, but probably because of re-
277
vised Chinese perceptions of the attitude of the Nixon Administration.
Moscow, of course, was pleased that the Warsaw Talks had suddenly self-
destructed, but the Soviets assured their readers that the Maoists were
273
Peking proposed that the talks convene on February 20, 1969,
and suggested an agenda that included an old topic, evacuation of U.S.
troops from Taiwan, and a new topic, agreement on the "principles of
peaceful coexistence."
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See Charlotte Saikowski, from Moscow, The Christian Science
Monitor
,
January 10, 1969; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to
Asia, December 19, 1968; in French to Southeast Asia, December 9, 1968;
and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, February 17, 1969.
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Peking, NCNA International Service in English, February 18,
1969.
277





capable of holding secret talks with Washington at any tine.
Such Chinese-U.S. liaison as there was in 1969 must have
been deeply hidden— there is no trace of it until October. This is not
to say that there was no observable action, for there was. But it was
279largely one-way, and initiated by Washington. By early October,
Washington's persistence in keeping the door open to Peking, probably
combined with China's crescendoing dispute with Moscow, brought revived
Chinese interest in the Warsaw Talks. Administration officials said they
280
had received "signals" from Peking of a softening of Chinese hostility.
It has been noted in the preceeding section on the Sino-Soviet
diplomatic dialogue that by early December the Peking Talks seemed to be
stalemated. Peking unquestionably viewed the border situation as extreme-
ly grave. On December 11th the Chinese charge in Warsaw held an "infor-
mal chat" with U.S. Ambassador Stoessel. They may have discussed a
278
A. Dronov, "Peking's Undercover Contacts," New Times , No. 9,
March 5, 1969, pp. 20-22.
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In the summer Secretary of State Rogers announced a relaxa-
tion of restrictions on travel and tourist purchases in China. On Septem-
ber 5th Under Secretary Richardson said
We do not seek to exploit for our
own advantage the hostility between
the Soviet Union and Communist China
. . .We are not going to let Soviet
apprehensions prevent us from bringing
China out of its angry, alienated shell...,
and, on September 15th, added
Long-run improvement in our relations
is in our own national interest.
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pending U.S. decision on trade, for on December 19, 1969, Washington
entirely removed monetary limits on tourist imports of Chinese goods,
relaxed restrictions on bank and insurance company transactions with
China, and allowed foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with
China in non-strategic materials.
On January 9, 1970, Peking and Washington jointly announced
their decision to resume the Warsaw Talks on January 20th. Once again,
Moscow was seriously concerned about collusion. On each occasion when
U.S. and Chinese representatives met, Moscow published a new diatribe
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against Chinese-U.S. collusion. But Soviet apprehension of a Chinese-
U.S. "deal" was put to rest when, as a result of the U.S. incursion into
Cambodia, the Warsaw meeting of May 20th was postponed indefinitely.
As mentioned during our examination of the Sino-Soviet dip-
lomatic dialogue, events in Cambodia caused a Chinese turnabout and
revival of the nearly collapsed Peking Talks. Concurrently, and perhaps
equally as valuable from Moscow's viewpoint, the Cambodian incursion
resulted in suspension of the developing Peking-Washington dialogue once
again. This dual development conspicuously favored Moscow in the super-
power arena, even though it seemed to consolidate Peking's influence in
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Meetings in the 1970 series of talks were held on January
20 (No. 135) and February 20, 1970 (No. 136). For Moscow's comments,
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2 82Southeast Asia somewhat at Moscow's expense.
By the end of the 1968-1970 period, Peking must have considered
its international position sufficiently improved (or possibly because
Foreign Ministry officials felt more secure after the end of the Cultural
Revolution) to reiterate, after a long silence, its proposal for a world
summit conference to discuss banning and destroying all nuclear weapons.
The controversial requirement in the 1970 proposal was that, pending a
summit conference, all nuclear powers should adhere to a generalized
283
"no-first-use" statement. The obvious implications of this were not
lost on Moscow, which, so far as is known, did not reply. (Neither did
Washington)
.
To summarize, the pattern of military activity in the tacit
exchange of Sino-Soviet interaction was one of constantly increasing
tension. Each side's military reinforcement of the border was perceived
as a threat by the other, even though its actual primary purpose may have
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Peking backed a new coalition of North Vietnam, the Revolu-
tionary Government of South Vietnam, Prince Sihanouk's N.U.F.K., and the
Pathet Lao, while Moscow continues to recognize the Lon Nol government
in Pnom Penh and the Royal Laotian government of Prince Souvanna Phouma.
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Peking, NCNA International Service in English, November 1,
1970, in the Peking Review , No. 45, November 6, 1970, p. 15; The New
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,
November 2, 1970. There is some possibility that the Chinese
resurrected their proposal at the urging of a delegation of the Japanese
Socialist Party, which had been visiting in Peking from October 22 to
November 3, 1970. On the other hand, the Chinese may have revived their
proposal in the presence of the Japanese delegation knowing that they
would gain immediate strong support.
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beer, defensive. If the opponents had not known what the other was doing,
or had decided not to respond to a particular move (it will be recalled
that the tacit exchange, by definition, is one in which a response is
not necessary), tension might not have reached such a high level. How-
ever, Moscow pointed out Red Army moves for the Chinese, and Soviet
intelligence capabilities kept Moscow abreast of Chinese moves. The
result was a detrimental mutual provocation that might have been avoided.
The pattern of political activity in the tacit exchange of
the Sino-Soviet interaction also tended to heighten tension, at least
until May, 1970. The record indicates that both Peking and Moscow were
continually weighing the activities of the other with the United States
or its allies, and that each saw the other colluding with the opposing
camp whether there was collusion in fact or not. A less suspicious,
more objective view of the other side's performance also would have less-
ened tension, but under the crisis circumstances prevailing, it was not
to be.
Remarks on Chinese-Soviet Interaction, 1968-1970
The record of Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction during
the period 1968-1970, as revealed in patterns of military engagement,
three channels of political dialogue, and the tacit exchange, seems
markedly different from that of Chinese-U.S. interaction during the
previous three years. Yet the aggregate impression somehow is one of
similarity. That is, in each case, the participants were able to surmount
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a crisis of open conflict and achieve a degree of stability at a contin-
uing high, but less deadly, level of tension.
The difference lies in the fact that Chinese-Soviet interaction
seemed much more apocalyptic than did Chinese-American interaction.
Military engagements were violent clashes of ground force units that
employed deception, not high-speed engagements of sophisticated aircraft
that occurred by accident rather than design. The political dialogue
was one in which both sides spoke with forked tongues and the violent,
irascible, threatening, provocative forks nearly obliterated the more
reasonable signals that were sent, as opposed to the Chinese-U.S. politi-
cal dialogue, where voices of restraint seemed stronger than the voices
of chauvinism. Even the Chinese-Soviet tacit exchange seems more dan-
gerous in that both sides conducted force build-ups of strategic signi-
ficance that quite obviously were aimed directly at the other. This did
not occur in the Chinese-U.S. interaction.
Moreover, Chinese-Soviet interaction, in all channels except
that of the official statements in the public political dialogue, shows
a much greater proclivity to invoke the use of nuclear weapons than did
the Chinese-U.S. interaction. From the evidence it seems that Moscow
used this tactic much more blatantly than did Peking. Soviet "nuclear
rocket rattling" is an outstanding feature of the irregular dialogue,
the polemics, and the tacit exchange. But Peking, too, seemed ready
to use nuclears if forced to do so (speaking "by indirection" through
Tirana), and, toward the end of the period, as noted in the patterns
of military engagement, proceeded to deploy nuclear-tipped MRBMs . In
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the Chinese-U.S. case, nuclear "rattling" was much less specific. It
occurred in rumors, not in easily traceable statements or observable
military activities.
The Chinese-Soviet record can be viewed as similar in the
aggregate but markedly different in detail from the Chinese-U.S. record.
The differences seem to be those of intensity.
Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction was conducted in a much
more intense manner throughout. This may be attributed to ideology and
proximity, which perhaps were not as prominent in the Chinese-U.S. dis-
pute.
If the information from this chapter is inserted into the
284international tension matrix described in Chapter 4, a surprisingly
similar configuration appears. That is, there were comparatively few
tension diminishing actions by either Moscow or Peking during the entire
three year period. Those tension diminishing signals/moves that did
occur were nearly obliterated by the many tension amplifying actions that
concurrently were in progress. Moreover, there was once again a mutually
shared readiness to declare tension diminishing actions to be fraudulent
or deceitful, which objectively moved them to the tension amplifying row.
Thus Peking, in the months between March 21, 1969, when Kosygin
first requested a top-level telephone conversation, and October 19, 1969,






seriously concerned over whether Kosygin's persistent initiative was
itself a deadly ruse. The belligerent and provocative Soviet stance in
military engagements, the irregular dialogue, polemics, and the tacit
exchange could powerfully persuade Peking that the Soviet request for
talks was either an attempt to buy time while a strike was being planned
.
or, worse, an attempt to set up a "Pearl Harbor" for China along the
lines of the Japanese diplomatic deception in 1941.
It is entirely possible that the aggregate Soviet political-
military posture, even though dichotomous, constituted a coordinated
Kremlin "grand design." In this line of thought, Moscow, fully aware
of Peking's belligerent intransigence, decides single-mindedly to or-
chestrate a dazzling political-military-psychological warfare campaign
designed to bring Peking to the negotiating table where, finally, the
Soviets can "talk sense" to the Chinese. Thus the voices of the top
Kremlin decisionmakers would exude evenhandedness , emphasizing Soviet
responsibility and the reasonableness of Soviet positions. But the
ominous pattern of military moves by the Red Army, the threatening Soviet
polemics, and the terrifying innuendos of the irregular dialogue empha-
sized the deadly seriousness behind Moscow's moves. Moscow was making
itself look quite unpredictable to Peking, and therefore quite dangerous.
As far as the Chinese were concerned, Moscow's nuclear threats were prob-
ably unnecessary, inasmuch as Red Army conventional strength would be
able to overrun the PLA in some places. As a result, Peking faced a
! choice of accepting the offer of talks or, apparently, of fighting off
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a Soviet attack. If this is actually what happened, there is no denying
that the Soviet plan was successful. Increasingly heavy pressure by
Moscow well could have persuaded the Chinese leadership that acquiescence
285in negotiations was imperative.
If this was the case, was it necessary for Moscow to continue
to apply pressure after negotiations in Peking were in progress? Would
pressure at that stage bring negotiating success, or would it then become
counterproductive? The indications are that Moscow kept applying pressure
after negotiations had started, that a few positive accomplishments were
achieved, but that major problems remained unsolved. There are no firm
case-specific answers to these questions. It may well be that continued
Soviet pressure, after negotiations had started, was counterproductive
and that Moscow should have relaxed somewhat.
This suggests a second school of thought: that the Soviets
had not really mounted a dazzling politico-military-psychological warfare
campaign against China, with a single grand purpose in mind, after all.
Instead, Moscow's forked tongue was really two separate Soviet voices,
each singing its own song. The fact that Peking decided to heed the
lilting soprano voice calling for negotiations had little effect on the
thundering basso, who kept right on singing.
285
The "pressure" school would also hold that Moscow used the
same tactics in the Middle East in 1970 in order to bring a belligerent,
intransigent Tel Aviv to the negotiating table with Cairo and Amman.
Once again, if this was the Soviet design, it was successful.
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What we are saying, of course, is that Moscow unquestionably
is inhabited by hawks and doves in foreign policy matters, and that for
any nation who is the object (on the receiving end) of Moscow's policy,
it is highly uncertain which of the aviary ultimately will be most in-
fluential in setting final policy. In Peking's view, the Czechoslovakian
invasion decision probably indicated that the hawks in the Kremlin were
currently predominant, and Chinese decisions were taken accordingly.
Conversely, Moscow probably had been persuaded that Peking was
inhabited by Chinese eagles and pigeons, particularly as far as the So-
viet Union was concerned, and that the chief eagle was Mao himself.
In this view, initial Chinese acceptance of Kosygin's negotiating propo-
sal, after a lengthy display of intransigence, was either a fluke or a
strategem, in which case Moscow hardly could trust the Chinese. This
powerfully accents the significance of Mao's personal intervention to
keep the Peking talks in session, on May Day, 1970. It has been reported
that Mao had not spoken to a Russian in some years. Suddenly he had
sought out the Soviet deputy chief of mission in Peking. There was a
possibility that the chief eagle was reversing his classification of
China's primary enemy.
The Sino-Soviet record of the last seven months of 1970, how-
ever, does not substantiate the conjecture that Washington, and not
Moscow, had become the prime threat in Chinese eyes. Rather, it seemed
to indicate that Peking had come to believe that neither Washington nor
Moscow was worse than the other. Both were equally bad. Thus Moscow's
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negotiations with Peking could take only small steps, just as the Nixon
Administration's policy of improving relations with China was limited to
small steps. Peking was not to be easily persuaded to accept either a
definitive border settlement or an agreed common ideological guideline
regardless of whether eagles or pigeons predominated in the CCP leader-
ship, for both the eagles and pigeons ultimately were concerned with
defining short and long range dangers to China. For a time in 1969 the
Chinese probably were persuaded that Moscow posed the major short term
danger to China. After Cambodia, and despite negotiations in progress
in Peking, chances are that the consensus in Peking continued to be that
Moscow posed the major short term danger. But the U.S. move may have
indicated to the Chinese that the American long range danger might be
changing, moving back at least partially into a short range threat cate-
gory. Mao's move, then, could have reflected this estimate.
Thus we must turn once more to our initial and basic considera-
tion of China as a unitary international actor. It will be useful,
before proceeding to the final analysis of superpower interaction on the
basis of the behavior of both actors from both case studies, to review
Chinese initiatives and responses in the Sino-Soviet case and juxtapose
them to the four working hypotheses.
It will be recalled that Hypothesis I proposed in effect that
as its nuclear weapons inventory increased, Peking would gauge its ini-
tiatives and responses to a level well below the nuclear threshold of
the warfare escalation ladder. During the period 1968 to 1970, when
China's nuclear capability had reached modest proportions, we have not
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detected hard evidence that Peking intended to act contrary to this hy-
pothesis. Rather, at the height of the crisis in 1969, just before
border negotiations convened in Peking, the Chinese government once again
reiterated its earlier policy statement on "no first use" of nuclear
weapons
.
On the other hand, several of Peking's actions seemed to indi-
cate that the Chinese leadership might be moving somewhat closer to the
nuclear threshold than it had been earlier. Thus the Chinese were will-
ing to "rattle rockets" "by indirection": Tirana was permitted to invoke
the threat of a Chinese retaliation in case the Warsaw Pact nations cross-
ed the Albanian frontiers in late 1968.
During the Sino-Soviet border crisis in 1969, however, Peking's
direct statements were much less specific. In fact, they were highly
reminiscent of the statements Peking had used earlier during the height
of the Chinese-American crisis: their belligerence was highly ambiguous.
There is no way to ascertain whether or not the phrase "If we are attack-
ed, the war will know no boundaries" implies an intention to use nuclear
rockets. Information on the deployment/redeployment of PLA or PLAAF
nuclear delivery units during 1969, which might give more solid evidence
of an actual Chinese military response to the Soviet threat, is not
available in the public domain. Moscow leaked information on the redeploy-
ment of nuclear-armed units, perhaps as part of a prearranged and syn-
chronized psychological warfare campaign, but Peking was much more secre-
tive, or circumspect, about the activities of units in its command that
could deliver nuclear weapons. Only after the 1969 crisis had eased,
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and, in fact, after the Peking talks were beginning to indicate a few
signs of progress, was it revealed that China probably had had a few
operational MRBMs ready for launching at test sites during the crisis,
and that the PLA was deploying more MRBMs or IRBMs. Even then, the rev-
elation came from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Chinese releases.
A reasonable evaluation of these Chinese actions seems to be
that although the expansion of Chinese nuclear striking force levels
automatically moved Peking to a position where crossing the nuclear
threshold was much less difficult, the CCP leadership nevertheless re-
frained from activities that might be interpreted as involving other
than development and improvement of a Chinese deterrent. China's poli-
tical-military initiatives and responses, while more involved with the
management of a larger Chinese nuclear force, cannot, so far as we know,
be said to have heedlessly flirted with the nuclear rung of the warfare
escalation ladder.
Hypothesis II proposed that as the Chinese nuclear capability
grew, Peking would try to develop ready lines of communication with a
superpower opponent. The evidence for this hypothesis is ambiguous and
uncertain in the Soviet-Chinese case. Ambiguity arises from the fact
that since the Chinese embassy in Moscow and the Soviet embassy in Pe-
king remained staffed and operative during the crisis, and that diploma-
tic protests were rapidly transmitted after the military engagements,
it can be said that ready lines of communication were maintained with a
superpower opponent.

On the other hand, if the definition of ready lines of commun-
ication is limited to those of "hot line" genre, it must be said that an
increasing nuclear capability initially did not persuade Peking that a
"hot line" was especially necessary. Lin Piao stated that China had re-
fused Kosygin's request to talk things over on the telephone. China
apparently was adamant in avoiding such "hot line" conversations until
well into 1970, when agreement was reached on a Moscow-Peking top-level
communications link. Istvan Koermendy's report does not dispel all am-
biguity in its statement that the Moscow-Peking "hot line" had been es-
tablished, or reestablished. If this rapid communications link had ex-
isted, and been severed by Peking during the height of the crisis when
it might have been needed most, the action could be said to have con-
travened the hypothesis.
Conversely, if there had not been an earlier "hot line" link,
or if one takes a broad view of the total thrust of the Sino-Soviet
interaction, it must be concluded that Peking ultimately did move to
accept the "hot line" concept despite serious initial reservations and
reluctance. If this view is accepted, Peking's actions seem to support
the hypothesis.
Hypothesis III stated that as their strategic weapons system
inventories increased, superpowers become increasingly ready to undertake
arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower. The Sino-Soviet
experience in 1968-1970 reveals little information that would tend to
support this hypothesis. Although Peking and Moscow did conduct nego-
tiations during the period, there is no overt indication that arms control,
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in the sense of limiting nuclear missile inventories (or conventional
inventories, for that matter), was a topic under consideration.
In fact, Peking demonstrated little interest in arms control
during the period. Chinese spokesmen denounced progress on arms con-
trol elsewhere (e.g., NPT and SALT). At the end of the period of in-
quiry, Peking reiterated continuing interest in general and complete
disarmament once again. Even this renewal of a historic Chinese People's
Republic position seemed to be announced without great conviction, and it
was surrounded by an aura of impracticality under prevailing conditions.
Therefore, we must conclude that the Sino-Soviet experience
regarding arms control does not, as far as can be ascertained, support
the hypothesis.
Hypothesis IV proposed that when there is a clear and present
danger of nuclear warfare, Peking would try to lessen tensions with the
opposing superpower through discussion of crisis control measures or
strategic postures. Since China's nuclear capability had achieved much
higher potential by the 1968-1970 period, it would be expected that
Peking would make a serious effort to lessen Sino-Soviet tensions. The
record of politico-military interaction indicates that this is not
straightforwardly so.
Peking in fact acted to maintain or even heighten tension un-
til the last seven months of the period, when the Chinese adopted a slight-
ly less intransigent attitude. It was Moscow, not Peking, who urged, al-
beit amid a plethora of militancy and threat, that discussions pointed
toward the relaxation of tensions were of paramount importance. Dragging
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their feet nearly all the way to the negotiating table, the Chinese
even then refused to be very forthcoming and continued to voice displea-
sure at an alleged Soviet failure to withdraw Red Army troops an agreed
distance from disputed border areas. Events in the tacit exchange in-
dicate that Peking, although finally agreeing to talk with Moscow, had
little faith in the outcome of those discussions. Chinese war prepara-
tions therefore amplified tension while the talks were trying to diminish
it. This evidence detracts from the hypothesis.
However, the hypothesis seems to be supported by more recent
evidence. After May, 1970, the Chinese did see fit to allow the Peking
talks to show positive results. Thus Peking ultimately can be said to
have discussed crisis control measures with an opponent superpower, and
to have agreed to a few steps, at least, that lessened tensions.
In short, for a disproportionate period it seemed that the
Chinese-Soviet record in 1968-1970 would not support Hypothesis IV.
Then, in a sudden twist of circumstances, Peking did act in a manner that
tends to give credence to the hypothesis.
Having made these estimates on Chinese actions vis a vis the
hypotheses in 1968-1970, during conflictive interaction with the Soviet
Union, we are now ready to juxtapose them to the estimates made on Chinese
actions vis a vis the hypotheses in 1964-1967, during conflictive inter-
action with the United States. The concluding analysis will attempt to
highlight changes in Chinese behavior that occurred during the period of
development of the Chinese nuclear force, as well as changes in American




The Weighing of Evidence
In this concluding chapter the evidence generated in the case
studies will be compared to the hypothesized behavior of nuclear super-
powers.
The preceeding examination of very large-scale and very con-
temporary events has been conducted on the basis of incomplete informa-
tion. This is not to say that the information was insufficient. If
anything, there is such abundant information that ordering becomes a
major problem. It is to say that governmental disclosure regulations,
whether they are in effect in Peking, Moscow, or Washington, result in
valuable substantiating data being withheld, with consequent degradation
in the quality of the evidence. As a result, the case study evidence
must be regarded as circumstantial, or indicative, at best. Even cir-
cumstantial evidence can be persuasive, however, and the evidence in
the case studies may point up important strengths or weaknesses in the
hypotheses.
Most assuredly, the behavior recorded in the Chinese-American
and Chinese-Soviet case studies will not exactly conform to hypothesized
superpower behavior, if only because the Chinese nuclear weapons systems
inventory is still far smaller than the inventories of the Soviet Union
and the United States. However, it should be remembered that we are
searching mainly for early indications in superpower behavior involving
China that might be interpreted as tending toward hypothesized superpower
behavior in the future. Thus, tendencies supporting or detracting from
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the hypotheses probably will be the limiting definitions of the analysis.
As noted earlier, even should some parallel behavior occur, it would not
be in order to consider a hypothesis to be even tentatively validated.
Following the analysis of the evidence in the case studies
vis a vis the four working hypotheses, and using that analysis as a foun-
dation, it should be possible to offer revised and additional hypotheses.
Improvements on the four working hypotheses, and additional hypotheses
generated by the case studies, will be presented for consideration. These
follow-on hypotheses are offered as a possible basis for further examina-
tion of superpower interaction.
In conclusion, several issues raised by the study regarding
China specifically, and superpower interaction generally, will be present-
ed. Hopefully these issues also will be subjected to research. Unlike
the follow-on hypotheses, which can be derived from within this study,
the issues raised are derived by combining evidence from the study with
information external to it.
I. Hypotheses - Case Studies Comparison
In this comparison, changes in China's mode of international
conduct, as the PLA's nuclear weapons inventory increased along lines de-
scribed in Chapter 3, will be ascertained if at all possible. Soviet and
U.S. behavior towards China also will be monitored to ascertain whether
it differed from their behavior toward each other. The extent to which
either Moscow or Washington acted differently toward China, their nu-
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clear inferior, than toward each other, will be significant.
Hypothesis I
Hypothesis I suggested that
As their strategic weapons sys-
tem inventories increase, superpowers
are increasingly willing to gauge their
initiatives and responses to a level be-
low the nuclear threshold of the war-
fare escalation ladder.
Evidence from the pattern of military engagement, the poli-
tical dialogue, and the tacit exchange in both case studies will be
weighed in this analysis.
In the Chinese-American interaction, on the Chinese side there
was no appreciable evidence of serious preparation for offensive war with
the United States in either the conventional or nuclear sense. (Some
civil defense preparations were made and civil defense exercises were
held.) On the American side, although massive conventional and nuclear
forces were deployed in the Far East, neither U.S. military activity in
Vietnam nor the general pattern of U.S. deployment indicated a U.S. ten-
dency to approach the nuclear threshold vis a vis China.
Generally, the impressions generated by Chinese and American
military postures were reinforced in their political dialogue and by
their political activity with third powers. On the Chinese side, a few
ambiguous threats that conceivably could have been interpreted as a pro-
mise of nuclear retaliation in case of attack by the U.S. were noted.
But Peking's rubbery phraseology equally could have meant retaliation by
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Chinese-supported guerrilla activity or even Chinese-encouraged domestic
uprising.
Not ambiguous was Peking's offer to exchange "no-first-use"
pledges with Washington. The latter 's disregard of this Chinese initia-
tive indicated, if anything, that the United States might be more likely
to move toward nuclear war than would China. This seems to have been sup-
ported by indications in the irregular dialogue that the U.S. may have
employed, or at least permitted, rumors of a preemptive strike against
Chinese nuclear production facilities as part of a psychological warfare
campaign against Peking in the early stages of their conflictive inter-
action.
However, the generalized, predominating impression of Chinese-
American interaction in the period 1964-1967 is one which the disputants
were operating well below the nuclear threshold. We have noted little
disposition on the part of either Peking or Washington to run any risks
inherent in the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict situa-
tion.
In the 1968-1970 period, however, Peking's interaction with
Moscow presented a quite different picture. Here we did find evidence
of serious preparations for both conventional and nuclear war. Both of-
fensive and defensive preparations were made by both sides, and Peking
closed out the period under study by commencing a deployment of nuclear
MRBMs. Yet in the actual border battles of March-August, 1969, little
evidence was unearthed that either side was prepared to permit escala-
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tion across the nuclear threshold. There seems to have been a definite
reluctance to employ air power in the border engagements, which heavily
accented infantry and artillery. (Although neither the Soviets nor the
Chinese have developed tactical air power to the extent that American
armed forces have, the Red Air Force must be considered very proficient
in the close air support role, and a useful tool in the border conflict
if so desired by the Soviet leadership.) There were no solid indications
that the Red Army ever fired, or intended to fire, even a Frog tactical
nuclear rocket at Chinese dispositions.
On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet political dialogue, in its
irregular and polemic channels, did emphasize nuclear threat and counter-
threat. Peking's dialogue once again was highly ambiguous. Moscow did
not necessarily have to put a nuclear interpretation on Peking's more
belligerent statements. Yet Peking, speaking by indirection through
Tirana, did indulge in some "rocket rattling." However, Peking also made
it clear that Chinese nuclear weapons were to be used only in a retalia-
tory mode. The unilateral Chinese "no-first-use" statement of 1969
placed the burden of crossing the nuclear threshold squarely on Moscow.
For its part, Moscow threatened Peking with the possibility of
nuclear war in nearly every possible signalling channel between the two
capitals except that of the official statements of the top leaders in the
Kremlin. Often verbally, and in the military activity on its own side of
the border, Moscow seemed prepared to go nuclear. Yet the Soviet official
position was one of "reasonableness."
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In sum, Peking's initiatives and responses, while remaining
below the nuclear threshold, were considerably closer to it than they
had been during the Chinese-American interaction. Moscow, however,
seemed to be pushing the nuclear threshold much harder than did Peking,
and the totality of Soviet conduct toward Peking was much more pugna-
cious than Washington's had been in the earlier period.
Whether Moscow actually expected to have to cross the nuclear
threshold, either before or after Peking crossed it, is a moot point.
To the outside observer, Moscow's performance might have seemed to be one
of borrowing trouble, if not in fact one of devil-may-care riskiness.
Yet to the CPSU Politburo the Soviet posture, in all its dichotomy, may
not have seemed particularly risky or dangerous if the situation seemed
to those decisionmakers to be firmly under control.
Similarly, an outside observer might regard Peking's initia-
tives and responses toward Moscow as very chancy, perhaps as flirting
with the holocaust. Yet to the Chinese leadership the course of events
may have been regarded as an astute handling of a difficult situation
that involved little danger because they were capable of controlling the
course of events. Additionally, the Peking decisionmakers probably could
see definite advantages on the home front in overemphasizing crisis as-
pects of the border situation. Mobilization of spirit and increasing uni-
fication and national identity of the diverse Chinese population well may
prove to be beneficial resultants of the border crisis as far as the CCP
Central Committee is concerned.
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Thus the evidence on the Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet
experience between 1964 and 1970 hardly lends much support to Hypothesis
I. It is clear that the nuclear threshold was not crossed during the
examination period, yet the superpower trend seemed to be one of pressing
the nuclear threshold much more closely toward the end of the period
than during the early stages. This, by and large, may be attributed to
Soviet activities vis a vis China, for it is fairly clear that the Krem-
lin's willingness to push the nuclear threshold, if only for political
gain, is of an order of magnitude greater than either Peking's willing-
ness, or Washington's willingness, to do so. Both Peking and Washington
seemed to emphasize the retaliatory nature of their nuclear capabilities.
Moscow, on the other hand, seemed more willing to emphasize the preemp-
tive nuclear mode, thus unilaterally moving the conflict nearer to the
threshold.
This has important implications for Hypothesis I, because it
indicates that a modification of the hypothesis will be required to re-
flect international political reality more accurately.
Hypothesis II
Turning to Hypothesis II, it will be recalled that this hypo-
thesis postulated that
The larger the strategic weapons
system inventory available to a super-
power, the greater the proclivity of that
superpower to develop ready lines of com-
munication with an opponent superpower.




In both the Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet case studies
the evidence is somewhat ambiguous because of the possibility that many
or most of the crisis decisionmakers concerned believed that irregular
or even public channels of communication were sufficient to the task,
even in the crisis situations described. That is, while a "hot line"
might indeed be necessary between Moscow and Washington, the senior nu-
clear superpowers, it was less necessary between either of them and
Peking, whose nuclear force was less sophisticated.
Nonetheless, it is readily evident that both Washington and
Moscow desired a continuing dialogue with Peking, whether or not it was
conducted over a "hot line." Moreover, it seems likely that Moscow, if
not Washington, did desire a "hot line" to Peking. The latter's reluc-
tance to engage in meaningful dialogue with either superpower must have
mystified, aggravated, and disappointed both Washington and Moscow.
In fact, Peking's readiness to discontinue the Warsaw Talks,
the only available official channel of communication between China and
Washington, even as the Chinese nuclear force was coming into being,
would seem to detract from Hypothesis II. Similarly, Peking's intransi-
gence toward negotiations with Moscow, in the face of Moscow's early re-
quest for conversations in March, 1969, and in the face of what must be
considered a threatening Soviet posture, seems to be another powerful fac-
tor tending away from the concept of the hypothesis.
Yet, in the final months of the examination period, Peking did
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develop— or restablish— ready lines of communication with Moscow, and
did move to keep the Sino-Soviet Talks in Peking in session. These be-
lated Peking-Moscow decisions lend at least tentative support to the ag-
gregate thrust of Hypothesis II. Moreover, the timing of these events,
coming late in the 1964-1970 period when the Chinese nuclear force was
taking on more meaningful stature, seems to support the trend aspect of
the hypothesis.
However, these same events, particularly the phenomenon that
the neighboring Soviet Union established a permanent ready line of com-
munication with China while distant America did not, also indicate that
Hypothesis II needs modification.
Hypothesis III
Turning to Hypothesis III, it will be recalled that this hy-
pothesis dealt with arms control negotiations:
As their strategic weapons system
inventories increase, superpowers are in-
creasingly ready to undertake arms con-
trol negotiations with an opponent super-
power designed to limit or reduce arms
levels.
Evidence for this hypothesis once again can be expected to de-
rive from the diplomatic dialogue of superpower interaction, with some
additional evidence from the public political dialogue.
However, evidence on this hypothesis from the record of Chi-
nese-American and Chinese-Soviet interaction is sparse indeed. There is
no evidence whatsoever of Chinese participation in an arms control dia-
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logue with either Moscow or Washington. On the contrary, Peking both be-
gan and concluded the period of inquiry with calls for general and com-
plete disarmament, but was apparently not interested in specific arms
control measures. Moreover, Peking's calls, which occurred at opposite
ends of a six and one-half year silence, were for a major multilateral
conference on general and complete disarmament. Peking evidently did
not contemplate bilateral superpower conversations on either disarmament
or arms control matters.
It is fairly obvious that Peking's calls for general and com-
plete disarmament were oriented toward persuading public opinion that Chi-
na was not an entirely irresponsible international actor. The calls came
concurrently with Peking's atmospheric nuclear test detonations of 1964
(number one) and 1970 (number eleven) , and seemed basically designed to
counteract or offset adverse world reaction against continued atmospheric
testing by any nation, whether or not it had adhered to the three environ-
ment Test-Ban Treaty. Thus it seems fair to conclude that Peking was not
sincerely motivated toward general and complete disarmament discussions,
at least in the short term, and even less toward bi- or tri-lateral arms
control negotiations.
Ambassador Young documented that the Kennedy Administration
went into considerable detail with Peking on the U.S. philosophy and ac-




op. cit ., pp. 252-68; Supra , p. 132.
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However, a meaningful Chinese-American dialogue on arms control did not
ensue. In 1964, the Chinese call for general and complete disarmament
indicated that partial arms control steps toward that ultimate goal
2
were not acceptable to Peking.
Available information on the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Peking
does not indicate that arms control negotiations were a topic of concern.
Yet there is always some possibility that Moscow may have attempted in
some way to interest Peking in missile limitations, be they geographic,
size, range, or numerical in nature. The reported Soviet dismantling of
IRBMs in the Soviet Far East in 1970 must have had obvious implications
for Peking, but whether the Soviet move either was related to or had any
bearing on the Peking discussions falls in the category of sheer specula-
tion.
It seems reasonable to conclude that there is no evidence in
the 1964-1970 period of interaction that tends to support Hypothesis III.
Consequently, a modification of Hypothesis III seems to be necessary.
This is based on the impression that the growth of Peking's nuclear force
has not yet achieved a level sufficient to activate meaningful Chinese
arms control negotiations with either Moscow or Washington. As Andrei
Gromyko told the Chinese in 1969, quoting an old Russian proverb, "Don't
spit in the well, you may someday wish to drink the water." Accordingly,
2
Alternatively, Peking might have been stating a strong opening
position for negotiations that did not occur for other reasons. These
could include not only apprehension over the situation in Southeast Asia
but also resentment at exclusion from the United Nations.
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a modified hypothesis on superpower arms control endeavors will be pre-
sented later.
Hypothesis IV
The fourth hypothesis derived from Soviet-U.S. experience was
not predicated on a long-term trend. Rather, since it was concerned
specifically with superpower crisis control behavior, the hypothesis
stated
Superpower conflict situations which
pose a clear and present danger of nuclear
warfare (such as when general purpose forces
are engaged and escalation seems imminent, or
strategic forces are arrayed against each
other and a dispute seems insoluble by other
than military means) stimulate the superpowers
to a dialogue designed to lessen tension through
crisis control measures or explanation of stra-
tegic postures.
Evidence for this hypothesis is derived from the pattern of
military engagement and the political dialogue as examined in both case
studies.
In the Chinese-U.S. case, it is readily evident that general
purpose forces were engaged, but the possibility of escalation, although
present, was not necessarily imminent. Regardless of Peking's loud alarms
about an American attack, a U.S. transgression of the nuclear threshold
was not a likely possibility even though transient rumors to that effect
were recorded early in the period. At the strategic level, U.S. nuclear




Under these circumstances, U.S. conduct toward China seems to
have supported the hypothesis: Washington desired a continuing dialogue
to enable the powers to lessen tensions, especially through the delimita-
tion of crisis control measures. However, Chinese conduct toward Wash-
ington was not reciprocal. Thus the Chinese were unwilling to engage in
anything but sporadic private negotiations, were prone to polemical exag-
geration, and before the 1964-1967 period ended, altogether ceased talk-
ing publicly to Washington. Thus, in its apparent disinterest in a con-
tinuing dialogue at that time, Peking's behavior tends to detract from the
hypothesis.
The case study permits further analysis which, although not re-
versing the perhaps superficial aggregate impression of Chinese behavior,
tends to discount it. Thus while the diplomatic dialogue was finally dis-
continued by Peking, the move was not taken until both sides probably had
thoroughly detailed their positions and intentions through diplomatic
meetings, in the irregular dialogue, and even in the public dialogue. In
this view, a Chinese-American crisis control "arrangement" was achieved.
Thereafter, the necessity for further tension-lessening dialogue was not
crucial.
Therefore, although the evidence is highly ambiguous and actual
events do not completely conform to the hypothesis (e.g., a "continuing
dialogue..." was not held), it is submitted that the record of Chinese-




Turning to Sino-Soviet interaction in the 1968-1970 period,
much the same sort of highly tentative support for the hypothesis is re-
vealed. Moscow and Peking, while far from solving their dispute, in fact
seem to have commenced a dialogue and to have diminished tensions on their
borders.
At the height of the Sino-Soviet border crisis in 1969, it was
questionable whether a mutual withdrawal from the brink could be accom-
plished. At this stage, Moscow was acting in a manner that can be con-
strued as supporting the hypothesis at the level of official statements
although not at any other level. The Kremlin seemed intent on establish-
ing a continuing dialogue designed to alleviate Sino-Soviet tension. How-
ever, Peking's refusal to engage in negotiations with Moscow for six
months detracts from the hypothesis. Meanwhile, the escalatory military
engagement pattern, provocative signals in the irregular and polemic chan-
nels, and ominous events in the tacit exchange initiated by both dispu-
tants must have aggravated rather than alleviated tension. As noted ear-
lier, Moscow's behavior pattern was much more frightening than Peking's
during the instant case, and, moreover, than Washington's behavior during
the earlier case. The developing behavioral trend seemed destined to be
one that, if continued, would mean invalidation of the hypothesis.
Yet this dark picture changed. Peking did decide to conduct a
continuing dialogue with Moscow. A Sino-Soviet crisis control arrangement
for the border, particularly its neuralgic areas, seems to have been con-
summated although its exact terms are not known. The two powers ultimate-




Therefore, it seems reasonable to regard the evidence gathered
as tentatively supporting the hypothesis. After some consideration of
the evidence on this hypothesis vis a vis the evidence on the other three
hypotheses, it is submitted that Hypothesis IV is in fact rather persuasive
This consideration of the evidence concerning the hypotheses
forcefully illustrates that these three great international actors hardly
can be said to act consistently with at least this—and perhaps any—set
of hypothesized behavior. In some cases a superpower pair has seemed to
behave, at least tentatively, as hypothesized from the Soviet-U.S. exper-
ience. In other cases, this parallel behavior cannot be found.
Insofar as the evidence seems to support only two of four ini-
tial working hypotheses, it would seem that the acquisition of increased
numbers of strategic nuclear weapons systems does not—at least on the
basis of presently available information—have the degree of explanatory
power for superpower behavioral interaction that was initially estimated.
Cultural, ideological, political, geographic, and nonnuclear military fac-
tors inexorably continue to exert their collective and sometimes domina-
ting effects.
However, this result also indicates the likelihood of weaknesses
in the initial hypotheses. The evidence in the case studies permits some
rectification of these deficiencies.
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II. Hypotheses Derived from the Study
Hypothesis III has been shown to be least satisfactory of the
four initial hypotheses. It was not supported by the evidence. However,
we noted that future development of the Chinese nuclear force might re-
sult in the generation of further evidence regarding superpower willing-
ness to undertake arms control negotiations.
Accordingly, Hypothesis V, revising Hypothesis III, is offered:
As a superpower's nuclear weapons
system approaches parity with that of a
competing superpower, the two become more
inclined to negotiate a limit on, or re-
duction of, their nuclear force levels.
Hypothesis V more definitively states Hypothesis III. However,
the more strict definition has two inherently serious problems.
First is the problem of defining "parity." It is by no means
certain that a satisfactory definition of parity, in the connotation of
exactly equivalent nuclear force structures, can be written. There is an
exceptionally large number of variables to contend with in calculating the
possibilities of a nuclear stand-off; thus there is no assurance when
actual "parity," as opposed to numerical parity, has been achieved.
Assuming for the sake of argument that some sort of definition
of "parity" is agreed, (we might call it "working parity"), the second
problem is one of timing. It is unlikely that China will achieve either
working parity or numerical parity with either Moscow or Washington until
late in this century. Hypothesis V, therefore, becomes a subject for
testing only in the distant future.
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Hypothesis I, concerning superpower willingness to gauge diplo-
matic and military initiatives and responses below the nuclear threshold,
also was regarded as not well supported by the evidence. It was suggested
that the hypothesis could be modified to reflect international political
realities more accurately.
This modification must take into account Soviet behavior toward
China during the 1968-1970 period, when Moscow's initiatives did not seem
to be gauged appreciably below the nuclear threshold. In fact, Moscow's
initiatives vis a vis Peking had no parallel with Soviet initiatives vis
a vis Washington since 1962.
The essence of the phenomenon lies in the fact that superpowers,
like powerful states in the pre-nuclear era, occasionally may be willing
to "bully" a weaker nation in a manner they would not contemplate in
their relations with an equal. Accordingly, Hypothesis VI, modifying Hy-
pothesis I, if offered:
Superpowers are willing to gauge
their initiatives and responses at a
level well below the nuclear threshold
of the warfare escalation ladder in
their relations with an equally strong
superpower, but not necessarily in their
relations with a weaker nation.
The problem with Hypothesis VI, as with Hypothesis V, is one of
defining terms. Hypothesis VI depends on notions of superiority, parity
(or equality), and inferiority in the strategic sense, all of which are
not susceptible to precise definition. Numerical superiority, parity, and
inferiority of course may be discerned; this may be quite different from
realizing an accurate result from the calculation of a nuclear exchange
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between competing strategic forces of different composition.
Additionally, if parity could be satisfactorily defined, there
is the problem that parity between two national force levels often is a
highly transitory phenomenon. If we agree that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
had achieved "working parity" in their strategic forces in 1971, will we
continue to agree in 1972 or 1973? National strengths are relative and
dynamic. As nations grow and decline, wax or wane, their strategic force
levels occasionally may seem to be in parity. Parity may be the excep-
3
tion rather than the rule. Finally, notions of superiority, parity, and
inferiority in Hypothesis VI probably must be discounted by the McGeorge
4
Bundy thesis, a consideration further complicating straight-line testing
of the hypothesis.
Following the evolution of Hypothesis VI from Hypothesis I, and
similarly deducing from the record of Soviet activity vis a vis China in
the 1968-1970 period, it is possible to offer Hypothesis VII:
The acquisition of large nuclear
weapons systems will not necessarily
cause a nation to refrain from inter-
national risk-taking so long as its
government believes that control of
the crisis situation can be maintained
through unilateral restraint but also
through good communication with af-
fected nations.
Cf., William R. Kintner, "Comparative Costs of Security,"
Draft, mimeographed, Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 26,
1971, p. 19: "In two-power relationships parity of power has always
been a temporary condition; it never has been a lasting state of affairs."
Bundy, op. cit .; Supra . , p. 74.
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Hypothesis VII is believed to reflect the reality of recent
decisionmaker thinking in Moscow with fair accuracy, (e.g., Soviet ac-
tions on the China border in 1969; in the Middle East in 1970) and which
may to a lesser extent reflect thinking in Peking (e.g., the initial Us-
suri engagement) and earlier thinking in Washington (e.g., Dienbienphu;
Quemoy , 1958). If this is so, the continuing danger of an unexpected nu-
clear exchange must be granted a finite probability of occurring, because
hypothesized "assured governmental belief" in crisis controllability,
since it is in part subjective, may be erroneous. Thus two superpowers
involved in a crisis situation, each of whom believes in its ability to
control the crisis ultimately by its own restraint and its ability to in-
form the opponent of this decision, may suddenly find themselves in an
accidental war.
Consideration of Hypothesis II (regarding ready lines of com-
munication) indicated that even though the hypothesis seemed to be sup-
ported to a degree by the evidence, it needed modification. Accordingly,
Hypothesis VIII, an equally brief but hopefully more accurate reflection
of both Soviet-U.S. and Sino-Soviet experience, is offered:
When mutually imminent and threaten-
ing nuclear strike capabilities are achieved
by superpowers, they will move to institute
"hot line" communications.
This phraseology points up the fact that superpower decision-
makers tend to want to talk to each other after a certain point is reached
on the nuclear weapons system deployment curve. This point may be when
a nuclear exchange becomes a thinkable reality for both sides.
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This leads to a suspicion that the definition of parity which
troubles Hypotheses V and VI may be less difficult than indicated, pro-
viding that some imprecision can be tolerated. A working definition of
parity, implicit in Hypothesis VIII, might be that when a nuclear ex-
change becomes a mutually perceived realistic threat, parity has been
reached.
Hypothesis VIII may be tested within the next few years when
China deploys ICBMs. At that time, if a Washington-Peking "hot line" is
established, we may consider the hypothesis validated.
Since Hypothesis IV was believed to have been better supported
by the evidence than any of the hypotheses initially set forth, it will
not be modified.
As a result of the evaluation of evidence collected in the
case studies of superpower interaction during the period 1964-1970, we
have offered:
(i) Hypothesis V in lieu of Hypothesis III. Hypo-
thesis V has a definitional problem but seems
superior to Hypothesis III, which was unsatis-
factory.
(5) Hypotheses VI and VII in amplification of, if
not in lieu of, Hypothesis I. Hypothesis VI
has definitional problems, but should be val-
In the U.S. preliminary agitation for a Peking-Washington
"Hot Line" already has occurred. See Jes Gorkin, "U.S. -China Hot Line
—




uable. Hypothesis VII is quite specific and
may be difficult to validate, but is deemed
valuable to understanding.
(3) Hypothesis VIII to better define Hypothesis
II. Hypothesis VIII may be tested in the next
few years as China deploys ICBMs.
III. Issues Meriting Future Research
In addition to providing evidence on which the initial hypo-
theses might be evaluated, and on which modified or new hypotheses might
be generated, this inquiry has developed information which, when combined
with background knowledge, can add to our understanding of China, the So-
viet Union, the United States, and their interrelated international poli-
tical activities. The issues raised will be discussed in this concluding
section. Three major issues, concerning Chinese behavior, superpower gov-
ernmental preoccupations, and superpower conflict will be addressed, in
that order.
A. Issues Regarding China
(1) The case studies, when juxtaposed, show a number of similar
characteristics in Chinese behavior toward a threatening superpower. Not
only is Peking's use of similar terminology and similar phrases in its
invective against Washington and Moscow rather startling, but Peking's
performance vis a vis Moscow, as compared to earlier performance vis a vis
Washington, may have varied in detail but not in major thrust.
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A continuing fundamental thread is traceable in Peking's policies and
actions during the 1964-1970 period. This thread seems to be that of
Maoist doctrine originated three decades ago. In developing a strategy
against the Kuomintang, Mao reported to a meeting of senior CCP cadres
in Yenan in 1940
:
We must pay attention to the follow-
ing principles in waging struggles against
the die-hards. First, the principle of self
defense. We will never attack unless attacked;
if attacked, we will certainly counterattack. .
.
We must never attack others without provoca-
tion; but once we are attacked, we must never
fail to return the blow. Herein lies the de-
fensive nature of the struggle. As to the
military attacks of the die-hards, we must
resolutely, utterly, and completely smash
them.
Secondly, the principle of victory. We
do not fight unless we are sure of victory;
we must on no account fight without prepara-
tion and without certainty of the outcome.
We should know how to utilize the contradic-
tions among the die-hards and must not deal
blows to many sections of them at the same
time; we must pick out the most reactionary
section to strike at first. Herein lies the
limited nature of the struggle.
Thirdly, the principle of truce. After
we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards
and before they launch a new one, we should
stop at the proper moment and bring that par-
ticular fight to a close. In the period that
follows we should make a truce with them. Then
on our own initiative seek unity [i.e., peace]
with the die-hards and, upon their own consent,
conclude a peace agreement with them. We must
on no account fight on daily and hourly without
stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein
lies the temporary nature of every particular
struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new
offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle.
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In other words, the three principles
are "justifiability," "expediency," and
"restraint." Persisting in justifiable,
expedient, and restrained struggles, we
can develop the progressive force, win over
the middle-of-the-road forces , isolate the
die-hard forces and make the die-hard chary
of heedlessly attacking us.. -And we can in
this way win a favorable turn in the situa-
tion. 6
In a current global context, the die-hards may be considered
as both the Soviet social-imperialists and the American capitalist im-
perialists and their camps, while the progressive forces are China, its
allies and sympathizers, and *the middle-of-the-road forces are all other
nations, organizations, and peoples. China, through the 1964-1970 period,
emphasized defense and the return of a blow. China did not fight exten-
sively since victory was hardly assured—defeat probably seemed more
certain. Chinese leaders emphasized preparation for war. Peking tried to
emphasize the contradictions between the die-hard leaders (Moscow and
Washington are contending as well as colluding). Peking exercised the
principle of truce (at the September 11, 1969 Peking Airport meeting) and
appears to have sought to establish temporary peace with the Soviet Union
(Mao's May Day, 1970, initiative). Last, Peking tried to make the die-
hards chary of attacking China by proceeding with strategic weapons sys-
tem development.
Mao Tse-tung, "Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japan-
ese United Front," Selected Works , Vol. Ill, London: Lawrence and Wis-
hart, 1954, p. 198, quoted in Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoy :
Mao, Chiang, and Dulles , Salt Lake City: University of Utah Institute of
International Studies, 1959, p. 4. The die-hards were the Chinese-Na-
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This accumulation of parallels seems to indicate that at least
in the case of China under Mao, doctrine may be considered as predictive
of international behavior. This postulate seems worthy of further test-
ing, either against future Chinese behavior or against the behavior of
other nations which ostensibly operate on a doctrinal base.
(2) However, it should be noted that in the modern world
Peking has experienced major difficulty in selecting the most reaction-
ary section of the die-hards. This selection is essential to Mao's 1940
doctrine, because the section of most reactionary die-hards must be the
g
first object of the party's attention. To Peking in the 1960s, there
was great difficulty in determining whether Moscow or Washington should
be the primary object of attention. It has been noted that this was a
principal issue of the Cultural Revolution. At least until May, 1970,
it seems apparent that Mao regarded Moscow as enemy number one, as did
his close associates. Even so, they seemed to draw a somewhat narrow
distinction between Moscow and Washington. Chen Yi said
tionalists, the middle-of-the-road forces were the middle bourgeoisie,
the enlightened gentry, and groups independent from Chiang, and the pro-
gressive forces were the proletariat, the peasantry, and urban petty bour-
geoisie. This Maoist doctrine foreshadowed Mao's strategy of the "one-by-
one solution." See his speech "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are
Paper Tigers," Current Background , No. 534, November 12, 1958, p. 11.
Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao Tse-tung," Com-
parative Politics , Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1971), pp. 323-60, at p. 327,
asserts that while not always successful, Mao has attempted to make pol-
icy-making procedures conform to his doctrine. Following from this, it
might be presumed that Mao in fact tried to have policy itself, not only
policy-making procedures, conform to doctrine.
8
Cf. , Ibid . , p. 348.
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The Americans are bastards, but
honest bastards. The Russians are
liars and traitors."
However, after the Cambodian incursion by U.S. and South Vietnamese for-
ces, which may have made Peking less willing to regard Americans as hon-
est, Moscow may have had to share equal billing with Washington as enemy
number one.
This raises another issue worthy of further study: what acti-
vities by a nation predict or lead to a change in its classification by
another nation as a friend or an enemy? Put another way, what are the
accepted bounds on international political activity by superpowers, mid-
dle powers, and lesser states which permit them to maintain their current
relationships?
(3) The preceeding discussion emphasizes that Chinese strategy
under Mao has been one of achieving political gain from positions of mili-
tary inferiority. Reducing the Maoist phenomena to this essence and mea-
suring it against Chinese gains, the conclusion that Mao may someday be
ranked as one of the great strategic genuises of history is inescapable.
Some mainland Chinese, of course, apparently already hold Mao
in this regard, partly as a result of regime agitation and propaganda,
but partly because they realize that despite many breakdowns and short-
Chen Yi, quoted in "Bastards, Traitors, and Heretics," The
Economist
,
(London), March 8, 1969. I have been unable to find a direct
citation for this statement by Chen in Chinese translations or sources
available to me.
The opposite case can be made, of course. This is that the
Cambodian incursion solidified communist forces in Southeast Asia and
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comings Mao has managed to coalesce a contankerous , divergent, but talent-
ed populace to a degree heretofore unknown. The same realization seems
to be filtering among overseas Chinese.
In his quest for unity, power, and resurgent glory for China,
even if these be only by-products of his inner vision of an improved
life for the long-suffering Chinese peasant and workman, Mao's strategy
for making political gain from a position of military inferiority seems
to compare favorably with the contemporary but shorter-lived effort of
Charles de Gaulle and to the historic but equally protracted effort of
Bismarck. This suggests that a detailed comparison of these three lea-
ders, including their methods, attitudes, and milieu, would be valuable
to an improved understanding of the impact of great men on the interna-
tional political process.
B. Issues Regarding Superpower Governmental Preoccupations
The categorization scheme selected for presenting the case
studies has singled out the importance of events in the tacit exchange,
highlighting the fact that superpowers observe opponent interaction with
third powers with great intensity. Therefore, it is possible to list
three major preoccupations of superpower governments:
pushed them into Peking's arms. If Peking perceived the situation in this
way, it would not have been particularly aggravated by Cambodian events.
These preoccupations of course are applicable across the board,
in varying degree, to the governments of all nations.
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1) Problems or requirements of the domestic scene.
2) Problems or requirements directly posed by oppo-
nent superpowers, particularly tension amplify-
ing activity in the military or political chan-
nels of interaction.
3) Problems or requirements posed by opponent super-
power interaction with the third superpower.
The case studies illustrate that each of the superpowers seems
to place a different priority on these governmental preoccupations. Thus
the governing stimuli for Chinese responses throughout both periods seemed
to come from the following sources, in order of priority:
(2) Opponent political-military tension amplifying
activity (first the U.S., then the Soviet threat).
(1) Chinese domestic political requirements.
(3) Developments in the tacit exchange.
Peking was shrewdly persistent in linking one solution to the first two
preoccupations. Thus Chinese-proclaimed threats of Soviet or U.S. ag-
gression, whether or not factually-based, helped mobilize and unify the
populace and perhaps distract it from everyday irritants. Admittedly it
is questionable whether domestic requirements occasionally were not at
first priority over all foreign problems in Peking's view. Certainly
they may have been so considered at the height of the Cultural Revolu-
tion. As far as the third priority for developments in the tacit ex-
change is concerned, this seems correct despite the great Chinese procli-
vity to denounce all so-called evidence of Soviet-U.S. collusion. It is
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suggested that Peking's rationale for this may be less concerned with ac-
tual collusion than it is with scoring points in the dispute with Moscow.
In contrast to the Chinese situation, the same governing sti-
muli for Soviet responses seem to be acted on in a different priority:
(2) Opponent political-military tension amplifying
activity, particularly Chinese.
(3) Developments in the tacit exchange.
(1) Soviet domestic political requirements.
Soviet leaders also have shrewdly linked foreign developments to the do-
mestic scene. They are aware that foreign threats or diversions can uni-
fy and mobilize the U.S.S.R. behind their programs. It is also true that
the Kremlin has been giving increasing priority to domestic requirements,
moving to satisfy demands of the consumer sector. Nonetheless, it seems
evident that the CPSU remains in such firm control over Soviet society
that it can afford to concentrate on the foreign scene, particularly on
Chinese and U.S. activities. The total picture of Soviet resource allo-
cation, even though in the process of change, continues to emphasize mili-
tary power.
In the U.S., a startling reordering of priorities is noted af-
ter 1967. In the 1964-1967 period, U.S. preoccupations can be regarded as
ordered in this priority:
(2) Chinese politico-military tension amplifying activity.
(3) Developments in the tacit exchange (the Sino-Soviet
dispute)
.
(1) U.S. domestic political requirements.
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According to President Johnson, there were no priorities assigned. All
stimuli were regarded equally. The U.S. would have guns as well as but-
ter. In 1968 and subsequently, however, it is obvious that U.S. govern-
mental preoccupational priorities have been
(1) U.S. domestic political requirements.
(2) Opponent political-military tension amplify-
ing activity (primary concern: U.S.S.R.; secon-
dary concern: China).
(3) Developments in the tacit exchange (the Sino-
Soviet dispute).
It should be noted in passing that the U.S. tendency to turn inward as a
result of the trauma of Vietnam (the "Vietnam Syndrome") may be regarded
as a delayed substantiation of Mao's prediction of 1965, making his at-
12
tempt at prophesy appear somewhat more favorable.
However, the significance of this phenomena, in which each of
three superpowers can be said to differently order its priorities of pre-
occupation between foreign and domestic requirements, may be that so long
as the superpowers do not achieve a parallel ordering, world stability is
unlikely. Should Moscow, Peking, and Washington simultaneously decide to
give first priority to their domestic situation (e.g., if all were to
"turn inward"), a more relaxed period in world politics might follow.










rangement or understanding on "spheres of abstention." Such an under-
standing when one or more superpowers is exhibiting expansionist tenden-
cies, in influence if not in attributable territorial aggrandizement, is
remote.
However, another possibility for simultaneous superpower or-
dering of preoccupational priorities, which might also promote a more re-
laxed period in world politics, can be posed. Each of the three powers
might begin to act predominantly according to its perception of develop-
ments in the tacit exchange. That is, if each power were to move so as
to counteract moves made by the other two which tended to coalesce their
aims and programs to the detriment of the first, a triangular balance
might be achieved.
The case studies have marked a tendency for each of the three
powers to play a balancing role. We have been repeatedly reminded that
Peking regarded Moscow and Washington in collusion against China. Our
account contains numerous Soviet assertions that Washington and Peking
were colluding against Moscow. We have been made well aware of the U.S.
perception of a Sino-Soviet anti-imperialist monolith. More important
to the analysis than these propagandistic assertions or stereotypes, how-
ever, are actual moves made by each of the three nations in regard to
both the others.
Peking's moves are perhaps the most interesting. Briefly, it
13
Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss , Controlling Small
Wars: A Strategy for the 1970'
s
,
New York: A. A. Knopf, 1969, pp. 351, 412,
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has been illustrated in the case studies that whenever the Sino-Soviet
situation seemed especially threatening, as after the Warsaw Pact in-
vation of Czechoslovakia during the fall and winter, 1968-1969, and again
in the winter of 1969-1970 when Soviet political and military pressure on
Peking was high despite the fact that negotiations with Moscow were in
progress, the Chinese moved to resume formal discussions with the United
States in Warsaw. One can question Peking's timing—why did China not
request reopened discussions at Warsaw during the outright border conflict
of spring and summer, 1969?—but not Peking's political tactics. The
Chinese were emphasizing to Moscow that they, too, were able to deal with
Washington, possibly to Soviet disadvantage.
A similar phenomenon has occurred quite recently. In the spring
of 1971, as increasingly sharp Sino-Soviet polemics indicated a down-turn
in their relations, Peking initiated a political gambit at the people-to-
people rather than state diplomatic level. China's "ping-pong diplomacy"
with the United States must have been a meaningful signal to Moscow, and
in any case can be regarded as a tour de force in the annals of diplomacy.
On the other hand, we have recorded that Peking's expression of
disapproval and perhaps a feeling of apprehension over increased American
unpredictability over the Cambodian incursion in May, 1970, was accom-
panied by an ever so slight, and, as it turned out, temporary Chinese move
toward Moscow. Less than a year later, Peking had moved away from Moscow
and toward Washington again.
Moscow's activities during the period encompassed by the case
studies can be viewed as attempts, by fair means or foul, to restore the.

322
once vaunted Soviet-Chinese partnership, to reaffirm the socialist al-
liance against the United States and its allies. Because of the dras-
tically changed Sino-Soviet relationship, it is possible that at least
some in Moscow may not have believed the prospects for this restoration
to be very favorable. It is also possible that because of greatly in-
creased Soviet strategic strength in the late 1960s, the Kremlin is no
longer placing as high a priority on the alliance.
Nonetheless, a pattern in Soviet political moves can be dis-
cerned: when Soviet-Chinese fortunes ebb, Soviet-U.S. or Soviet-European
14
relations are brightened by a shiny Soviet initiative. The reverse al-
so seems true. Although this was not brought out in the case studies, it
is believed to be demonstrable that when the Sino-Soviet situation began
to look-up ever so slightly in 1970, Moscow's attitude toward Washington
began to harden. In 1971, as Sino-Soviet relations seemed to be turning
downward, Moscow seemed to relax somewhat toward Washington.
During the 1964-1967 period Washington's posture toward Peking
evolved to a considerable degree from the traditional hard-line anti-
Chinese U.S. attitude. This evolution has continued, and now shows little
tendency toward reversal barring an unexpected hostile act by Peking.
The Administration has perceived that it would not be in the U.S. best in-
terest to treat one center of a polycentric Communism differently than ano-
ther. Washington has moved slowly to equalize trade regulations applica-
14
In 1970, the Soviet Westpolitik
,
presumably given impetus in
part by the Chinese problem, coincided with Chancellor Brandt's Ostpoli-
tik . Result: a Soviet-West German renunciation-of-force agreement that
profoundly affected the long-stalemated European political climate.
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ble to Communist-governed nations. It has become official U.S. policy
to not take sides in any Sino-Soviet conflict.
These moves by each of the three capitals indicate that they
are seeking a balancing role, hoping thereby to be able to protect their
interests without resort to force.
How successful might they be? Each of the three nations has
had some historic experience at manipulating a balance of power situation
and some have done better than others, a subject we cannot address here.
Besides, times have changed. The cast of characters if different, as are
their costumes and their ideologies. We must postulate at least a finite
possibility that the three mutually could achieve a balance and avoid the
abyss of war.
The three powers may be viewed as aerialists balanced on a
frame mounted atop a great tower—they must interact in a very coordinated
manner or their frame will become destabilized, and, in company with the
aerialists, fall to the ground. But aerialists can see and communicate
and feel the results of the others' moves immediately, and therefore re-
spond rapidly and accurately to adjust their collective balance. In-
ternational diplomacy unfortunately exhibits many of the opposite charac-
teristics: nations keep secrets from each other, they often refuse to
speak to each other, and their perceptions of moves by the others have
been regularly in error. Aerialists must perform successfully in order
to earn their living. National decisionmakers, on the other hand, may
deem it advantageous, within limits, to upset an existing equilibrium.

324
Once this is done, for however limited an aim, the prevalence of misper-




political performance indicates that there is a fairly high probability
that the other states concerned may act so as to further destabilize the
equilibrium rather than restore it.
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Therefore, if international relaxation as a result of super-
power abstention or of attempts to achieve a new international balance
is not entirely a hopeful prospect, continued turmoil involving dispute,
if not conflict, must be expected. What issues do the case studies raise
regarding superpower conflict?
C. Issues Regarding Superpower Conflict
Patterns and Future Prospects
A recent analysis of international conflict, addressed to the
interaction of developing nations, has modelled the experience of local
conflict in six phases: Phases One through Five describe a dispute; Phase
Six denotes settlement. Within the first five phases, Phases Two through
Four are considered conflict phases, and within these three phases, Phase
Three alone is characterized by open hostilities.
This model clearly is applicable to superpower conflict. The
authors have intimated its applicability across the spectrum of interna-
tional conflict, regardless of the national characteristics (e.g., size,
population, technology) of the principal disputants.
The case studies of superpower politico-military interaction
lend themselves to inclusion in a conflict model—and result in some un-
expected patterns.
Bloomfield and Leiss , op. cit
.
, pp. 12-31, Appendix A.
Ibid
. ,
p. 15, the Bloomfield-Leiss Hypothesis (2): "All con-
flicts go through a preliminary dispute phase (Phase I) and one or more
of three basic conflict phases."
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In order to more precisely categorize the superpower con-
flictive experience, it is first necessary to establish strict limits
on Phase Three, Hostilities. One criterion for Phase Three might be the
requirement that hostilities must include at least several sequential oc-
currences of actual combat between armed units in which either or both
sides experience more than thirty casualties. This requirement excludes
occasional or sporadic aerial clashes and their resultant losses of air-
craft and crews.
Of three bilateral sets of superpower interaction, according to
this criterion, the U.S. -Soviet set has never proceeded from Phase Two,
(pre-hostilities , but dispute seen in military terms) into Phase Three
(hostilities), while both the Chinese-American set (in 1950) and the Chi-
nese-Soviet set (in 1969) did move into Phase Three.
Changing the criterion for Phase Three to one of, at a minimum,
one aerial interception and shoot-down, changes the pattern. Under this
criterion each of the three superpower sets has proceeded into Phase Three,
However, note the dates of entry into Phase Three under the criterion:
U.S. -Soviet hostilities: latest instance 1960
U.S. -Chinese hostilities: latest instance 1968
Chinese-Soviet hostilities: latest instance 1969
Under either criterion, the patterns for entering Phase Three
seem to indicate that the senior superpower set, the United States and
the Soviet Union, have achieved a somewhat higher degree of stability




Therefore, we might expect that as Chinese nuclear strength
continues to develop, the degree of stability exhibited in the Sino-
Soviet and Chinese-American relationships will be improved.
It may be argued that either Soviet or American nuclear devel-
opments will always be able to outpace the growth of the Chinese nuclear
force unless the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. perceive that they have reached a
saturation point. In succeeding years, therefore, while Chinese nuclear
growth may be absolute, China might fall further behind the senior super-
powers by comparative measure. Yet as more Chinese MRBMs and IRBMs come
into service, and, more importantly, as Chinese hardened-ICBM and SLBM
systems are deployed, Moscow and Washington decisionmakers will have to
reckon with the finite probabilities of a Chinese second strike deterrent.
It is submitted that the caution imposed on them thereby also may enhance
stability in Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-American interaction.
Superpower Involvement in Local Conflict
A final issue concerns superpower involvement in local conflict.
The studies of local conflict have illustrated that these conflicts often
do not proceed through all six dispute-conflict phases. Many local con-
flicts remain in Phases Four (post-hostilities, but conflict [military op-




, Hypotheses V, VI, and VIII above.
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When local conflicts have proceeded sequentially through the
phases from One to Settlement, the transition from one phase to another
has been hastened or slowed by the intervention of one or more super-
18
powers.
Opposed to this observation on local conflicts, superpower dis-
putes or conflicts are far from achieving Settlement and, in fact, are
stalled somewhere in the area of Phases Two, Three, or Four. This ap-
plies regardless of which superpower set is examined. The obvious reason
for this inertia is that the superpowers themselves operate under no su-
perior influences spurring them toward Settlement. If there is to be a
Settlement, they must arrange it among themselves. They have not been es-
pecially efficient in so doing in the paired conflict situations encoun-
tered heretofore.
Moreover, the superpower task of achieving settlement or self-
regulation is immeasurably complicated by situations in which the inter-
ests of more than two superpowers are involved. The case in point, of
18
Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit
. , pp. 28-29, Factor 13. It
should be noted that out of fifty-four local conflict situations since
World War II involving actual or potential application of force that




p. 405. Of. the analytical approach by Morton
A. Kaplan proceeding from the systemic level through the superpower
level to the local conflict level in his essay "Intervention in Inter-
nal War: Some Systemic Sources" in James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Interna-
tional Aspects of Civil Strife
,




course, is Vietnam, or, in the broader sense, Indochina. The case stu-
dies of superpower conflictive interaction have featured Vietnam as an
important continuing thread.
The Vietnam conflict can be considered as being caught up in a
three-way superpower dispute. The superpowers in dispute, having fastened
on Vietnam, have proven unable to find a way to move toward Settlement and
therefore have doomed that conflict to remain in Phase Three.
It is unquestionable that the Vietnamese nations, if not all of
Indochina, have been victimized by a three-way superpower unwillingness
and inability to move their own complex disputes/conflicts toward Settle-
ment. Vietnam's population and terrain have been hostages to superpower
intransigence.
How could Vietnam conflict have been moved toward Settlement by
the superpowers? A number of options come to mind:
1. By a trilateral superpower arrangement on Indochina imposed
either politically or economically, or both, on Hanoi and Saigon. This
arrangement might be either overtly or tacitly achieved.
2. By a Peking-Washington arrangement to terminate aid to their
clients, forcing the burden for supporting the war on Moscow, which might
not be willing to bear sole responsibility for its continuation.
3. By a Washington-Moscow arrangement to the same ends vis a vis
Peking.
4. By a Sino-Soviet agreement to terminate aid to Hanoi, in-




5. By a Sino-Soviet agreement to provide all-out aid to Hanoi,
including advisors and troops, thus presenting Washington with a situa-
tion in which Saigon necessarily would have to acquiesce in Hanoi's de-
mands unless superpower hostilities over Indochina were deemed an ac-
ceptable alternative.
19
However, none of these alternatives has been feasible as yet;
there seems to be little prospect of future feasibility. In this regard,
it should be noted that the current U.S. program of Vietnamizing the Indo-
china conflict does not move it toward Settlement. While removing U.S.
troops from combat, Vietnamization is as likely to mean an indefinite
extension of conflict as it is a lessening of it.
On the other hand, if a reduction of the U.S. military presence
in Asia, which presumably is supposed to follow from the Nixon Doctrine,
results in improved relations between Washington and Peking, and if the
Peking talks result in improved Sino-Soviet relations (lessened competi-
tion) between those two poles of power, there may be some possibility for
realization of the first alternative.
If the superpowers ultimately sponsor or otherwise permit an In-
dochina settlement, does it follow that the cessation of conflict in this
historic battleground will be the end of war in our time? President Nixon
19
For example, it can be deduced that one of Peking's objectives
in Vietnam has been to keep the U.S. involved, draining its energies,
morale, and resources without endangering China. See David P. Mozingo,
"China's Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution," Conference Papers
,
Seventh International Conference on World Politics
,




20hopefully predicts that this may be so.
An appreciation of the analysis of superpower interaction hardly
affords much optimism over this type of prediction. While the evidence
and analysis has indicated that the apocalypse of a nuclear exchange may
be avoided by the superpowers, given a measure of prudence, reflection,
and restraint, the contending nature of their goals and the disparate
nature of their behavior in trying to achieve them indicate that occasion-
al conflict, probably by proxy forces, is likely.
20
President Nixon, interview with C.L. Sulzberger on March 9,
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